46. 18. 60

THE TRVE ORIGINALL OF THE SOVLE.

Proving both by divine and naturall reason, that the production of mans Soule is neither by creation nor propagation, but a certain meane *way between both.*

Wherein the doctrine of originall sinne, and the purity of Christs Incarnation, is also more fully cleared then hath been heretofore *published.*

By *H. W.* B. D.

PSAL. 139. 14.

I will praise thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marveilous are thy workes, and that my soule knoweth right well.

LONDON,
Printed by *T. Paine*, and *M. Symmons.*
1641.

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TO
THE RIGHT
HONOVRABLE
WILLIAM FENIS,
Viſcount *Say* and *Sele*,
Maſter of the Court of
Wards and Liveries,
and one of his Maje-
ſties moſt Honou-
rable privie
Councell.

SO great is the unhappineſſe of our times, right Honourable, wherein men

have been rather led by affection, than judgement, that a bare *ipse dixit* hath with most men easily gained the authoritie of a truth. Hereby able wits have been discouraged, Arts have lost much lustre, and the World more light.

This ensuing Treatise, being a poore Orphant, that it might be secured from such prejudice, the Epidemical distemper of our times, I thought best humbly to shrowd under your Honours protection, to the intent also

tha

that they who will not receive a naked truth for it ſelfe, may embrace it for the beauty it ſhall derive from ſo noble a Patron. Vouchſafe then, Right Honourable, as to accept it, together with this my humble and thankfull acknowledgement (the beſt coine I have) of all your favours toward my ſelfe & ſtock whence I ſprang: ſo to pardon my boldneſſe in interrupting you.

The God of the ſpirits of all fleſh, bleſſe your Lordſhip, your ho-

nourable Lady, & hopefull of-ſpring, in the fatneſſe of the earth, and dew of heaven, and after lead you to that place where the ſpirits of juſt men made perfect, take ſanctuary, which ſhall be the daily prayer of

Your Honours in all

humility to be commanded,

ELIAS PALMER.

To the Reader.

WHether this Treatiſe (*compoſed by M^r.* Henry Woolnor) *were to ſatisfie himſelfe rather, or the curious world, I cannot ſay. He was early arreſted by ſudden death, that ſent him hence a priſoner to his grave: Theſe papers* (*containing his* Eſſay of the Soules originall) *were brought to mine hands, for their birth, all the intereſt I ſhall challenge therein: A diſcourſe that may be as profitable, as it is deſireable, though in it ſelfe very ſub-*

lime and remote from the ſenſes, yet levelled to the plaineſt capacitie, that none, I hope, will depart it unreſolv'd.

To ſpeake any thing of this ſubject definitively, is as farre beyond mine intentions, as my buſineſſe, but ſhall as beſt becomes me, humbly ſubmit to the cenſure of the learned; whoſe counſels and encouragements gave not only being, but lengthned out mine intentions toward the Preſſe. As for others whoſe indigeſted notions cannot admit of ſuch a ſpeculation, nor can therfore be competent Judges in a matter beyond their ſphære, let them be ſober; as God diſtributes to every one, Rom. 12. μέτρον πίστεως, *a meaſure of, or in the faith. Farewell.*

ELIAS PALMER.

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A TREATISE PHILOSOPHICALL,

Containing

The true Originall of the SOULE.

Wherein is laboured to prove both by divine and naturall reason, that the production of mans Soule, is neither by Creation nor Propagation, but a certaine meane way betweene both.

CHAPTER I.

The use of this Question, and how it is to be handled.

AMong the many intricate questions wherein the Church of GOD hath almost lost it selfe in this last

The difficulty and necessitie of this doctrine.

last age of the world, there is none more difficult to know and more necessary to be knowne, than that which concerneth the *Soules originall*. *The difficulty* appeares in that so many worthies who have entered into this Labyrinth, could never yet finde a cleare way out of it againe. *The necessitie*, in that there are so many necessary points in divinitie depending upon this, which cannot be well cleared without it, especially the doctrine of *originall sinne*, and the immortality of the soule, which are two of the maine principles of Christian Religion.

The possibilitie of knowing it.

But some perhaps will say, who then shall undertake that which no man ever yet could performe? It is true indeed, I say so too: and so in a manner say all. And thus under a colour of modesty and humilitie, wee are all hindered from seeking that which happily might other-

therwiſe be found. I reply therefore on the cõtrary, why ſhould we not attempt it. They are not alwayes the learnedſt men that find out the greateſt myſteries: neither are they alwayes the greateſt men, by whom God bringeth the greateſt things to paſſe. Sure I am, the promiſe is made to the godly, not to the great; & it is Gods uſuall courſe to produce the greateſt effects by the moſt unlikely inſtruments, that the power and praiſe may be of God, and not of man. Certaine it is, there is a truth if we could find it: For God will prove himſelfe true, though every man be a lyar, and therefore if any miſtake be, the fault is in our ſelves. This I hold as one principle. Againe, looke what God hath ſpoken in his Word, the ſame he hath wrought in the world: he doth not ſay one thing and doe another: but his word & his works agree,

Ioh. 7. 17.

2 Cor. 4. 7

Rom. 3. 4.

agree, and this I hold as a ſecond principle. Laſtly, I doubt not but in this controverſall age God is about to refine the Chriſtian Religion, and to reveale ſecrets that have beene hitherto hidden: and ſeeing many other myſteries are daily cleared, why ſhould not this alſo? ſeeing that God which giveth an heart to undertake, can give power to performe; let men ſay & thinke what they will, I ſhall not therefore faile, through his aſſiſtance, to doe my beſt indeavour.

Curioſitie to be avoided.

Two extreames notwithſtanding I confeſſe are in this matter to be avoided: Curioſity and Negligence. Firſt, Curioſitie: It is ſtrange how mans nature is affected to noveltie, ſo divine a thing is knowledge, that even innocency it ſelfe was ambitious of it; it coſt *Adam* a fall, as we know. Neverthleſſe, ſecret things belong to God, and onely things revealed to us and our children

Deut. 29. 29.

children. Where God hath not a tongue to ſpeake, we may not have an eare to heare; when he is ſparing in revealing, we muſt be ſparing in enquiring; forbidden fruit may not be taſted; and when God hath ſet us limits, we may not paſſe our bounds, leaſt we die; Being creatures we muſt ſubmit our ſelves to our Creator: and if we will be Chriſtians, faith muſt ſatisfie where reaſon cannot. And good reaſon there is it ſhould be ſo, both for our humiliation and triall. To *humble* us when we ſhall ſee our reaſon non-pluſt, even in matters of greateſt conſequence, and to *try* our faith in mounting above reaſon, when it ſhall appeare that wee rely more upon Gods word then our own fancy. Now that the ſoule is immortall, and that all men are ſtained with originall ſinne: are things moſt certaine, for the Scripture plainly affirmes them: And if the originall

Gen. 2. 17.

Exod. 19. 12.

originall of the ſoule be doubtfull, yet even reaſon teacheth, that it is altogether madneſſe to reject a certaine truth for uncertaine. Juſtly therefore is their curioſity to be condemned, who are wondrous inquiſitive to know whence the ſoule came, but care not at all whither it goes. Indeed deſiring to ſee cauſe of doubting in the one, that they may have the more libertie to be careleſſe in the other.

Cautions to be obſerved.

Yet is not this ſo to be underſtood, as if we were not to ſeeke after any thing, but that which is manifeſt in the Scripture, for ſo we ſhall not need to ſeeke at all. Neither is every queſtion curious, which may ſeem to be ſo: but that indeed is a curious queſtion, which is either needleſſe, or not revealed. Nor how needfull this preſent queſtion about the ſoules originall is, no man doubteth, the onely *quære* is, whither

whither it be revealed or no; and indeed many thinke it is not. But beſides that all things are not revealed at once; we muſt know that God reveales things two wayes: either by his word, or by his works. Now as many things are not to be found in the booke of the creatures, are yet manifeſt in the booke of the Scriptures. So many things that are not mentioned in the word, are yet manifeſt in the works of God. It is our dutie therefore to ſearch both. But divine things are to be ſought eſpecially in the former, and naturall (as this is) in the latter, yet ſtill comparing both together. If therefore this truth can be found in either, then it is revealed: neither can we ſay, it is a ſecret, untill both be throughly ſearched. And becauſe there is a depth in both paſt finding out, therefore we muſt exerciſe our ſelves in them day and night; and

and never leave ſearching, I meane for things needfull, ſo long as the world endureth, and in this cauſe where God is ſparing in revealing, it is to make us the more diligent in ſearching and enquiring.

For as Curioſitie on the one hand, ſo negligence on the other is alſo to be avoided. And not onely in regard of thoſe fundamentall doctrines which doe ſo neerly depend upon it, the overthrowing of which would overturne all Religion, but alſo in regard of the godly themſelves, both to ſtay their minds in this wavering age, and to cut off thoſe doubts and unbeſeeming motions, which through Sathans malice, and our owne corruption, are too apt to ariſe even in the hearts of Gods beſt children; and laſtly, to ſtop the mouths of wicked men and Atheiſts, who are ready upon all occaſions to blaſpheme GOD, and

and make a mocke of Religion. For the ſhunning of ſuch difficulties as theſe, under a colour of modeſty, and to avoid curioſity, or the like, gives them occaſion of ſuſpition, that there is ſome ſecret fraud which we are afraid to diſcover, in all points of controverſie therefore ſo much as is manifeſt in the word. I certainly beleeve, though reaſon ſeemes againſt it, and withall I know that it is not for me to queſtion the doctrine, but to blame mine owne ignorance, and ſo ſet my ſelfe to ſearch, not becauſe I doubt, but becauſe I doe beleeve the truth. And this we may and muſt performe as well for our owne ſatisfaction, as the edification of others.

Neither may the difficulty diſcourage us, but rather whet on our diligence ſo much the more: wherin for our comfort, ſo long as we maintaine that the ſoule is ſo produced (whither immediately

ately from God, or mediately from man) that it is of an immortall nature, and yet ſtained with originall ſin, according to the Scriptures: what ever we determine of the manner, we are out of danger of hereſie, though perhaps ſubject to error. Neither yet may the feare of being cenſured for preſumption or curioſitie, hinder the ſober ſearch of it; which though it cannot juſtly for the former reaſons, yet can hardly be avoided: not onely becauſe ſome lazy perſons would gladly free themſelves of that labour, by calling it curious, but alſo conſidering the intricate niceneſſe of it, which is ſuch indeed as may ſeeme to be handled curiouſly, and yet without curioſitie; yea, curiouſneſſe it ſelfe is no curioſitie in ſuch a curious (though neceſſary) queſtion. Wherefore taking Philoſophy on the one hand, and Divinitie on the other hand, to leade me,

me, & craving the light of Gods Spirit to direct me, I will set my selfe unto it: resolving so God may be glorified, not much to care who is offended.

CHAP. II.

Whether the originall of the Soule may be perfectly knowne in this life.

BUt before I proceede any further, I must preadmonish my Reader, not to thinke to attaine perfect knowledge herein in this life: not yet to thinke it strange that he cannot. For how doe we thinke it is possible to know how the soule is made before it is: when we cannot conceive what it is after it is made? For albeit we know it is a spirituall substance, truly subsisting, yet what manner of metaphysicall matter, it is impossible for any man to conceive. Nor seeing we

we doubt not but that we have ſoules, though we know them not, and are no whit troubled that we doe not know them: why ſhould we doubt, or thinke it ſtrange, becauſe we cannot finde out their originall, which muſt needs be harder than the other.

Reaſons why the Soules originall cannot perfectly be known.

Yet leaſt this ignorance ſhould more trouble than the knowledge will doe us good (if reaſon will be ſatisfied with reaſon) I will make it appeare, that it is not onely reaſonable ſo to be, but impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe: For firſt there is no perfect knowledge to be had of any thing in this life. Whatſoever hath any being, hath ſuch a ſecret dependance on God, the firſt being as no man is able to comprehend. And if it be ſo in thoſe things we are beſt known unto us, how much more muſt it needs be ſo in thoſe things which we have leaſt knowledge of. Second-

Secondly, the ſoule is a ſpirit, and ſpirits are ever more difficult to judge of than corporall ſubſtances: not being ſubject to ſenſe, as anon we ſhall ſee. Thirdly, the ſoule is an incompleat ſpirit, being but part of a creature. And therefore more difficult to be knowne: for as is the thing knowne, ſuch is our knowledge of the thing, if that be imperfect, our knowledge is imperfect alſo: and therefore by like reaſon, the ſoule being an incompleate ſpirit, we can have but an incompleate knowledge of it. Fourthly, this queſtion concernes the exiſtence of the ſoule. Now the exiſtence of any thing is harder to know then the eſſence, and conſequently thoſe queſtions that concern the exiſtence are more difficult then thoſe that concerne the eſſence. And therefore if it be impoſſible for us in this life perfectly to know the eſſence of the ſoule,

it must needs be so much the more impossible to know the originall.

What knowledg men have of spirits.

And to make yet this more plaine to every mans apprehension, let us a little compare the faculty of knowing with the nature of the things to be knowne: For as the consideration of the faculties of spirits, doe not a little helpe to finde out their natures, so by the nature of the soule, we shall better judge of this faculty of understanding. And first, touching the whole man: we know that man is a mixt creature, consisting of two natures, soule and body, which are sweetly united to make up one compleat creature. The body indued with senses to receive the images of all corporall things: and the soule furnished with a faculty of reason, which apprehēding those images, doth discourse and draw consequents from them, according to its own ingenerate

ingenerate principle of reason, whereby it gets knowledge of causes and effects, which sense cannot attaine unto. This being the onely naturall way of mans knowledge. Hence it commeth to passe, that when we come to discourse of spirituall natures, the knowledge of which, lyes not through the senses, but is gotten onely by the rationall power or force of reason that is in man. We are put out of our naturall accustomed way, and so being halfe lost, wee wander in uncertainties, without any perfect knowledg, or such as might content the nature of man. And this I take to be one reason why we are so dim-sighted in spirituall things.

Againe, to come more closely to the nature of the soule: we know that whatsoever excellencies are in inferiour natures, are much more and much more perfectly in those that are superiour.

The soules knowledg of it selfe.

riour. Whence it is that the perfections of other creatures are much more perfectly in man, and chiefly in the ſoule of man. And thoſe vertues which are in mens ſoules, are after a more excellent manner in Angels: and all perfections moſt perfectly of all in God. Now as their natures are, ſo alſo are their faculties, and therefore in like manner the knowledge of inferiour natures, is comprehended by the ſuperiour, but never the ſuperiour by the inferiour; I meane properly and naturally. For becauſe the ſoule knowes by certaine ſpirituall Ideas, or abſtracted ſpecies, which being groſſely taken from the ſenſes, are perfected by degrees, as they come neerer the ſoule: hence it is that the knowledg of things (according to the manner of our knowledge) is a more intellectuall apprehenſion of them; and ſo of an higher nature than the things them-

themselves that are knowne. Whence it appeareth that it is impossible for the soule to know it selfe properly or perfectly, yea, or so well as it can inferiour natures.

If it be said, if the soule be thus ignorant of it selfe, how then doe men know Angels, & both men and Angels God, being superior natures?

First, Although the soule cannot know it selfe, according to that proper and naturall way of knowledg, whereby it knoweth other things, yet it knoweth it selfe by *reflexion*, that is, by beholding its owne image in the effects as it were in a glasse: but this knowledge is but a shadow in comparison. 1. Reflexion

Secondly, I answer the soule knoweth Angels, and both men and Angels, & God two wayes: First, by the *inferiour*; secondly, by the *superiour* it selfe. By the inferiour: so by consequents 2. Comparison.

of reaſon drawne from ſenſible things, we conceive ſomething of ſpirits, both our owne ſoules and Angels: and by the image of God in his creatures, we conceive ſomething of him alſo. But eſpecially we know the ſuperiour by the ſuperiour it ſelfe: And ſo both men and Angels know God by union with him; that is, by the working of his holy Spirit abiding in us; of which nature is that immediate viſion of God which the Angels injoy in heaven, and the Saints ſomewhat taſte of on earth.

3. Infuſion.

By this which hath been ſaid, it appeareth, that properly to know that by which it knows is impoſſible for any creature: becauſe to know that, is to be above it ſelfe: and to have that which it hath not. This therefore is proper to God alone, whoſe eſſence and knowledge is both one: and all other natures by the ſuperiour comprehend

To know that which knowes impoſſible.

hend the inferiour. As for example, we see in the senses (for as the sense is, so is the understanding) the eye sees: but it cannot see that it sees. Beasts know, but they know not that they know: they know by sense those things that are inferiour and subject to sense, but how they know, that is, by sense cogitative (the highest perfection of their nature) they know not. For that is to be comprehended by a higher perfection, that is, by reason; and thereby indeed men know how they know: but how they know that, even themselvs doe not know, otherwise then by the effects and by way of reflexion; but the thing it selfe, that is, the essence of the soule, the soule it selfe cannot properly know.

Every nature as it is more excellent, proves it selfe and the inferiour

Yet we must know that we know our soules better then beasts doe themselves; and no doubt Angels themselves better

Why God knows all.

than we doe our selves: and God who is above all knoweth himselfe absolutely and perfectly; because his nature is of that height, that essence and knowledge in him are all one. Thus we see the reason why GOD only can perfectly contemplate himselfe, & every other creature as it comes nearer to his nature, can thereby contemplate it selfe, and those which are inferiour. And hence it is that man who is a creature consisting of soule and body, can by his soule cõtemplate elementary natures: but for as much as his soule is also united to a body, which is part of himselfe, he cannot perfectly know the secrets of nature, even in these corporall things. Whence no doubt it is that a man may find his reason non-pluſt in so many workes of nature. But the Angels being altogether of a spirituall nature, may have perfect knowledge of

Why man knows not all secrets of nature.

these

theſe inferiour natures (I meane as they are in themſelves, not as they are virtually in God, for ſo he onely knowes them perfectly) and yet they cannot perfectly contemplate themſelves, no nor our ſoules neither, becauſe they alſo are ſpirituall like them. And hence alſo it may well be, that Angels cannot know mens thoughts, as is manifeſt in the Scripture. Much leſſe then can man have any perfect knowledge of his ſoule, and much leſſe the Originall. No although he were not joyned to a body, unleſſe he had another ſpirituall nature above the ſoule, yea, above Angels, by which hee might looke downe upon it, and ſo diſcerne all thoſe difficulties which now he cannot comprehend. Even as by theſe ſoules we can looke downe upon inferiour creatures, and judge of elementary creatures in the world: For as love, ſo knowledge doth

Why Angels cánot know our thoughts.

Why man not knowing his ſoul, much leſſe the originall.

deſcend, and therefore if we had ſuch ſuperiour ſoules, yet then we ſhould find as much difficulty in them alſo.

Here therefore it is to be noted, that no nature (excepting Gods) can know it ſelfe perfectly, ſo neither properly, but as it were by way of reflexion. For even as the eye, though it beholdeth all other things, yet it cannot ſee it ſelfe, unleſſe in a glaſſe; ſo we cannot know our owne ſoules, but as it ſhewed it ſelfe in the workes as in a mirrour, ſo that as by it wee know other things, ſo by other things we come to the knowledg of it: which muſt needs be an imperfect ſhaddow, and indeed not ſo much as a ſhaddow of perfection. And herein it beareth the image of God in a ſpeciall manner, who cannot be known properly, but only by his creatures, rather what he is not, then what he is. So that as it is proper to him

him alone, who is the perfection of all natures to know all things: ſo he only can properly and perfectly know both them and himſelfe.

How far the ſoules Originall may be knowne.

Some perhaps will ſay, if it be a thing that cannot be knowne, then it is in vaine to enquire after it. I anſwer, that though the knowledge of the ſoule be very difficult, eſpecially the originall of it, and though it be impoſſible to know it perfectly, and ſo properly as we know other things, for the reaſons aboveſaid, yet there is a competency and ſuch as may give reaſonable ſatisfaction to our nature, to be attained, and therewith we ought to reſt contented. For though we can ſee no reaſon, yet if we ſee reaſon, why we ſhould ſee no reaſon, reaſon it is we ſhould be content without reaſon.

CHAP.

Chap. III.

Diversitie of opinions about the nature and the originall of the soule.

Strange conceits about the soule.

THE truth of this ignorance will farther appeare; and also farther the point in hand, if wee shall consider the many strange opinions that have been in the world, concerning the anture and originall of it.

1. *Aristotles* opinion.

First, *Aristotle*, that Prince of Philosophers, who being ignorant of the Creation, held that the world was eternall: did also maintaine that soules have been from eternity: but yet propagated from parents to children, the soule being in the seed potentially, though not actually: but whether it were mortall or immortall, as himselfe was not certaine, so his writings are very doubtfull: yet rather concluding that it was; howbeit, the first creation of nothing, is denied flatly

flatly by him and all his followers.

2. Poets.

Somewhat more tollerable than this (because it hath some resemblance of truth) is the fable of the Poets: that *Prometheus* made the first man of the slime of the earth, and being beloved of the gods, and sometimes taken up to heaven, he there saw the cælestiall Orbes to live and move by fire; whereupon he made bold to steale some of the heavenly fire to enlive his body, and so informed it with a living soule; whence it seemes came that opinion, that soules were made of cælestiall fire.

3. That Angels made them.

Others againe held that Angels made all mens soules of spirit and fire: of this mind was *Selencus*: and long before him all *Carpocrates* was of opinion that they made the whole world. Also so *Menander*, and others.

4. Of his own substance.

Others say, God made them of his owne substance, as *Priscillianus*

lianus, Servetitus, and their followers.

5. Of the soule of the world.

But as touching the matter, most of the other Philosophers were of opiniõ, that soules were bred of the soule of the world, which they imagine to be a cælestiall substance or *quint-essence*, of which they say the starres are made, and so are incorruptible and immortall, even as the body is corruptible and mortall, being compounded of the elements.

6. *Hypocrat.*

Notwithstanding *Hippocrates* thought that the soule was ingendred of the heat or vitall spirits, or els of the harmony of the whole body, or (to speake plainly) it was he could not tell what.

7. *Galen.*

That famous Physitian *Galen* also, held it to be either an aeriall body more then the elements, or els not corporall, and yet carried by the animall spirits as by a chariot.

Plato,

8. *Plato.*

Plato, and his followers, maintaine, that all ſoules were at firſt bred in heaven, of the divine nature, and dwelt here, being indued with excellent ſciences and vertues: but afterwards deſcending from thence into mens bodies, as into ſtinking priſons, they are corrupted, and forget all their former knowledge, and when afterward by ſtudy and inſtruction, thoſe cæleſtiall ſparkes are againe kindled in them, they doe onely recall or call to mind thoſe things which they knew before in heaven. And farther they affirme, that if by vertuous living, good workes, or ſome other kinde of purgation, after they are ſeperated from their bodies, (for which cauſe it is like Purgatory was invented) they be purged from this corporall contagion: then they ſhall returne againe to heavē from whence they came. For thus doth Sathan ſeeke to obſcure

obſcure the truth with lies, when he cannot put out all light of nature.

9. *Origen.* Not much unlike this (and as it is like derived from it) was the opinion of *Origen*, who though he thought as the Scriptures teach, that God created the ſoule of nothing, and not of any cæleſtiall ſubſtance, yet he ſaith that all ſoules were created together at the beginning of the world, as Angels were, and becauſe they ſinned in departing from God, they are ſince put into divers bodies, to be as it were their Jayles and fetters to impriſon & clog them, more or leſſe, according to the diverſitie of their ſinnes. And that for this cauſe the world was made, that ſo theſe evill ſpirits might be bridled.

10. *Pythagoras.* No leſſe, if not much more ſtrange was that μετεμψύχωσις, or tranſmigration of ſoules, which the *Pythagoreans* imagined, *viz.* that

that they passed at death out of one mans body into another, yea, into fowles, fishes, plants, without any difference, exercising their power in them, so far as in those natures could be manifested: and that accordingly as they had lived in one body more or lesse vitiously, so they were received at death into a worse or better body. And it seemes the *Jewes* themselves were somewhat infected with this opinion by the *Romans*, for they thought that Christ was *John Baptist* risen againe, or *Elias*, or *Jeremiah*, or some other of the old Prophets.

Mat. 14. 2. & 16. 13, 14. Mar. 6. 14. Luk. 9. 7, 8

11. Certaine *Platonists* or *Pythagoreans*.

Yea, there have not beene wanting some heretickes of old, who following the opinion of the *Platonists*, have affirmed the soule to be of such a nature, as it can never be quiet, untill such time as it hath finished all manner of works whatsoever can be done in the world, of what na-

ture

ture soever, whether good or bad, by passing out of one body into another, through all sorts of creatures. And untill then, say they, it can never be throughly purged or be at rest.

12. Certaine *Tertullianists*.

Yet more, some have maintained that at death those soules that lived well, are turned into Angels, and those that have lived wickedly, become devills, as the *Tertullianists*, &c. And hence it is that we reade of conjurers, who have killed men and children, that they might have their soules as their imps and familiar spirits, to command after their deaths; and such an one it is said *Simon Magus* was.

13. Every man 3 soules.

Neither is there more diversitie about the nature than the number of soules, for some are of opinion that every man hath three soules; a vegetative soule with plants, a sensitive soule with beasts, and a reasonable soule like unto the Angels, although

though indeed they are but three faculties or sundry operations of one and the same soule in us.

Others againe thinke there can be no lesse than two soules at the least; the one sensuall, the other rationall; the one mortall, the other immortall; the one propagated by the Parents, and the other created by God. And this *Occam* would prove from the diversity and contrariety of appetites and desires in one and the same man, which he thinks cannot be in one and the same individuall nature. 14. 2 Soules.

Some others yet more grossely have affirmed, that every man hath indeed two soules, the one made of the substance of God, and the other of the substance of the devils. These were the *Maniches*, who held two beginnings; a good God, and an evill God. 15. *Maniches.*

Contrary to these, and yet no lesse unreasonable, is the opinion of 16. *Averrois.*

of that great Philosopher *Averrois* that there is one onely soule of all men that ever were or shall be in the world.

Diversities of opinios amongst Christians.

But leaving these Heathens and heretickes, with their heathenish and hereticall conceits, as not worthy the confuting, let us heare the verdict of the learned Christians since Christ, who all with one cõsent affirme, that the soules of men are either immediately created by God, or else mediately propagated by man: yet herein also there is no small diversitie, for in either of these, there are two opinions, each differing from other.

1. Creation.

2. Propagation.

17. Created out of the body.

Of those that maintaine the soule to be immediately created by God; some think it is created without the body of nothing, and then infused into it by God after the forming of the body: of this mind was *Hillary*, &c.

18. Created within the body.

Others againe thinke it to be created within the body of the con-

conceived fruit; which hath first vegetative life, then sensitive, and lastly, the reasonable soule is created therein, and united therewith, by the immediate power of God onely. Both these have been countenanced by many of the best learned, especially the latter; which is most commonly received as the truth at this day.

19. Propagated corporally.

Notwithstanding, others contend, that although God at first created *Adams* soule of nothing, yet ever since they have beene naturally propagated from the parents together with the body; so that as wee have our bodies from *Adams* body, so our soule from *Adams* soule, but so as it is immortall notwithstanding.

But of these some conceiting it to be a corporeall substance, thought also that it was generated after a corporall manner; which was worthily condemned by *Austin* and others.

But

20. Propagated ſpiritually.

But thoſe that held it to be a ſpirituall ſubſtance, held alſo that it was propagated ſpiritually, the ſoule of the ſoule, as it were light of light; And this heretofore was upholden by many of the moſt learned men amongſt the Antients: yea, as St. *Hierome* witneſſeth, moſt of the Doctors of the Weſterne Churches were of that minde. So that it ſeemeth this opinion was as commonly received among them there, as the other now amongſt us.

21.

Laſtly, there were ſome that wavered between theſe two opinions, not knowing which to take; and of this minde was St. *Auguſtine* and *Eucherius*, who durſt neither condemne thoſe that thought it was ſpiritually propagated from the Parents, nor yet thoſe that held it to be immediately created by God. The one profeſſing in one of his Epiſtles that he could not finde

Auguſt. Epiſt. 157.

Lib. 2. *Cap.* 56.

any

any certainty of the soules Originall throughout the Canonicall Scriptures; in which doubt he also continued to his death, as appeareth plainly in his Retractations.

CHAP. IV.

The state of the question propounded, with the chiefe difficulties on both sides.

HEreby it appeareth sufficiently both how much difficultie is in this question of the soules originall, and how imperfect our knowledge is therein. But since all the rest are most absurd, erronious, and some blasphemous; and two, onely as most probable claime right therein: proceed wee now to their titles, and so if it be possible to find out the truth, in this most intricate questiõ, *viz.* whether the soul be naturally propagated

The censure and choise;

gated from *Adam*, or supernaturally created by God?

Not generated.

If we say the first, it must needs be generated of the soule, or of the body; if of the body, then it will follow, that it is by nature corruptible, and so not immortall. And if we say it is spiritually produced of the soule, that seemeth contrary to reason, unlesse we should overthrow the excellent nature of the soule; for if it be a spirituall and immateriall substance, indivisibly subsisting by it selfe, how can it be that one should ingender another? Besides many other inconveniences would follow thereupon, as afterward we shall see.

Not created.

Now if on the other side we say, that they are daily created by God of nothing, besides the opposition that this hath to Gods first institution of nature, whereby all things were setled in a course to increase and multiply of themselves, and God hath rested

sted from the works of creation ever since: it is no lesse opposite to divinitie. For if this be true, it cannot be conceived how there can be any originall sin without impeachment to Gods Justice. Whence it is that not onely the old Anabaptists, the Pelagians, and our new Pelagians the Anabaptists, holding that the soule is immediately created by God: deny that there is any originall sin, otherwise then by imitation: but even divers of the antient Fathers seeme to be of the same minde; and not onely *Hierome*, and *Chrysostome*, but as (*Zanchy* witnesseth) this was the chiefe reason that moved the chiefest Divines, and most famous Doctors of those times, to choose rather to hold the propagation of the soule, than to fall into so many absurdities as follow upon the former Doctrine. And as they could not see how these two could stand together; so

Originall sin denied by some of the Ancients.

Zan. de operibus par. 3. li. 2. c. 5. thes. 1.

Not cleared by our moderne Divines.

neither can I see, how it can be seene. Nay, I dare say farther, themselves that hold this opinion, themselves cannot see it clearely; neither can they herein satisfie either themselves or others. As appeareth plainly,

1. first, because throughly urged, they put it off, by accounting it a curious question, and so restraine diligent searching, under a colour of modesty.

2. Secondly, they plainly confesse, they cannot satisfie such.

3. Thirdly, they urge & exhort us to faith without reason.

4. Lastly, they turne us from searching after the originall, to make a good end with it; and that indeed is good counsell; but in the meane while, if this opinion be contrary to the truth, and staineth God by consequence, they must give others leave to doubt, and to dissent. For as it is ridiculous folly to neglect quenching, to finde out who fired our house; so it is a great

great wickednesse to lay it upon him that did it not.

For if the soule comes immediately from God, the question is, how we come to be defiled with originall sin? this infection cannot proceed from the soule, for if God created it, he maketh it exceeding good; and it is not good to say, God forsakes it before it sinnes, or it sinnes before it comes into the body, or God punisheth for anothers fault; a good soule for a mans sin. 1. Not by the soule.

Againe, it cannot be polluted by the body; for neither can the body be sinfull without the soule, nor yet if it could, could the divine nature of the soule be corrupted by the body; and if it could be, yet not with originall sin. 2. Not by the body.

Neither can it be by the union of both, for that is done by God. And how can it possibly stand with Gods Justice, to put a new created soule that is good and 3. Not by union.

without ſin, into ſuch a condition, as wherein it ſhall be ſtraight way liable to eternall damnation, for the fault of another, that doth nothing perteine unto it? or how can it belong to a good ſoule newly created of nothing, that not a ſoule but a man ſome thouſand yeares ſince ſinned? Neither will it availe any thing to ſay, it is created in the infuſion, and infuſed in the creation: for that is all one as if we ſhould ſay in plainer words, Its made in the marring, and marred in the making: for being a ſpirituall ſubſtance, and nature diſtinct from the body, if it come from another principle, it muſt have a proper exiſtence of its owne, before it can be made part of another; and if not in time, yet in nature I am ſure, it muſt firſt be, before it can be united to the body. Neither can it helpe to ſay, it is Gods decree; for that cannot be proved, and being

ing unjuſt, is moſt juſtly diſproved.

But the laſt and beſt refuge is, that originall ſin paſſeth neither by the ſoule, nor by the body, but by the offence of our firſt parents, who ſtanding in the roome of all their poſteritie; as looke what gifts they received, was no leſſe for their poſteritie, than for themſelves: ſo what they loſt, they loſt alſo for their poſteritie: And therefore in the inſtant that God createth ſouls, although he creates them good, yet for *Adams* ſin, he deprives them of thoſe ſupernaturall gifts, which otherwiſe they ſhould have had: which depriuation although it putteth no evill into the ſoule, yet evill neceſſarily followeth, and hence is Originall ſin. 4. By neither by law of Iuſtice inſufficient.

This indeed comes ſomewhat nearer the matter, for if it be granted that the ſoule is not propagated from *Adam*, it muſt The reaſon why.

be granted withall, that we are not guilty of Originall sin simply, because wee proceed from *Adam*; but by some other means; as namely, because he stood in our roomes; and we are men as he was; but yet this will not serve the turne neither; For first it stands not with the Justice of God, that *Adams* sin should be imputed to us any other way then as it is our own: that is, as we sinned potentially in him: it being Gods just ordinance in nature, that all things should be potentially in their principles, and pertake of their natures: secondly, it is confessed (as the truth is) that originall sin is not onely by imputation, as this is, but also by propagation: yea, I will say more (and yet according to the truth) that it is not by imputation but onely in respect of propagation. For if wee could be without sin of our owne (as a new created Soule is) his sinne could

1. It must be our owne.

Rom. 11. 16.

2. Not by imputation onely.

3. Chiefly by propagation.

could not justly hurt us. True it is that God may justly punish all mankinde for the sin of *Adam*, yet this is and must be his posteritie onely, & neither they for his sin properly (for the son shall not beare the iniquitie of the Father) but because by his sin they are made sinfull, or rather sinned in him, and so for their owne sin are justly subject to the same punishment. So that in truth, propagatiõ is the main, if not the onely streame of originall corruption. Now if wee receive onely the least parts of our selves, that is, our body from *Adam*, which cannot be the subject of sin, not onely because it wants the soule, but because not parts, but whole persons sinned in *Adam*; how can this satisfie any reasonable man, that it is possible for us to be guilty of Originall sinne, if the soule comes immediately from God. Ezek. 18. 20.

Chapter V.

The meane chosen, and the question resolved.

Further satisfaction needfull.

THis therefore is a most profound question, full of wonderfull difficulties; this is that intricate Meander, and that endlesse Maze, wherein St. *Augustine* wandered all his life long, and could finde no issue: and to conclude, this is that wherein Divines to this day have rather shewed their modesty, in not searching, than their judgement in determining the truth. If not rather too much fearing least they should seeke too farre, they have thereby failed in finding. But how soever, it is very commendable to walk soberly herein, yet we may not through too much modesty, leave a gap open to be trodden downe by the feet of beastly Atheists; and therefore notwithstanding it is a La-

batinth, where it is hard to wade out safely, yet we may and must indeavour to give satisfaction in such a needfull question.

The Authors apologie for this singularitie.

And here I most humbly crave leave to step a little out of the cõmon path, or rather to make the same path straight, which (as to me it seemeth) is a little crooked in this place; bearing out against Philosophy on the one hand, and Divinitie on the other; and if force of reason doe not prove my assertion, I will willingly beare the blame that is due; which yet I hope, cannot be much though I should erre.

1. First, because it is a most difficult point, wherein the greatest Clearkes can scarce tell which way to turne themselves.

2. Secondly, because the premisses being confessed, it can be no fundamentall errour.

3. Thirdly, being in the meane, it must needs be confessed neerer the truth, (at least) then that

which hath yet beene maintained by the moſt wiſe and godly of the antient Fathers in former ages.

4. Fourthly, thoſe opinions wch I oppoſe, were never maintained as neceſſary doctrines, but onely as probable opinions.

5. Laſtly, I am not peremptory, (much leſſe obſtinate) but willing to ſubmit to better judgements: and propound this onely by way of tryall, as one that would gladly be a means to find out the truth.

How man propagates man.

That we may therefore ſaile even between this *Scylla* & *Charibdis*, ſeeing we ſee it can neither be meerely propagated by man, nor yet immediately created by God: my concluſion is, that it is partly from both. That is to ſay, that the whole man conſiſting of ſoule and body, doth propagate a creature like himſelfe, conſiſting of the ſame parts; by vertue of that efficacious

ous word of God in the beginning (*increase and multiply*) and the concurrence of his own immediate power therewith. And that therefore God hath set a stedfast law in nature for the generation of mankind (both soule and body) as well as other creatures. But yet partly mediately and partly immediately, himselfe having a more peculiar worke in this than in any other. For besides his generall providence in conserving the naturall order that himselfe hath instituted; as the nature of the soule is more excellent, so answerable thereunto the act of his providence is more immediate therein than in any other creature whatsoever. And thus the soule may be propagated as well as the body, after a manner convenient to either nature: God having so much in it as to make it immortall; and man so much as to make it sinfull; yet not as if there

Mans propagation naturall.

Gods act in the production of the soule.

Soule and body not to be divided.

there were any seperation in their generation, the body of the body onely, and the soule of the soule onely (for this is but to multiply difficulties without end, no man being able to say directly, here it is either for the one or the other) but the whole of the whole, generation being not of parts but of persons. For nature it selfe teacheth, that neither soule nor body can properly be said to be generated; but the creature consisting of soule and body: neither is there any thing that seemes to me more absurd, than that when God and nature hath thus conjoyned them: the Scripture alwayes speaking of the generation of the whole man; and nature we see alwayes bringing forth the whole; we should notwithstanding make a seperation; fetching one part from heaven, and another from earth: and then vainely tyre our selves to bring both

ends

ends together againe. Now if the soule and body may not be seperated in this case, much lesse should we take upō us to assigne the proper cause of every effect herein: and yet because such is the curiositie of mans nature, that it will not otherwise rest satisfied; if we must needs in reason distinguish, what in nature cannot be severed, I should thus determine.

How the soule is propagated of the soule.

The essentiall causes distinguished.

That the parents, by Gods immediate assistance, doe out of their owne spirituall nature, informe their issue, with a reasonable soule, in the instant of conception, for the preservation of humane kinde. So that I conceive the pōwer of God to be the externall efficient cause, who as he made the first soule immediately of nothing: so by reason of the purity of it, it can have no other externall efficient cause, but his owne immediate power. The procreating cause is the parents,

1. Efficient.

2. Procreant.

rents, who are as instruments in Gods hand, to bring forth what, how, and when he please, according to his own eternall decree.

3. Materiall. The materiall cause, is the spirituall matter of the parents soule. It will be said, the soule is immateriall: be it so, then, I say, the soule is made of that matter wch is immateriall. For though it be not corporeall, yet it is spirituall, and being a spirit and not a body, it is rather an act than a matter: so that according to the course of nature, I confesse more is to be ascribed to the efficient cause, yea, so much that the latter is almost extinguished in the former. And hence it is that though the soule be congenerated with the body, yet by reason of the pure nature of it, God being the efficient, it is as neere to a creation as possibly it can be: and as it were a meane between creation and propagation. Touching the formal cause as it selfe

Mark this mystery.

4. Formall.

is the forme of the body, or rather of the man; so its owne form is the specificall difference, or individuall existence; which it hath as a reasonable soule, in the cõmon nature of man; proceeding from the concurrence of all those causes. And herein that body or rather the corporal seed the perfection of the body, especially the pure spirits therein (wherewith the soule naturally unites it selfe, by reason of sympathy and familiarity which is betweene them) becomes an assisting or instrumentall cause. 5. Instrumẽtall.

Lastly, the finall cause is the preservation of mankinde, and his owne glory by them, according to his first institution. 6. Finall.

Now all this is done in conception, soule and body beginning both in the same moment of time, and neither being before or after other. Time.

And thus we may conceive how the soule is propagated of the soule, after a spirituall manner;

as

Simile.

as the flame of one Lamp lighteth another (by promotion or multiplication) being blowne by the power of God, and fed with the oyle of the animall ſpirits. And that this may not ſeeme ſtrange, before I come to the proofe of it, I deſire that theſe few Concluſions might be conſidered.

Concluſions concerning the ſoules originall.

1. Of the union of the body and ſoule.

Firſt, that there is no ſuch diametrall oppoſition betweene the ſoule & the body, but that they may be naturally coupled together. Indeed the ſoule is far from ſuch a groſſe & viſible ſubſtance as the body is compounded of; yet is it not without ſome ſpirituall kind of ſubſtance, and that not altogether ſimple. Neither doe I think the creatures of God to differ ſo much in kinde as in degree. Beſides, it is manifeſt that the ſoule is of the loweſt degree of ſpirits, and not onely capable of, but coveting union with corporall natures, and ſo according

according to the course of nature, may as well be propagated with them as united with them.

2. Of the union of the soule with God.

Secondly, as any nature is more excellent: so it hath a neerer union with that first being wheron it depends, & is more immediately moved by it: Now because all natures doe subsist, and are sustained more or lesse immediately by that first being, according as their natures are neerer unto it, or farther removed from it; answerable whereunto the worke thereof is more or lesse immediate in them. Hence it followeth that the soule being more excellent, and consequently neerer to God than any corporall creature can be: as he workes more immediately in them, than in others after they are made: so by like reason it followeth, that he doth so in their first propagation.

3. The efficient cause in generation.

Thirdly, there is nothing generated in the world, but it hath some

some externall efficient cause. Now this in corporall generations all grant to be the heavens, which being of a more excellent nature, send downe their influences to inferiour creatures, by vertue of which (next unto God) they continue their kinds. But the soule, being a spirit, is above all corporall creatures; and being made by Gods owne immediate hand onely at first, it can have no other externall efficient but the same immediate power still. So that whereas it is commonly said, *Sol & homo generant hominem*, it may more truely be said, *Deus & homo generant animam*. Neither is it absurd that man should have two efficients; it is rather an honour that God & nature should concurre together in his generation.

4. The true cause of mortality.

Fourthly, Mortality proceeds not so much from generation as divine malediction. For had not man

man sinned, it is confessed that the body should have beene immortall as well as the soule. Although therefore the soule were compounded and generated after a corporall manner, without any immediate act of GODS power (none of which are true) yet it would not presently follow, that it must needs be mortall.

Lastly, Whatsoever hath the being immediately from God, cannot be annihilated but by the same immediate power: so that it is the act of his immediate power, that is the proper cause of immortalitie: and hence it appeareth that though the body which is produced by the power of nature, onely may dye and perish, yet the soule whose production is not without an immediate act of the Deity, can never dye, but by the same power omnipotent by which it lived.

5. The cause of immortalitie.

Thus

How man is ſinfull, and the ſoule immortall.

Thus then it appeareth that though the ſoule be propagated in the manner aforeſaid, yet it is nevertheleſſe immortall, ſince it is neither made of any corporall matter, nor produced onely by the power of nature; and God is never the more faulty, though wee be ſinfull, becauſe being wholy in *Adam*, according to the juſt law of nature, & ſo ſinning potentially in him, he with us, and we with him being then actually one; the whole nature of mankinde is thereby ſo corrupted, and this pure ordinance of God in producing ſoules ſo defiled, that corruption paſſeth in the very conception, and we are ſtained with originall ſinne, and ſo are liable to Gods eternall wrath, ſo ſoone as we begin to be. It being a juſt and neceſſary law in nature, that as the roote is, ſuch are the branches: and look what the tree is, ſuch muſt the fruit be.

Pſal. 51.5
Eph. 2.3.
Rom. 11. 16.
Mat. 7.18.
Gal. 6.7.8.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Scriptures to prove the ſoules immediate creation, anſwered.

HAving thus declared the manner of the ſoules creation, or rather procreation; for the better ſatisfying of the ſober minded, and ſilencing ſuch as ſhall be wilfully contentious, it behooveth me in the next place more fully to explaine & prove the ſame. Wherefore after this generall entrance having preſumed to determine this ſo intricate a queſtion, that wee may have the freer paſſage, my next indeavour ſhall be to cleare the ſame by removing out of the way ſuch obſtacles and objections as may ſeeme to oppoſe it. And the rather becauſe they are ſuch, as whereby I ſhall beſt explaine my ſelfe, and ſhew that it may be ſo, and ſo afterward prove the more clearely that it

The methode and reaſon of it.

is so: and thereby also take away that prejudice wherewith mens minds are forestalled, before I proceed to the proofe of it.

Objections marshalled.

Here therefore I must first encounter with a whole army of Arguments, that seeme to be set in battaile aray against me; and then pitch a new field of reasons to maintaine what I have spoken. The arguments that come marching against me seeme to be ranged in two severall battalions: the former mainly intending to fight for the immediate creation of the soule, the latter altogether against the propagation of the soule; Those that most establish the soules immediate creation, are of two sorts: partly, Testimonies of Scripture, and partly, reasons drawne from them. Being thus greatly beset with enemies, I have notwithstanding great hope of victory; not onely because I have before well

well abated their courage, and broken their force, by setting them in the first encounter to fight one against another: but also because by the advantage of the place, the forces of both fall besides me; for neither doe I hold that it is not at all from God, nor altogether from man.

Testimonies of Scripture.

And first to answer those testimonies of Scripture, which are brought to prove the immediate creation of the soule; that generall answer of that divine Father Saint *Augustine*, may serve for all, *i. e.* that the divine testimonies only teach that God is the giver and former of our soules; but they doe not declare how or by what meanes, God sendeth them into us. So that by his judgement they straine the Scripture too farre, who indeavour to prove this immediate manner of the soules creation from them, and indeed if wee proceed to a particular examination

nation of them, wee ſhall finde
Exod. 21. 22.23.24. that amongſt all, there is not ſcarce one that doth purpoſely ſpeake, either of the originall of the ſoule, or the generation of man. As for example (to take them up in order) the firſt is drawne by conſequence from a Law which God made concerning the hurting of a woman with childe: for which if it were ſo that her fruit did depart from her before it was informed with a ſoule (as they would have it) then he ſhould have ſome light puniſhment onely; but if it were informed with a ſoule, & thereby periſh; then he that did it ſhould dye the death. And why (ſay they) ſhould ſo ſmall a puniſhmēt be inflicted for the one, but becauſe it was void of a reaſonable ſoule before; & ſo great a puniſhment for the other, but becauſe the ſoule was preſent, and ſo a man being ſlaine, the ſlayer muſt give life for life.

But

Answer.

But first of all, this is to corrupt the Text, for the words truely translated be these: If men strive and hurt a woman with childe, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischiefe follow, or (as some reade it) death follow not, (for so it is in the Originall) he shall be surely punished, according as the womans husband will lay upon him, &c. and if any mischiefe or death followeth then thou shalt give life for life, &c. This being the true Text in the Originall, from which wee ought not to swerve, it maketh nothing to their purpose: Indeed the Septuagint seemeth to reade it thus; *Et non fuit efformatum*, that is, and it hath not been informed or enlived with a living soule. And thus that the fruit may depart without a soul, they make the text depart from the true sence.

Geneva Bible.

ἐξεπορεύθη μήτηρ.

Secondly, if this should be granted, this informing must be un-

derſtood of quickning, elſe no judgement could be given, ſeeing none can know when the ſoule is infuſed: & if that ſhould be the meaning, ſeeing they ſay the rationall ſoule comes after vegetation and ſenſe, it muſt be needs that the childe can move before it hath a rationall ſoule, and ſo it ſhall ſtill be uncertaine when a man ſhall deſerve death by ſuch a miſchance, unleſſe we could ſet downe the juſt time when God did infuſe the ſoule, or feele when it is intuſed. But touching the quickning, there is more reaſon a man ſhould dye for it after then before, though the ſoule be the ſame from the beginning, both becauſe it is not ſo certaine before what it is, or whether it be any thing or no: and alſo before it be come to that perfection, any light matter might occaſion a miſchance, for which there were no reaſon a man ſhould looſe his life.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, this is to be underſtood of the mother, as well as of the childe. If her fruit depart from her, and yet death follow not, neither to her ſelfe, nor to it, a light puniſhment may ſerve, but if either dye, he muſt render life for life. But it is manifeſt then, there muſt be life, elſe there could be no death: and life there cannot be in a reaſonable creature without a reaſonable ſoule; this therefore maketh nothing at all for them, but yet ſomething againſt them. 3.

The next is taken from the prayer of *Moſes*; *Let the Lord, the God of the ſpirits of all fleſh, ſet a man over the congregation, which may goe in and out before them*: and when God was about to take away *Moſes*, he like a faithfull Steward, having a care that the people might be well governed after his departure, and knowing how weak mans judgement is, and how apt to erre in choo- 1 2. Num. 27. 16.

sing of Officers, entreats God by that Epethite, that he would choose for them. As if he should say, thou, oh father, from whom commeth every good gift; thou that giveſt spirit and wisdome to all men; thou that searcheſt the heart and tryeſt the reines; doe thou set a man over the congregation, that may be fit to goe in & out before thy people, &c. And that this is the sense, plainly appeareth by Gods answer:

1. Vers. 18. *Take yee Joshua, a man in whom is the spirit, &c.*

2. Besides if it were meant simply of the soule (for which there is no shew of reason) yet will it not follow, that because he is the God of them, therefore he daily creates them of nothing.

3. Psal. 33. 15. Pro. 21. 1. 2. Next followeth that of the *Psalmist; He fashioneth their hearts* (or soules) *alike; He considereth all their works:* which is in effect this: The hearts of all men (even of Kings) are in the hands of the Lord,

Lord, and he turneth them whethersoever he will: he orders both the thoughts and actions of men, according to his owne good pleasure, as is plaine from the words both before and after, and so is nothing to the purpose: and if it should be meant of the originall of the soule, whereof there was no occasion to speake in this place, yet the question still remaines, whether God formes them mediatly or immediately, by creation or propagation.

But that which is esteemed of more weight, is that of *Salomon*, where resolving the parts of man at his death into the first principles, he saith, *Then shall the dust returne to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall returne to God that gave it.* But though this may prove the immortalitie of the soule, yet the immediate creation cannot be proved by it, but rather the contrary. For it is manifest that he hath relation to

4. Eccles. 12. 7.

1.

2.

mans first creation, and that necessarily in the one, else it should
3. not be true For every mans body is not now made of the dust, but onely *Adams*. from whom we came, and therefore if wee will make a true Antithesis, it will follow, that neither is every mans soule created of nothing, but onely *Adams*, from whom all others come. So that this is rather *Salomons* meaning as the body returnes to dust, whereof it was first made, so the soule returnes to God from whom it first came: but that was immediately from *Adam*, & so therefore is this.

5. The next proofe is taken from the words of God by the Pro-
Isai. 57.16 phet *Isay*; *I will not ever contend with man, for the spirit will faile before me, and the soules which I have made:* which some doe thus expound: If I should straightly marke what is done amisse, and severely punish your sinnes, then not

not onely the bodies which yee have received from your parents, but even the soules which I have immediately created and infused into your bodies, would also perish: but who seeth not that there is more in the exposition than in the Text. If indeed this were a truth manifest in the Scripture, it might happily be so understood; but this being the thing we question, ought first to be proved, which cannot be from this place; for the word translated *soule*, signifieth *breath*, and sometimes any creature that hath breath, and so the meaning is, those whom he made to live and breath, would faile and dye; which the soule cannot doe, and therefore it cannot be meant of that. Neither would it follow, that because he made them, therefore he made them immediately of nothing, and so the question remaineth still unanswered. נְשָׁמָה

6 Ezek 18.4

Againe, God saith by the Prophet *Ezekiel*; *Behold all soules are mine, &c.* But is little to the purpose, for here by *soule* is meant the whole person; for so it followeth in the next words; *The soule that sinneth shall dye.* What shall the soule only be punished, and not the whole person rather? Besides, if every soule be created of nothing, because it is Gods: then so should the body be, for that also is his.

7. Zach. 12.1

There is yet another place alledged out of the old Testament, to prove this, which as it seemes to me is clearly against it, namely, that of the Prophet *Zachary*, where it is said; *Thus saith the Lord, Which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him*; if it be formed by the Lord, then not by man, say some. But that followes not, for it may be by both. And therfore *Augustine* well answereth,

it is

it is not denyed, but God formeth every mans soule, but the question is whereof, whether of the substance of the parents soules, or of nothing? But it is objected, that the scope of the place is to comfort the Church by setting forth the omnipotent power of God. Be it so, if then we admit an immediate act of Gods power herein (which I graunt) the scope of the place is answered, and yet the soule not immediately created. Againe, it is manifest the two former sentences have relation to the first creation; for God doth not now either stretch forth the heavens, or lay the foundation of the earth; and therefore why should not the latter also, seeing it is apparent he created the first soule immediately of nothing; but wee doe not reade that he created ever any other so since Lastly, it is to be noted, that the text saith not the Lord createth,

but the Lord *formeth the spirit of man, &c.* and where did ever forming signifie creating of nothing, *de hoc postea.*

8. Ioh. 5. 17. To this purpose, (though to small purpose) some doe also produce, that saying of our Saviour, *My Father worketh hitherto, and I worke:* as if by this working he meant the daily creating of soules: but his meaning was, not in the creatiõ of new things, but in the preservation of the old: and not so much in the preservatiõ of nature, as in the propagation of grace. For indeed it is not the government of the world, but the regiment of the Church, that our Saviour speaks of in that place: not ordinary operations in the course of nature, but miraculous workes in the promulgation of the Gospel, as the words both before and after doe manifest And though it be true, that God and Christ too (being essentially one) doe cause all

all these things that are done naturally (for he is the Author of Nature) yet he is not properly said to worke that which nature worketh, because he is therefore said to rest, because he hath committed these things unto nature.

9. Some also would seeme to wring it out of the words of the Poet *Aratus*, cited by St. *Paul*; *Wee are the off-spring of God.* For such weak proofes as these, must serve where better is wanting, which poverty does indeede more weaken and discredit the case, than any way confirme the same. For his meaning is onely, that wee are of a divine nature, by reason of that spirituall and immortall soule that is in us, but how we come by it, whether by creation or propagation, neither did *Paul* here purpose to speake, nor the Poet ever dispute. Acts 17. 28.

10. But most of all, and most worthily of all, is that of the Apostle to Heb. 12 9

to the *Hebrewes* urged; and indeed, almost all the rest, have no inference at all to the purpose, and this no necessitie, nor (as we shall see) no just probabilitie: the words are these; *If wee had Fathers of our bodies that corrected us, and wee gave them reverence; shall wee not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live.* Whence they collect that earthly parents propagate the body onely, and God creates the soule of every man immediately.

Answer. But for Answer, first of all *Beza*, whose judgement is (*i.e.* is to be) reverenced, rendreth the sense of this place thus; If all men yeeld this right to naturall parents, to whom next to God we owe this life, that they may rightfully correct their children; shall we not be much more subject to our heavenly Father, who is the Author of our spirituall and everlasting life? And indeed

indeed what els can be the meaning? For if in the next place we consider the scope, it is to perswade to the patient suffering of afflictions, and not to teach the originall of the soule. Againe, if wee examine the words, we shall finde, that the word σαρκὸς, *flesh* (for so it should be translated and not bodyes) cannot be meant of the body without the soule; for parents doe not correct a carkasse. Secondly, the word, πνευμάτων, *of spirits*, is not to be understood of a soule without a body, for God is the father of mens bodies too, and not of the soule alone; and lastly, the word, παιδευτὰς, *chastisers*, (as the parents are called) signifies such a chastisement, as when instruction is joyned with correction; but there can be no such correction of the body without a soule, a castigation being of an understanding man, and not of a body onely; and as the

the word, ſo the Antitheſis makes it apparant that the Apoſtle in this place makes mention of a twofold caſtigation, the one carnall, the other ſpirituall: ſo that not ſoule and body, but ſpirituall and carnall caſtigation is here oppoſed. But be it that God is here in a peculiar right called the Father of ſoules, it muſt not be in a ſenſe of our own deviſing, whereof there is no example nor warrant in the Scripture, but as they teach us: which is that he created mans ſoule after a peculiar manner; not of former matter, as the body, and all other creatures, but immediately of nothing, when he breathed into him the breath of life. Laſtly, I grant that God hath a more peculiar worke in the production of every mans ſoule, than in any other thing throughout the whole order of nature, and yet according to the courſe of nature too. And this is

is the utmoſt that can be urged from this or any of the former places; (theſe being the moſt and beſt that ever I could finde brought for the immediate creation of the ſoule) none of which doe infringe but rather confirme this mediate manner which I have propounded.

CHAP. VII.

Reaſons from the Scripture for the ſoules immediate Creation, anſwered.

THe reaſons drawn from the Scripture to prove the immediate creation of the ſoule, are theſe; firſt, becauſe *Adams* ſoule was created of nothing, and in the creation of his, God hath declared the manner of the creating of ours; ſince it is unlike the originall of his ſoule and ours ſhould be unlike, when as wee are both of one kinde. And

From the Creation of *Adams* ſoule.

ſeeing

ſeeing our Saviour Chriſt ſpeaking of Marriage, calleth men back to the firſt inſtitution, ſaying, *it was not ſo from the beginning*; there is the ſame reaſon why we ſhould learne the originall of our ſoules alſo from the beginning. But notwithſtanding this, there is no more neceſſitie, nor indeed probability that our ſoules ſhould be created of nothing, becauſe his was: then that our bodyes ſhould be ſtill made of the ſlime of the earth, becauſe his was. For every one knoweth there is one conſideratiõ in the firſt creatiõ of things, and another in the producing of them afterwards, according to their kindes by ordinary generation. And if this difference ſhould alter the kinde, then it ſhould doe ſo in all other living creatures as well; for though in part they were made of that firſt matter, yet were they in part alſo created by the immediate

power

power of God, as well as *Adam*. But seeing it cannot vary the kind in them, it cannot by the course of nature doe so in us neither. Nay, it seemes in the text there is more reason it should be thus for man rather than for any other creature. For it is said, *God breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives*: the plurality of which word may in reason be better expounded of the many lives that were potentially in him, than of the divers faculties and operations which yet are but one life: and proceed from one soule onely. And the rather because the words *Spiraculum vitarum*, might well be rendred the Spirit of Soules. As who should say that spirituall nature which was the fountaine of all those soules which have beene produced ever since; and (which is to be noted) this is never affirmed of any creature in Scripture but such as being made male and female,

Gen. 2. 7.

Gen. 7 15. & 6. 17.

female, had power given them to propagate more of the same kinde; so that it may seeme to be principally spoken for this cause, and therefore to be belonging to man above all the rest, and chiefly in respect of the soule, which being made after such an immediate manner in man, is therefore of a farre different and more excellent nature than the soules of brutes, but yet propagated as well as they.

From the creation of *Eves* soule.

A second reason is drawne forcibly from the creation of *Eve*, for because *Moses* expresseth the difference that was between the creation of her body and his; the one being made of the dust, the other of a rib: but speaketh not of any difference in the creation of their soules: therefore (say some) it is very probable that both were created alike of nothing; otherwise *Moses* would never have omitted it, especially considering it was his prin-

principall intent to declare the originall of all things.

But this also is easily answered. For, first, if it be a good argument that *Moses* would not have omitted it, if it had beene otherwise created than *Adams* was; then it is much more forcible to prove that shee had no soule at all. For if that which was taken out of *Adam* made the body onely, then it is confessed he speakes nothing of the creation of her soule, but leaves us to guesse that it might be as *Adams* was; or rather that shee had none at all, otherwise *Moses* would never have omitted it. Secondly, it is the thing in question, whether *Moses* expresseth the different creation of their bodyes onely, and not of their whole persons rather, according to the expresse words in the text. Thirdly, if it should be granted that her soule was immediately created of nothing, it were nothing

Answer.

thing to the purpose: for this is still in the first creation of mankinde, and therefore no fit rule to measure the manner of mans propagation afterward. Lastly, it is at least to prove one unknowne thing by another, there being no lesse doubt of the manner of the creation of her soule than of ours. But for my part seeing in things doubtfull that which hath most reason, is to be received as most reasonable: I should rather thinke her whole person both soule and body, to have beene made of *Adams* substance than otherwise, and that for these reasons.

1. Because *Moses* speaketh nothing of any more immediate creation of Soules, but of the first; He saith not, that God breathed into her nostrils the breath of lives as into *Adams*: there is not the least word or title that can seeme to signifie any such matter, and what reason can

can be given that he who omitteth not the circumstance of the manner of closing up *Adams* side againe, should overslip that miraculous worke of God in creating another new soule, if he had done so. Neither is it sufficient to say, it was in vaine to repeate it, for it is no where affirmed; and if it were not needfull, why should it still be doubtfull, and men left onely to guesse at it.

Secondly, Not only doth *Moses* not speake of any new created soule infused into her, but if only her body was made of that which was taken from *Adam*, (as is said) then for ought *Moses* speakes of it, it may be questioned whither shee had any soule or no; which must needs be very absurd especially considering it was his chiefe purpose to declare unto us the true beginning of every thing at the first. I doe not impute such an over-sight to the holy penman of

of God. Thirdly, ſo far is *Moſes* from teaching that, that he plainly affirmes the contrary; ſaying, that of that rib, he made a woman: not a body, ſpeaking of her whole perſon. and not of a part oneiy; unleſſe a woman may be a womã without a ſoule, as ſome ſilly ones have fooliſhly imagined.

Gen. 2. 22. *Zan. de operibus par. 3. li. 1. c. 1*

Gen. 2. 23.

Fourthly, thoſe that hold the contrary opinion, yet graunt that God did not onely take out the bare bone only out of *Adams* ſide, but ſome fleſh together with it; which made *Adam* to ſay, this is not onely bone of my bone, but fleſh of my fleſh. And it ſeemeth an unlikely thing, that being done inſtantly by the almighty power of GOD, he ſhould take out a dry and dead bone onely; and not the life, ſpirit, & ſoule, that was in it, (after the manner of the ſoules being in ſuch a ſubſtance) together with it Now if he tooke it thus

whole

whole together as it was, (the ſoule not being ſhut out of any part of the body;) how eaſie is it to conceive, how God might miraculouſly, in the firſt creation, ſeperate the whole matter of her perſon from *Adam* onely, and ſo of that bone as of a living body, produce a new creature in a ſhort time; which now in longer time uſe to be ſeperated from both ſexes, and ſo perfected by degrees in naturall generation: yea, why may not this originall affinitie between the two ſexes, give ſtrength to the courſe of nature in producing more, by uniting them againe in generation.

Fifthly, This is the more probable, becauſe herein we have a clear type of Chriſts incarnatiõ, whoſe whole humanity, (as we ſhall heratter ſee) was alſo miraculouſly made of the ſubſtance of the virgin onely, as *Eves* onely of *Adam*; a man of a woman onely,

onely, as a woman of a man only: both being insensible of it: and (as is probable) both asleep when it was done.

Lastly, when she was brought to *Adam*, he confessed that *shee was bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh*; that is, of the same humane nature that he himselfe was both for soule and body, and also taken out of him. Neither needed he to say, soule of my soule; for flesh is usually put for the whole person; as where (even in the same book) it is said,

Gen.6.12. *All flesh had corrupted their wayes*: which notwithstanding is chiefly in regard of the soule. And least any should doubt of it, he presently addes. *Shee shall be called Woman, because shee was taken out of man*: where he plainly affirmes, that her whole person was taken out of man, and for that cause was named woman, which cannot possibly be understood of the body onely. I will therefore

therefore hereunto subjoyne the forgoing words of our Saviour; *Let no man seperate what God hath joyned together*, and conclude that her whole person, as well soule as body was taken out of man. So that in this also, that of the Apostle is true, *God hath made all of one blood*, even *Adams*. Wherefore from this reason I also conclude the contrary, that seeing in all probabilitie *Adams* soule was of such a nature, as thereon could be made another, and ours are of the same nature that his was: it is not absurd, but very likely, that others may be made of ours also.

Mat. 19. 6.

Act. 17. 26.

The third and last reason of any weight is, that Christs soule was created of nothing, and he is like unto us in all things, sinne onely excepted (*ergo*, &c.) But first if it be necessary, that wee should be like unto him in all things except sin, then it would follow that we should be conceived

3.

1. From the creation of Christs soule.

ceived by the Holy Ghoſt, as he was, for that was without ſinne; eſpecially, if he might have been conceived without ſin, without that worke, as by this doctrine it ſeemes he might, as afterward
2. wee ſhall ſee. Secondly, it is not yet proved that Chriſts ſoule was immediately created of nothing; yea, it may be denied by the ſame reaſon, for then wee ſhould not be alike to him in all things except ſin. If it be ſaid that if Chriſts ſoule had beene traduced by ordinary generation, it muſt needs have beene ſinfull, I graunt it; and therefore, I ſay, it was that his conception was extraordinary and ſupernaturall; for it being impoſſible in nature for a Virgin to conceive without man, therefore this was brought to paſſe by the miraculous power of the Holy Ghoſt, who ſeperated a part of the Virgin for that purpoſe, and ſupplied what was wanting in nature by

by supernaturall power, which is signified in that it is said, *Shee was overshadowed by the holy Ghost.* But although he was not conceived after the manner that other men are, that so he might be without sinne: yet it followeth not from hence, but his whole humanitie, both soule and body might be made of the same matter that other mens are, so as he be not corrupted with sinne. Which how it may be, we shall heare in the proper place, where this also shall be brought as an Argument to prove the contrary: so weake are objections against the truth.

Lastly, Though it should be granted that Christs soule was immediately created by God, as the first *Adams* was; because it could not be propagated after the manner of mankinde without sinne, yet it would not follow, that all ours are therefore so, as they collect. Nay, the con-

trary plainly appeareth; for, for the ſame cauſe that his muſt be created immediately to be without ſinne, ours muſt be mediately that they may be ſinfull; and for the ſame cauſe he cannot be propagated without ſinne, we cannot be ſinfull unleſſe propagated.

And thus much for the Scripture, and reaſons drawne from them, to prove the immediate creation of ſoules. Whereby all men may ſee upon what weake grounds, this opinion is fathered upon the Scriptures. And now I am to encounter with the other troope of Arguments taken from the impoſſibilitie of the ſoules propagation.

Chap. VIII.

Whether propagation can ſtand with the ſpirituall nature of the Soule.

Objection ordered.

From the probabilitie of the Creation, proceed wee now unto

unto the impossibility of the propagation of the soule. And indeed the reasons oppugning the soules propagation are very many and forcible; and such as doe sufficiently prove that man cannot of himselfe alone (without some more special work of God) propagate his like as beasts doe theirs. The reasons (that wee may not be confounded with the number of them) are either such as do more specially respect the nature of the soule, not without some respect to propagation: or else such as doe more specially respect the nature of propagatiō, not without some respect to the soule. But before I come to the particulars, the generall answer to all may be this.

1. From the nature of the soule.

That all naturall reasons are taken from corporall generations, and so doe onely prove that soules cannot be propagated as bodies are, which is not denyed. For neither doth the body pro-

2. From the nature of propagation.

pagate the ſoule, neither yet is it propagated after a bodily manner: but the whol man generates the whole man after a manner convenient to either nature.

1. The ſoule ſupernaturall.

The firſt objection is that the ſoule is ſupernaturall, and nature cannot produce any thing above nature. But firſt it cannot be properly ſaid that the ſoule is ſupernaturall. It is indeed above elementary natures, and therefore I alſo deny, that it can be propagated of, or by the body alone. Againe, I ſay not that the whole man can beget his like, according to that common manner whereby other creatures are generated: but by the ſupernaturall power of GOD aſſiſting him. And ſo though it were ſupernaturall, yet it is not againſt nature that it ſhould be propagated, ſeeing as it is ſupernaturall, ſo it is ſupernaturally propagated.

2. Spirits cannot propagate.

Secondly, It is objected that the ſoule is a ſimple ſpirit, like unto

unto Angels: and therefore as one Angell cannot beget another, so neither can soules.

First, I answer, that we might with as good reason, reason thus; soules are like unto Angels, and Angels cannot be united with bodies, therefore soules cannot. 1.

Secondly, I doe not say that one soule doth beget another, but one man another. For generation is not of matter, or forme onely, but of the whole compound, consisting of matter and forme. 2. *Homo generat nec materiam nec formam, sed rerũ compositum.*

Thirdly, though soules are of a simple spirituall substance, as are Angels in respect of elementary; yet even Angels themselves and much more mens soules, are not without a spirituall kinde of composition. For to be simply simple, is proper onely to the nature of God.

Fourthly, Mens soules are of a farre more inferiour nature,

and ſo are more compounded than the nature of Angels: and very fit it was that they ſhould be ſo, that they might be the more ſutable to corporall natures, with whom it pleaſed the Creator to unite them.

Laſtly, We ſee it is the will of God, that ſoules ſhould be produced with bodyes, one after another in a naturall order to the worlds end, and therefore hath conferred his efficient power for the effecting thereof from the beginning; none of all which can be affirmed of Angels. And now let reaſō or any reaſonable man judge, whether it will follow, that becauſe one Angell neither doth nor can beget another, therfore man cannot beget man; yea, God cannot by man produce one ſoule out of another, though after a metaphyſicall manner, as for the reaſons aforeſaid we cannot throughly conceive.

Of

Of the ſame kinde is that objection, that the ſoule is immateriall, and the reaſon ſtands thus: Whatſoever is made, muſt be either of nothing, or of ſome matter pre-exiſting: now the ſoule is without matter, and therfore cannot be propagated, but muſt needs be immediately created of nothing. But I deny the ſoule is altogether immateriall; for although it hath no elementary matter, yet it hath ſpirituall matter: For all created ſpirits, being compounded of act and potency, have a kinde of ſimilitude with corporall natures, both in regard of matter and forme; yea, even Angels themſelves. But by a kinde of tranſcendency, their matter is as our forme, and their forme as the forme of our forme: which becauſe we want fitter words, may indifferently be called ſpirituall matter and forme, which doe beſt of all agree with the inferior

3. The ſoule is immateriall.

The ſpirituall matter of the ſoule.

nature of the ſoule: And if it be ſaid, it can have no ſuch ſpirituall matter, becauſe then it muſt be of ſuch a nature as may receive contrary formes, as we ſee in the generation of all other creatures, by reaſon whereof the ſoule ſhall be made corruptible. I anſwer, firſt, that though it be ſo in elementary generations, yet it followeth not in ſpirituall compoſitions, ſeeing their matter is of an higher kind. Secondly, Though nature cannot produce one ſoule out of another, but by a corruptible courſe, yet it followeth not but the God of nature may. Thirdly, as the ſoule to ſpeake properly, conſiſts rather of power than any parts: ſo the propagation is rather by promotion then any deciſion. Fourthly as the ſoule hath its eſſence more in the power and faculty, than in the matter of it: ſo more is to be aſcribed to the efficient, than to the materiall

all cauſe, more to God than to man, and yet that according to the courſe of nature too. Laſtly, as man is the perfection of the creatures, ſo his is the perfection of generation. It is no ſtrange thing therefore, but very fitting that there ſhould be ſomewhat in it tranſcending the common courſe, as namely, that one immortall nature ſhould be derived from another, by ſuch a kind of generatiõ as is very neere a creation, by vertue of that firſt ordination, and continuall aſſiſtance of the father of ſpirits, on whom the ſoule hath ſo neere a dependance.

4. The ſoule corruptible.

Againe, it is objected that the ſoule is incorruptible. and it is a rule in nature, *Generatio unius eſt corruptio alterius*; the generation of one is the corruption of another. Now if in every generation there muſt be a corruption, ſeeing the ſoule cannot be corrupted, it cannot be generated neither.

neither. But, first, if this corruption should be graunted in the generation of the soule, it is onely in *termino a quo*, which cannot hinder the immortalitie of the soule that is propagated, neither doth it belong to the soule that doth propagate, for the generation is of the soule generated, not of the soule generating. Againe, what manner of corruption is that which is here meant? A perishing indeed, but such an one is rather a perfecting. For in generation the seed is not corrupted by putrefaction, but by perfection; that is, it ceaseth to be that which before it was, and is made that which it was not; because the potentiall being is turned into actuall being; seed into a creature: so that the thing is the same that it was before, though not after the same manner that before it was: and thus I graunt there is a corruption in the soules generation, namely, it ceaseth

ceaſeth to be in power onely when it is in act: and why then there is not ſomething in man that is not the ſoule, but rather the ſeminary of the ſoule, as the ſeede is of the body, wee ſhall heare afterwards.

5. It can ſubſiſt by it ſelfe.

Another argument is taken from the power that the ſoule hath to ſubſiſt by it ſelfe without the body after this manner: if the ſoule cannot be produced without the body, then can it not live without the body: and if the bodies generation be the cauſe of producing it, the bodies corruption muſt alſo cauſe the death of it; but the ſoule can live without the body, and cannot be corrupted by it; and therefore is not generated neither with nor by the body. Theſe things thus hudled up together, are partly true and partly falſe: for, firſt, there is not, nor ever was there a ſoul produced without a body: that opinion of *Origen*

gen was justly hissed out long agoe: So that though no soule is produced by the body, yet no soule is produced without it. Secondly, it is not to be thought that any soule is produced by the body otherwise then by an assisting cause, or *causa sine qua non*; whether wee consider the body generating or generated: but this, I say, that the soule is not brought forth without the seede of the parents, and yet not by that as it is corporall onely, but as there is soule-seede, or rather spirituall power in it: And thus the soule shall be no lesse able to subsist by it selfe, although it be not propagated without the body, then a childe shall not be able to live after the death of his parents, by whom it was brought forth into the world; and as it is not generated, so neither can it be corrupted by the body. Lastly, it cannot be said properly that the soule doth subsist

subsist by it selfe alone, so long as it is united to the body, for according to the course of nature it cannot doe so; but after the death of the body, for as much as it is not made of mortall seede nor produced meerely by the power of nature, and therefore cannot die: it cannot doe otherwise but must of necessitie subsist by it selfe alone without the body. Of the same kinde is that objection, that as the body cannot corrupt or hurt the soule, so much lesse can the soule be propagated by the body. For if it be absurd to say the soule is infected with sin by the body, (because that which is corporeall cannot worke upon that which is incorporeall) much more absurd is it that the soule should be generated by the body. But this also falleth beside without hurting, for though the soule cannot be generated of or by the body (which I also confidently affirme)

6. It cannot be hurt by the body.

affirme) yet this is no impediment why it cannot be produced out of the ſoule by the efficient power of God, to which the body alſo may be an inſtrumentall cauſe in this as well as it is in all other ordinary actions of the ſoule.

7. It worketh in-organically.

Laſtly, it is objected that ſeeing the proper actions of the ſoule (as to underſtand and will) are performed without any help of the body: ſo alſo is the originall being of it; for ſuch as the operation of any thing is, ſuch is the eſſence, and contrarily, as Philoſophy teacheth. But firſt it may be doubted whether any action of the ſoule be performed without any helpe at all from the body ſo long as the union laſteth. Secondly, for as much as the ſoule ordinarily doth neither underſtand nor will, without the aſſiſtance of the animall ſpirits, it followes (according to the former rule) that

that by the course of nature neither is the originall without some operation of the body. And whereas it is said, the mind it selfe must be free from all matters, that it may be the better able to discerne the same; as the eye judgeth of colours: this may proceed not so much from the vacuity of matter, as the equall respect it hath to all matter. For being the perfection of this mundane frame, it hath the Idea of all natures in it, as the eye doth represent all colours. But as the agent is more noble than the patient, though proportioned to it, so is the soule above all matter, and yet agreeing with it. Answerable whereunto the originall (according to the former rule) must needs be more transcendent than the cõmon course of generation. Lastly, all those arguments are more forcible to prove that the soule cannot be united with the body: and being ma-

manifestly false in that, they have small probabilitie of truth in this.

Chapter IX.

Whether the losse of seed be the losse of soules.

Objection from propagation it selfe.

But the most forcible arguments (and which are indeed accounted impossible to be overcome) are those which are taken from the course of nature in propagation it selfe, whether we consider the matter or manner of it; the matter conceived, or the manner of conception. As first, because many soules must be lost, because much seede is. Secondly, because the soule must come from two soules. Thirdly, the parents must loose part of their soules. Lastly, touching the manner of conception, it may well be questioned how this doctrine can stand with

with the time of conception; the imperfect beginning and the varietie of conceptions in the same wombe. All which seeme to take away all power from man, for having any part in the propagation of the soule: and these being the chiefe difficulties, if they may be well cleated, I doubt not but this doctrine will easily be received.

In one & the same wombe.

First therefore to begin with the first, which concernes the losse of seede, which although it may seeme difficult at the first, yet (I trust) may receive a reasonable answer; for the adversaries of this doctrine doe thus reason against it: If the soule be propagated by the seede, what shall become of so much seede as is lost? either in sleepe, or by such dishonest means, as *Er* and *Onan* practised, or which being received into the wombe, never commeth to conception? What (say they) shall so many soules be

1. *Obj.* About the losse of soules.

Gen. 38. 9.

be loſt? or ſhall they be choaked in the wombe? or ſhall they remaine alone without bodyes, ſeeing it is certaine, they are not to be accounted amongſt the number of men? In a word, becauſe it cannot be denyed but much ſeede paſſeth from man which never commeth to perfection, no not to conception; hence they conclude, that if the ſoule paſſeth in the ſeede, then many ſoules periſh, and ſo the ſoule ſhall not be immortall.

How the ſoule is in the ſeede, & yet not loſt with it.

But theſe conceive not rightly, yea, too baſely and bruitiſhly of the ſoules generation; imagining that wch no man ſound in his wits will goe about to maintaine. For by that which hath been ſaid, it appeareth that the ſoule never paſſeth in the ſeede, but at the inſtant of conception, and from thenceforth a new ſoule remaineth in the conceived fruit. Neither can it be properly ſaid that it paſſeth then,

then, for as the ſoule is in the body, and yet not conteined of it, ſo it is alwayes in the ſeede, though not comprehended by it, and whenſoever the ſeede proves not effectuall, the ſoule remaines as it was, what ever becomes of the ſeede; for the ſoule is never procreated but in conception, when both ſeedes meete in a due proportion, and become one, and when the efficient power of God concurring with all other naturall cauſes, doe out of the ſubſtance of the generating ſoules, produce another together with a body capable of that divine forme.

Some reſemblance whereof wee may ſee in the lighting of a Lamp or Candle; for as fire is the moſt ſpirituall of all corporall ſubſtances, ſo by it wee may have the cleareſt reſemblance in this caſe; the ſoule of man may well be compared to a ſpirituall flame, united to the body by the ſpirits. *Simile.*

be loſt? or ſhall they be choaked in the wombe? or ſhall they remaine alone without bodyes, ſeeing it is certaine, they are not to be accounted amongſt the number of men? In a word, becauſe it cannot be denyed but much ſeede paſſeth from man which never commeth to perfection, no not to conception; hence they conclude, that if the ſoule paſſeth in the ſeede, then many ſoules periſh, and ſo the ſoule ſhall not be immortall.

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then, for as the soule is in the body, and yet not conteined of it, so it is alwayes in the seede, though not comprehended by it, and whensoever the seede proves not effectuall, the soule remaines as it was, what ever becomes of the seede; for the soule is never procreated but in conception, when both seedes meete in a due proportion, and become one, and when the efficient power of God concurring with all other naturall causes, doe out of the substance of the generating soules, produce another together with a body capable of that divine forme.

Some resemblance whereof wee may see in the lighting of a Lamp or Candle; for as fire is the most spirituall of all corporall substances, so by it wee may have the cleerest resemblance in this case; the soule of man may well be compared to a spirituall flame, united to the body by the spirits, *Simile.*

ſpirits, as the flame of the Lamp by the oyle; now as in the lighting of a Lamp, every touch of fire doth not kindle it, but as after blowing and fit applying of fire thereunto, it ſometimes flameth with a touch; ſo the ſoule is not kindled at every conjunction of ſeedes, but onely then when (as I ſaid before) it is blowne by the efficient power of God, which meeting with all other naturall cauſes, out of the matter of theſe flames applied, this new heavenly flame (the ſoule) is produced. And as in that elementary inflammation the Lamp is not turned into the flame, but inflamed by another; ſo the corporall ſeede is not turned into the ſoule, but informed with a ſoule by others. Which ſoule being a ſpirituall flame, not nouriſhed by any elementary matter as the other is, nor kindled without that everlaſting breath whence it firſt came: it

can

can never after be extinguished as the other may. And hence it commeth to passe, not onely that soules perish not when any seede is lost, but also that in case mans seede be mingled with other creatures (as it sometimes happeneth) such unkindly conceptiõs are never informed with reasonable soules: not onely for that there is a want in the concurrence of all naturall causes; but because God doth not conferre his efficient power, but where and when he pleaseth. To conclude, therefore it appeareth that soules are neither lost, nor choaked in the wombe; nor yet constrained to live alone without bodyes when the seede proves not effectuall, for then there is no soule produced; I will not say, but there may be fire, but in that case (I dare say) there is no such flame kindled.

CHAP.

Chapter X.

How one ſoule can proceede from two ſoules.

2. *Obj.* That the ſoule muſt be mingled of the parents ſoule.

THe former objection being taken away, we are to proceed to the ſecond, which is that if the ſoule be traduced from the parents, it muſt needs be as well from the mothers ſoule as the fathers, and if from both, then either there muſt be two ſoules, or elſe two ſoules muſt be mingled together, and ſo grow into one, both which are no leſſe than impoſſible, to which (although it ſeemes unanſwerable) theſe things which ſhall be ſpoken, being throughly conſidered, I truſt will give ſufficient ſatisfaction. For firſt, why might wee not for the ſame cauſe ſay, that there muſt be two bodyes alſo, one from the father and another from the mother? and if it be ſaid that one partakes of both,

both, how comes it to paſſe then, that it is ſometimes like the father onely, & ſometimes onely like the mother; yea, oftentimes a ſon like the mother and a daughter like the father. In all other things moſt contrary to that part from whence the ſex is received. And if it muſt be confeſſed that the worke of nature herein is above reaſon, what wonder if it be ſo in the ſoule alſo; yea, why ſhould it not be ſo in that, much rather than in this? and if the former draw us onely to an admiration, but not to a negation of it, becauſe the thing is apparent: why ſhould not the latter doe ſo alſo, ſeeing in nature it is no leſſe manifeſt then the former, both being brought forth together as wee ſee? To come a little neerer the matter, I would firſt of all demand how it commeth to paſſe, that among all living creatures of two divers ſeeds, that is to

One creature cannot be made of two ſouls.

Vide *Scal. de subti. exer.* 268.

ſay, of the male and female is notwithſtanding generated but one creature of the one kinde; Since as Philoſophers truely teach, the ſpecies of things cannot be mingled no more than ſoules: and the eſſence of every thing is indiviſible; and two formes cannot be made one. Now ſeeing the ſeede of any creature conteines in it both matter and forme thereof: and is the ſame in *potentiâ* (as they ſpeake) differing from the creature it ſelfe onely ſo much as power differeth from act; that is, ability to be or doe, from being or being done; how therefore can it poſſibly be that one creature can be produced from two ſeedes in univocall generations; ſeeing alſo that vegetative nature have therefore but one ſeede. Theſe reaſons made *Ariſtotle* deny that females had any ſeede at all, being onely as the ground wherein ſeede is ſowen.

Now

Now if this be true, the point is cleare without any farther opening; for then the ſoule proceeding from the ſoule of the father onely, there ſhall not need be two ſoules, nor one mingled of two. But this is denied, & therefore ſome further anſwer is to be ſought out. For though the ſex proceed not from the ſex, yet (they ſay) if this were true, neither by the courſe of nature could ever be propagation by both. Be it ſo, yet I ſay, that as two ſeeds produce but one creature, becauſe the ſeeds of male and female, though they be two in number are but one kind (elſe there muſt be two bodyes alſo) ſo it is cõcerning the ſoule more plainly, I ſay, that as the ſeede of either apart cannot properly be called ſeed-ſeed, becauſe neither of them alone conteines the matter and forme of the creature, and is not *Animal in potentiâ*; but at the inſtant of conception,

How the ſoule is from both as both are one.

The ſeede of both but one ſeede.

tion, when both ſeedes are ſo mingled that therein is conteined the power of producing the like, then onely it is rightly called ſeede; and before, onely, becauſe it may be thus; for that is to be actually ſeede to have this potency in it: ſo as the ſeede is properly but one in all ſenſitive creatures aſwell as in vegetative, in that ſenſe that theirs is: ſo in like manner, I ſay, that the ſpirituall ſeede of the ſoule (if by way of reſemblance I may ſo call it) is not in the ſeverall ſeede of either ſex (for there is no ſuch materiall or locall diviſion) but rather in both when but one. For in generation wee may not conceive one act to be made of two; but two in act doe make one. The myſtery of wh chunion lyes in this, that the nature is one, and the ſexes two, which againe united in one produce a third.

For by the ſpirituall ſeede of the

the parents soules, I doe not meane any seperated matter, as the bodies is: but far otherwise: namely, that potentiall vertue in the parents soules, which in conjunction uniting their forces together out of their owne matter doe enforme their seede with their nature, that is, a soule apprehended and united by the spirits therein. It being the ordinance of God that mans nature should be distinguished into two sexes, that by the more forcible union of both, the whole kinde might be preserved: And because the soule is rather facultie than matter, the seed must needs be rather power than sperme. Now the reason why parents doe cõmunicate a soule to their issue, is because in this conjunction two are made one flesh, not onely carnally, but the very soules doe so cleave together, that if it were possible they would lose their proper formes

What the soules seed is, & how generated.

The production of soules.

Gen. 2. 24.

and become one, which though being tyed by nature or rather Gods seperation (which yet is not farre removed) they cannot effect; yet by the fitnesse of other causes concurring, and the infinite power and wisdome of God so ordaining and assisting, another soule and creature like the former is produced. The like whereof we may see in æquivocall generations, where when one thing is changing into another, even in the very change, a third most commonly is ingendred. And so here it is to be thought that in the interchanging of soules (if I may so say) even in a small moment of time, this is performed; as it were by conceit or fancy, and therefore is worthily called conception, or conceiving. Whence is that of *Athanasius*, who saith, even as fire is begotten by the striking together of the stone and the steele; so is the soule by the parents.

Things breeding without seede.

Why conception so called.

Atha. lib. de var. qu. 16.

rents. By all which it plainly appeareth, that although the ſoule be received both from the father and the mother, and indifferently from both, yet it followeth not therupon that there muſt be two ſoules, neither yet that two ſoules ſhould thereby be mingled in one; no more than the ſeeds of both which are not two ſeeds mingled or two forms made one (which is impoſſible) but onely one; and that no leſſe ſimple, ſpirituall, and immortall, than either of the former.

CHAP. XI.

How the ſoule can be propagable, and yet indiviſible.

BY that which hath beene ſaid, there is a way opened alſo, for the clearing of that other difficulty, concerning the indiviſible nature of the ſoule, which they ſay cannot poſſibly

3. *Obj.* Parents ſoules divided.

ſtand with the courſe of generation. For if the ſoule be propagated from the parents, it muſt needs be, that either the whole ſoule of the father is traduced, and ſo the father ſhall be left ſoule-leſſe; or elſe ſome part and portion of the ſoule, and ſo the ſoule ſhall be diviſible: and the like may be ſaid of the mothers ſoule, as well as the fathers. For the anſwering of this objection, it muſt be conſidered that the ſubſtance & matter of the ſoule is not like theſe corporall natures; and ſo though this would follow in thoſe, yet not in that. It is commonly ſaid of Philoſophers (to which Divines alſo conſent) that the ſoule is *tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte*; wholly in the whole body, and wholly in every part. So that the ſoule cannot be divided into parts; but if we will needs conſider of a part, that part is the whole and yet the whole not divided,

1. How a part is the whole.

vided, and therefore when one ſoule is propagated of another, it is all one whether we ſay it be of the whole, or of a part: for even that part is the whole, and yet (according to the received doctrine) the whole not divided, nor any whit diminiſhed.

2. No parts but powers.

Others deale ſomewhat more ſubtilly herein, as that learned both Philoſopher and Divine *Keckerman*; who in his Phyſickes treating on this ſubject ſaith, that the ſoule is not united to the body by any phyſicall or corporall touching, and thereupon concludeth thus: *Et quia anima non unitur corpori per contactum ideo etiam non concluditur extremitatibus corporis, ſicut aqua concluditur extremitatibus vaſis, & quia non concluditur extremitatibus corporis ideo etiam non extenditur ad extenſionem corporis, & per conſequens, fruſtra quæritur, an ſit in toto corpore tota, an in ſingulis partibus tota:* Becauſe the ſoule

Keck. Syn. l. 4. cap. 6.

is not united to the body by touching, therefore alſo it is not included within the bounds of the body (as water is in a veſſell) and becauſe it is not ſo included within the bounds of the body, therefore alſoit is not ſtretched out to the utmoſt limits of the body; and conſequently it is a vaine quære, whether the whole ſoule be in the whole body, or whole in every part. Now if this indeed be the truth (as indeed it commeth neerer to the pure nature of the ſoule) it is no whit leſſe to the preſent purpoſe; ſeeing it followeth accordingly, that the ſoule is in the ſeede, and yet not conteined of it: and ſo the propagatiõ thereof is rather a powerfull operation, than any locall diviſion. For ſeeing all confeſſe that the eſſence of the ſoule, properly conſidered, conſiſts not in parts, but in powers; it muſt needs be confeſſed likewiſe that proportionably thereunto

unto that the propagation of the ſoule is not by deciſion, whereby one part is ſeperated from another; but by promotion, whereby the ſame power is effected in another, which it hath in it ſelfe; and this is the manner of propagation, which (as I ſaid) is cõvenient to the nature of the ſoule. The rather is this to be received as agreeable to nature and reaſon, becauſe if it be well obſerved, we ſhall finde that the very nature and eſſence of ſoules conſiſt chiefly in their faculties: as corporall natures in their elementary compoſition: and God himſelfe in vertues: his nature, being, as well as being moſt knowne, in goodneſſe, juſtice, mercy, &c. which perfections as they are too high to be eſſentiall to any created nature: ſo are they all that one eſſentiall vertue which is in God, or rather which is God himſelfe. Now ſeeing the ſoules nature conſiſts eſpe-

especially in the divine faculty of it, this doctrine may best be cleared by considering the faculties thereof. Whereby it may appear, even as when I give another my understanding, or make him know that which I know, my knowledge is still the same, and nothing diminished: so when these intellectuall natures, I meane one soule produceth another, the soule is still the same and indivisible. I know to communicate the notion is one thing & the faculty another: notwithstanding herein the similitude holdeth, that even as the notion communicated to another, is nevertheless perfect in his minde that imparts it: so even the faculty it selfe (which in respect of corporall natures is as a reall notion) when it is propagated to another, is nevertheless perfect in him from whom it proceedeth.

4. And that it is thus the proper-

ty

ty of ſpirituall natures to looſe nothing themſelves in communicating their eſſence to others, may farther appeare by the teſtimony of that learned divine *Zanchy*; who in confuting the heretickes objection againſt the divinitie of our Saviour Chriſt, reaſoning after this manner, that if he receive the whole eſſence of the Father, the Father ſhall be left deſtitute: and if but a part, then it will follow that the eſſence of God is diviſible, anſwers the ſame thus; that he receiveth the whole eſſence, and yet the Father hath it all ſtill. For, ſaith he, ſpirituall natures whileſt they are communicated, are neither wholly taken away, nor any thing at all diminiſhed. His words be theſe; *Res enim ſpirituales, dum communicantur; neq; tolluntur penitus, neq; etiam imminuuntur.* Neither can it be ſaid, that this is proper to God, ſeeing he affirmes it of all ſpirituall natures

Spirituall natures may be communicated, cannot be diminiſhed.

Zanch. de trin. Elob. par. 2. l. 3. cap. 7.

tures indifferently; yea what elſe can be meant by the indiviſible-neſſe of the ſoule, but that it is of ſuch a nature as cannot be diminiſhed by taking ought from it? elſe how ſhould it differ from corporall natures, for even they cannot be diminiſhed if nought be taken from them? yet, I ſay, not that the ſoule can be parted at all, after the manner of dividing corporall natures; but this, I ſay, as the eſſence and forme of every creature is indiviſible, no leſſe than the ſoule, and yet they can out of themſelves propagate their like, without making their forme or eſſence diviſible, ſo may man produce his like without dividing his form or eſſence, which is his ſoule. For ſeeing the forme of a beaſt, as it is ſo, is as much indiviſible as mans ſoule, and experience proves that they notwithſtanding communicate their formes to their iſſue, why alſo may not parents give ſoules

to

to their of-spring without dividing their own? especially considering man is the most excellent creature, who must needs therefore excell in this faculty as well as in others. Neither can it be said, that then his soule must be full of soules, no more then that other creatures should therfore have in them many of their own kinds, because they beget many: for as *Scaliger* well answers, there is in that one sufficient power for the generating of many: and so much for those objectiõs which are taken from the matter conceived, I proceed now to those that concerne the manner of conception.

The soule not full of soules.

Scal. exer. 6. sect. 10.

Chapter XII.

How the manner of conception can stand with the soules generation.

TOuching the manner of conception, three things especially

Objectiõs.

especially are and may be objected: First, it is doubted whether conception be in the act of generation or afterwards. Secondly, it should seeme by this, that the soule is imperfect at the first, and grows by degrees with the body. Lastly, it may be questioned, how superfetation, and the conception of twinnes, can stand with this manner of the soules propagation And if these also can be well cleared, there is nothing more materiall worth the questioning.

1. Whether conception be in generation.

First, I say, it is a question amongst the learned, whether conception be at the first union of seeds or no: for (as some Physitiās write) there must be a certaine concoction and preparation of the seede before conception. First of all I might answer, that the ordinance of God herein is so wonderfull as passeth all mens understandings, so as none can say directly how it is, either for

for the soule or for the body: it being one of those things which *David* professeth was too wonderfull for him, and therefore much more for us. And yet if we make no questiō of the conception of the body, though we cannot conceive the manner how; why should we be more doubtfull and inquisitive about the soule, of which we know we are lesse able to conceive?

Psal. 139. vers. 6.

2. That the soule begins with the creature.

Secondly, I answer, that though it should be granted, that the more grosse and corporall parts of the seede doe (as indeed they do) require time before they can be throughly mixed & knit together to make a perfect conception: yet in reason it must needs be, that the more spirituall parts, and chiefly the soule is conceived in the first instant; I meane a small moment of time, and that in the beginning at the first meeting and union of the seeds of both sexes. And thus it must

must needs be, not only becauſe ſpirituall natures are more quick and ſubtill, and ſo move in leſſe time than corporall; and therefore may doe that in a moment, which the other cannot doe but in a longer time; whence it is that in eating and drinking wee ſee the ſpirits are refreſhed, and the man ſtrengthened immediately after he hath eaten, before ever the meat can be concocted; but alſo experiẽce teacheth, that in the breeding of all creatures, the internall parts are perfect before the externall, the more ſpirituall parts of the body, before thoſe that are more groſſe and corporall; and therefore it followeth by like reaſon that the ſpirits in man have their perfection before the body, and the ſoule before the ſpirits: for there is no doubt but nature obſerves the ſame order in the beginning that ſhe doth in the continuance of her worke, there being one and

and the same cause of both. Againe, be it that there is such a concoction in conception, (as in respect of the body questionlesse there is) yet it cannot be denied, but the corporall parts are prepared & perfected by the other, which must needs therefore be first, and in the first instant; for that which beginneth must of necessitie be in the beginning; because all that is done afterward is by vertue of that power wherewith it was informed at first. For that power becoms the first act of the conceived fruit, and is the very soule of the creature, wherewith if the seede be not informed at the beginning, all comes to nothing at the end. ἐντελέχεια πρώτη.

And hence it is that if all causes doe not fitly concurre together for the forming the seede with the soule at first, by whose working it may proceed to perfection afterward, the whole worke is frustrated.

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The consideration whereof may teach us, what the reason in nature should be, that there is more failing in the conception of man than of other creatures. Namely, because the soule being of a more excellent nature in man, requires a more fit proportion, and due temper of all meanes, before such a heavenly flame can be kindled, and the seede informed and united therwith, then is necessary for the production of any other creature whatsoever. Now this very beginning only is properly conception, all that followeth afterward being nothing but a continued perfecting of this beginning by insensible degrees: which not nature but reason, hath distinguished into conception, forming, quickning, &c. to every of which that time is allotted, wherein that worke most appeares, though natures work be one and the same from the beginning.

But here it will be objected, that if the ſoule be in the ſeede at the firſt conception, it muſt needs be very weake and imperfect at the firſt, and ſo growing and increaſing with the body, it muſt alſo decreaſe and dye with it.

2. Whether the ſoule be imperfect at firſt.

For anſwer whereunto, I would firſt of all demand of them who hold that it comes by immediate creation, how the ſoule of an infant newly quickened in the mothers wombe, can be as perfect as when it is a perfect man? Surely there is not ſo much difference (at leaſt in the ſoules appearance) betweene conception and quickening, as is betweene quickning and manhood: when therefore they anſwer the one, I may happily thereby alſo anſwer the other. But not to ſtay ſo long, in the ſecond place I anſwer, that all ſoules as well the ſoules of beaſts as of men, are eſſentially as perfect in the firſt inſtant

instant of conception, as ever afterward, yea, even the soule of a plant when it is in the seed, for though not being of such a fiery nature as living creatures, and wanting meanes to exercise its power, it may lye a while, yea, many years as dead (as Mustard-seed will doe) yet the vegetative soule in the essence thereof, is as perfect as the most perfect plant, as plainly appeareth so soone as the meanes of growing is administred to it. Now if the soules of other creatures (which as they are soules doe neither increase nor decrease, no more than the soule of a man doth, may be perfect when they shew no perfection) no nor action at all, why should we thinke mans soule imperfect, because it doth not manifest the perfections at all times alike. And if this be a good argument against the propagation of the soule, because it should then seeme to be imperfect

Reasons proving the soules perfection in the first conceptiō.

1.

2.

fect at the first, and so to grow up with the body: why should not that be as good against the immortalitie of the soule, that it seemes also to dye and decay with the body? yea why should 3.
it not be much stronger, seeing it may better stand with the nature of immortalitie to increase, & grow better, than to decrease and wax worse? But to put all 4.
out of doubt, seeing all confesse that the soule is ἐντελέχεια πρώτη, the prime act or first mover, and essentiall forme of the creature; it must needs be perfect at the first, and alwayes the same. For reason teacheth that that which is first, and gives perfection to all the rest, cannot have another before it to give perfection to that; for so there should be a first before the first: and a soule of the soule. And seeing the soule is the essentiall forme, it must needs be unchangeable also: for it is impossible the forme should be

be altered, so long as the creature continues the same, what creature soever it be. So that this never change but at death, nor then neither in men: because it is begotten of immortall seede, and not brought forth without the immediate hand of GOD. It skilleth not therfore whether the soule can see, heare, or reason, when it is in the seede: it sufficeth that it hath that spirituall and divine nature, which when the organs are perfected, is able to doe it. Herein it is with the soule as with the body; the child newly conceived hath not the fashion of an humane body; yet is there all that is essentiall to the nature of it, as will in time appeare; so is there all that is essentiall to the soule in conception: but the bodily parts requiring time hath it imperfectly, the soule being spirituall and above time, hath it perfectly in the first instant: yet in this case

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the soule must stay for the expression of it selfe, till the body be perfected; and then all those (seeming) new-come perfections, are to the soules as cloths to the body: onely accidentall ornaments, and externall habits, which doe not alter it indeed, but onely in shew.

3. Of conception of Twinnes.

Lastly, concerning the question of superfetation, whether twins be conceived at once or at divers times; we need not much to dispute. For whether it be either or both wayes, it makes no matter; for if nature hath power to worke so diversly for the producing of bodies, there is no question but that both God and nature is able to indue them with soules accordingly. And it is sufficient for the point in hand, that howsoever the manner of generation be, there is (at least of the soule whereof we dispute) but one conception of one, and that at once, which once is in ptopa-

gation. For though among other creatures, the receiving of the ſeede once, ſometimes produceth many, and often, many times but one; yet we need not grant it ſo in humane propagation: and yet if we ſhould in regard of the former we need not doubt (as I ſaid) but God is as powerfull to produce ſoules, as nature is to bring forth bodies: and for the other, we muſt needs thinke, either that the former is a propagation to the latter, or elſe the latter a perfecting of the former (otherwiſe there would be divers bodyes too, any or all of which rightly underſtood, may well ſtand with this manner of the ſoules propagation: yet in all probability there is but one for one with us; howſoever there are many for one; and one for many in ſome other creatures. Further then this, I thinke no modeſt or reaſonable man will or need inquire; but rather con-

conclude this point as the Psalmist begins it; *I will praise the Lord, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marveilous are thy workes, and that my soule knoweth right well.* Psal. 139. 14.

Thus we have seene (I hope) sufficient reason, that it is not against reason, that God should produce one soule out of the spirituall matter of another, by the helpe of bodily organs. And if it were against reason, yet reason teacheth, that we should rather teach it, than that which is against Religion; which we are now to prove, for having thus explained my assertion, & cleered the way by answering all the materiall objections that I can meet with; whether from divine or naturall reason against it; whence it is manifest that it may be so: I will now proceed to prove that it is so. Conclusion of all the objections.

Chap. XIII.

Testimonies out of the old Testament, proving the soules propagation.

The methode observed in proving the soules propagation.

As the former arguments to disprove this mediate manner of the soules propagation, were of two sorts; Scripture, and naturall reasons; so also shall the arguments to prove the same be. For seeing God hath a two-fold voyce, the one speaking in the Booke of the Scriptures, and the other in the Booke of the Creatures; when the divine Oracles of the former cannot be heard, we must give eare to naturall reasons drawne out of the latter: the voyce of nature agreeing with the Scriptures, being indeed the voyce of God. The prooфes from the Scripture, shall be of two sorts likewise, either direct testimonies, or reasons drawne from them. And againe the

the testimonies shalbe first from the old, and then from the new Testament, which we will take up in order as wee shall meet with them.

And first that this doctrine may not seeme new, I will prove it even from the beginning of the world, beginning first with the testimony of God himselfe, who in the day he created man upon the face of the earth; he created them male and female, and blessed them, and said unto them; *Be fruitfull, and multiply, and replenish the earth.* Here without any limitatiō, they are commanded to fill the whole earth, & to subdue it also, which must certainly be understood of the whole man, and not of the body onely. For what is the body that it should subdue the earth, or who is man that he should limit the holy One of Israel? or presume to set bounds where God hath set none? Neither can there

1. Gods first Institution. Gen. 1. 27, 28.

be any colour of doubt how this is to be understood, seeing God spake the very same immediately before, even to the fishes and fowles. For, saith the Text, *God blessed them, saying, be fruitfull and multiply, and fill the waters, &c.* As therefore God so framed their natures, and gave such power unto them, that the like might produce the like unto it selfe, as touching the whole creature: so if we will beleeve God and his word, man doth produce man the whole, the whole as well as other creatures. Besides, how can it stand with reason, that that blessing that proves sufficiently effectuall to the basest creatures, should not only be effectual in man the most excellent, especially so grossely defective, as that man should not be able to propagate man, but some imperfect formelesse peice of a creature, which indeed is so unnaturall, as no man knowes what

Verse 22.

what to call it. For the body of a man can be no more termed man, than the carcase of a bruite beast, can be called a bruit beast: and shall a beast, upon whom there is no such blessing expressly pronounced in Scripture, be acknowledged to doe more this way in his kinde, than man who was most expressly blessed, even twice over? yea, is it not contrary to reason, and religion too, that God should command man that which he did not give him power to performe? for it is manifest, that God did not onely blesse, but command them, and it is no lesse manifest, did extend to the whole man. Now if Gods cõmand reacheth to the whole man, and mans power reacheth onely to the body, or carcase; how can it be avoided but Gods command, shall be in vaine and unreasonable, if not unjust? If in this worke the chiefe part belongs to God, it cannot with

reason be ascribed to man; neither can God command him to doe all (according to his kinde, that is the law of nature) if he can doe but the least part. Lastly, it is to be considered that God so framed the nature of every living creature, that it was apt, not onely for the bringing forth of the body, but also, and especially of the soule, that being the chiefe part of the creature: so that this blessing and command of God doth principally respect the soule in every creature. Whence it followeth that it is more absurd to deny the propagation of the soule, than of the body; but most of all absurd to deny it in man, who of all other creatures, is the most excellent, and herein most especially blessed of God.

To conclude therefore from the premises we may well frame this argument, that if the voyce & ordinance of God, be no lesse

effectu-

effectuall in man, then it is in the reſt of the living creatures propagating: then according to the ordinance of God, man begetteth whole man, ſoule and body. But the Antecedent is true, as appeares in the text, and therefore allſo the conſequent.

2. Gods reſting from his labour.

Secondly, It appeareth that God ſo ordered the nature of all creatures in the beginning, that they might perſiſt of themſelvs, and multiply their kinds by the power of nature; that ſo he himſelfe might not need to be alwayes creating new creatures: and herein man was ranked amongſt the reſt without any difference. And ſo on the ſeventh day (ſaith *Moſes*) God ended the worke which he had made, and he reſted on the ſeventh day from all his workes which he had made.

How then dare we ſet him aworke to create thouſands of new ſouls every day at our pleaſure.

Oli.

Anſ. I know the ordinary anſwer is, that God indeed reſted from creating any more new kinds of things, but not from creating any more individuals of the ſame kinde.

1. But firſt there is no ſuch limitation extant there, nor in any other place of Scripture, & therfore it is to be rejected as a vaine imagination of mans braine.

2. Secondly, This is a direct begging of the queſtion; for they graunt it generally in all the workes of nature, yea, in every particular, excepting onely this exceptiõ of their own: notwithſtanding *Moſes* ſpeaketh alike of both, aſcribing no more to one than to another.

3. Thirdly, It is moſt abſurd to ſay, God reſted from creating more kinds: but not from creating more particulars of the ſame kinde: becauſe to create new things of nothing is more properly a worke of creation, than

than ſtill to produce new kinds out of former matter. For according to the common definition of creation; *Creatio eſt productio entis ex non ente*, a making of ſomething of nothing. And therefore if God hath ſo ceaſed from his worke of creation, that he makes no more new kinds of creatures, although of former matter, much more hath he ceaſed from creating daily new ſubſtances of nothing.

Laſtly, otherwiſe God ſhould not have ceaſed at all, for it cannot be denied, but there are new kinds cõtinually brought forth, and not onely in æquivocall generations, but by ſuch copulations as are out of kinde, whereby it commeth to paſſe, that there are divers kindes of creatures now in the world, which were not created by God in that ſort at the firſt: ſo that this reſting muſt be underſtood chiefly, if not onely, from immediately creating 4.

creating new ſubſtances of nothing. From this place of Scripture therefore I reaſon thus: If God abſolutely ceaſed from the worke of Creation, then alſo he ceaſed from the creatiõ of ſouls: but the Antecedent is true, therfore the conſequent.

3. The creation of *Eve*.

Thirdly, we reade that God of the rib of *Adam* as of a living body formed *Eve*, but wee doe not reade, that he breathed into her noſtrils the breath of lives, as he did into *Adams*, which certainly if it had beene done, the Scripture would not have paſſed over in ſilence: eſpecially ſeeing it was *Moſes* chiefe purpoſe to declare the originall of all things: but contrarily, he plainly affirmeth, that of that he made a woman: and ſpeaking of her whole perſon, he ſaith, that *ſhee* (that is, *Eve* the woman) *was taken out of man*; and addeth moreover, that *therefore ſhee was called Wo-man*: and farther affirmeth, that

Gen 2.22, 23, 24.

that therefore by marriage God made them one flesh againe, and for that cause others should be so united also: besides divers other reasons alledged before, which need not here to be repeated.

4. The promised seed

Fourthly, When our first parents had committed sin, before they had brought forth any children, God made a comfortable promise to *Eve*, saying, that *the seed of the woman should breake the Serpents head*. Now the body it selfe being without reason, what is it being compared to the Serpent? Wherefore by *seede* in this place must needs be meant the whole nature of man, which Christ tooke of the Virgin *Mary*: For whole man was conceived and borne of her, except sin onely; as afterward we shall see. Neither is this to prove one doubtfull thing by another: for it is out of doubt, that by *seede* is here meant both body & soule: unlesse

Gen. 3. 15.

unleſſe we ſhall ſay, that Chriſt redeemed us by a body without a ſoule. And if this ſoule was received from *Eve*, as her ſeede, as well as his body, I thinke there is none will make queſtion of ours.

5. *Adams* offſpring. Gen. 5. 3.

Fifthly, Very forcible alſo if it be well conſidered, is that where *Moſes* ſaith, *Adam gat a ſonne in his owne likeneſſe, after his owne Image.* Whence it appeareth manifeſtly, that he was the parent of the whole nature, and not of one part onely: for this Image is oppoſed to the Image of God ſpoken of in *Adam* before: which Image and likeneſſe was not in the body, for then it would follow that God had a body, but in his ſoule in reſpect of his minde and reaſon; and thoſe other divine gifts whereby *Adam* excelled the reſt of the creatures. So that if we will make a true oppoſition, it will follow from this place, that as God made *Adam* in his

his innocency, in his own Image and likeneſſe, chiefly in regard of the ſoule, and thoſe divine gifts wherewith it was endued: ſo *Adam* in his corrupted eſtate begat a ſonne in his own Image and likewiſe, not in regard of the body only, but chiefly in reſpect of the ſoule, and in that, corrupt and ſinfull like himſelfe.

6. Gods promiſe to *Abraham*. Gen. 17. 7.

Sixthly, Such is that place alſo where God made a promiſe to *Abraham*, ſaying, *I will be thy God, and the God of thy ſeede after thee*. Where by *ſeede* muſt needs be meant that which is borne of ſeede, to wit, whole man, and not the body onely, for that without the ſoule of it ſelfe is dead: and as our Saviour ſpeaks in another caſe; *God is not the God of the dead, but of the living*. And if God will not ſtyle himſelfe the God of the dead, unleſſe the ſoule at leaſt be ſtill living, much leſſe will he call himſelfe the God of a ſenſleſſe ſubſtance, inferiour

Matth. 22. 32.

inferiour to the issue of brute beasts. Either therefore GOD must here promise to be the God of an unreasonable brute, or else *Abrahams* seede must conteine more than a body, yea, extend it selfe as indeed it doth to the whole man, as well soule as body, that is to say, persons consisting of both, for to such onely is this promise made. Neither is it for any man here to except & say, that the whole man may be said to proceede from man, though the soule comes from God: because he prepares the body, and gives the existence to the creature; for besides that it is contrary both to nature and reason (as afterwards we shall see) that a man should be a father to that to which he gives onely the least part of the matter, and nothing at all of the forme: it cannot be avoided but the Scripture doth here plainly affirme, that the whole man consisting

Obj.

Ans.

sisting of soule and body, is the seed, issue, and of-spring of man: & consequently begotten, born, and brought forth by the seed of man.

Seventhly, When the Scriptures doe expresly affirme, that sixty-six soules descended from the loynes of *Jacob*: doth it not plainly teach that the soules of children doe descend from their parents? Neither can the force of this place be avoyded, by saying that the soule is here by a Metonymy put for the body, or by a Synecdoche the whole soule put for the vegetable and sensible part of the soule, neither yet that it is only for that denomination is taken from the better part; or for that man disposeth the matter of the body for the receiving of the soule. The falshood of these conceits doth plainly appeare out of the Antecedent and consequent of the Text; for a little before it is said,

7. The souls that descended from *Jacob*.

these

these are the sonnes of Rachel which were borne unto Jacob, fourteene soules in all; and immediately after; *the sonnes of Joseph were two soules*: so that it is evident in the text, the soules signifie sonnes, *viz.* the whole person and nature of man. Although therefore hereby is not meant soules onely, but persons; according to the proprietie of the Hebrew tongue: yet why in this case should the holy Ghost speake of the whole person, if onely the least part of him be thereby meant. Neither can I thinke the Hebrew tongue so double, or the holy penman so much mistaken, as to say onely soules descended, if bodyes onely did: yea, how absurd is it, when by the rules of interpretation, the proper litterall sense is alwayes to be retained, unlesse some manifest falshood or absurditie doe necessarily follow upon it: and when wee must fly unto some

tropicall

tropicall ſenſe, it muſt be fetched out of the Text it ſelfe, if it may be, here we ſhould depart from both, onely to confirme a fancy, which hath no apparent warrant in the whole Scripture? and that when in all other places we underſtand the whole to comprehend the parts, yet in this caſe above when the Scripture ſpeakes of the whole, we muſt underſtand but the leaſt part: and when it names the ſoule, yet it meanes the body onely.

8. Scriptures that purpoſely ſpeake of mans generation.

Eighthly, As this doctrine is cleare by the teſtimony of *Moſes* from the creation of the world, and the firſt inſtitution of nature; ſo alſo from thoſe Scriptures which doe purpoſely ſpeake of the propagation of man, according to the ordinary courſe of nature ſince the creation. Two places there are eſpecially where this matter is purpoſely handled in the Scripture: in both which, the ſoule is ſaid

to

to be conceived in the wombe, and brought forth by the vertue of generation as well as the body. The first wee finde in the booke of *Iob*, where in making his moane to God, he useth these words: *Thine hands have made me, and fashioned me together round about: -- Hast thou not powred me out as milke, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh, and hast fenced me with bones and sinewes.* The other we have in the Book of the *Psalmes*, where *David* speaketh unto God in this manner; *Thou hast possessed my reines; thou hast covered me in my mothers wombe: -- My substance was not hid from thee, when I was made in a secret place, and curiously wrought as in the lowest parts of the earth; thine eyes did see my masse* (or whole substance) *yet being imperfect, and in thy booke all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there was none*

1. Iob 10. 8. 10, 11.

2. Psal. 139. 13. 15. 16.

none of them. To omit the omission (although it is very unlikely that *Job* and *David* here describing so precisely the manner of mans conception, breeding, & bringing forth into the world: wherein Gods power, wisdome, and goodnesse, is most of all to be magnified; should pretermit that wonderfull worke of the creation & infusion of the soule, if it had beene knowne and beleeved in their dayes) this onely I would know, how, if the soule be immediatly created by God, they could so peremptorily (without any exception or limitation) affirme that the whole man was formed in the wombe, powred out as milke, curdled like cheese, &c. which that they both joyntly affirme, will plainly appeare, if we cõsider these three things: Man, or me, secret place, and masse or substance. For the first, it is manifest they doe not herein speake of their owne persons onely,

onely, as being a matter proper to them alone, but in this they ranke themselves with all mankinde, so as man here signifies all mankinde, male and female (as *Moses* uses the word) soule and body, and one as well as the other. When therefore they both expresly affirme, that man is conceived in the wombe, it followeth that all mens and womens soules, have their originall together with their bodyes. As for the terme *secret place*, it signifieth the wombe of the mother, where the childe is conceived, which is expresly named where he saith, *thou hast covered me in my mothers wombe*: therefore when *David* saith, he *was wonderfully formed in a secret place*, he intimateth that the conception of the whole man, is made in the wombe. Lastly, the word *masse*, or *substance*, which he addeth afterwards, makes it yet more manifest, for it signifieth all

Gen. 1. 27 & 5. 1. 2.

Verse 13.

all whatsoever is in man, which is also proved by the words that follow after: for he saith, that this whole masse or substance of man which is formed in the wombe, was described in the booke of Gods providence, and who dare deny but the soule as well as the body was from all eternitie knowne unto the providence of God? for it is not meant of the members of the body only, but according to the true meaning of the words in the originall, all things whatsoever in man, is brought forth in continuance of time which before was not. So that from these Scriptures I conclude thus; If whole man, with his whole masse or substance be conceived in the wombe of his mother, then his rationall soule, together with his body, is propagated out of or by vertue of the seede. But whole man together with his whole masse or substance, is con-

conceived in the wombe of his mother; therefore the rationall ſoule, together with the body, is brought forth by vertue and power of the ſeede.

9. *Davids* confeſſion.

Ninthly, Like unto theſe alſo is that other ſpeech of the Prophet *David*; where he confeſſeth that not his body onely, but he himſelfe, both ſoule and body was conceived in ſin. So are his words: *Behold, I was ſhapen in iniquitie, and in ſin did my mother conceive me.* Whence it appeareth, not onely that the whole man is conceived in the wombe, but that he is bred and borne in ſin; yea corrupt and ſinfull even from the very firſt conception, which as (wee ſhall afterward ſee) could not poſſibly be if the ſoule were immediately created by God. And leaſt we ſhould not take knowledge of this, or knowing it think it more ſtrange than true; he ſetteth before it this ſpeciall note of obſervation,

Pſal. 51. 5

Behold,

Behold, as being a matter worthy to be knowne, and beleeved of all men.

Tenthly, The Prophet *Jeremy* likewise, or rather the Lord by the Prophet speaketh thus: *Before I formed thee in the wombe, I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the wombe I sanctified thee.* Whence also it appeareth, not onely that the whole man, the soule as well as the body is formed in the wombe; but also that the soule is present, and in some sanctified by grace (as all are corrupt by nature) even from the beginning; for so it may well be understood, that *Jeremy* was sanctified, as *John Baptist* also was, with the gifts of the holy Ghost, even from his mothers wombe: yea, before he was borne, even from the time of his first forming in the wombe. And seeing such sanctification and speciall knowledge of God cannot be ascribed to a body

Jeremies approbation.

Luk. 1. 15. 41.

without a ſoule; it will follow that as all are ſinfull, and ſome in part ſanctified, even from the very conception, neither of which can be without a ſoule: ſo all doe receive both ſoule and body together at the very firſt conception.

11. *Salomons reſolution*

Eleventhly, Hereunto may be added that of *Salomon*, which was before alledged to prove the contrary, where he ſaith; Eccl. 12.7. *Then ſhall the duſt returne to the earth as it was, and the ſpirit ſhall return to God that gave it.* That is, at death the body returns to the earth whereof it was firſt made, when God formed man of the duſt of the ground, and the ſoule returnes to God who firſt breathed into *Adams* noſtrils the breath of lives. Now if *Salomons* meaning be, that looke as the body ariſeth from the earth, ſo the ſoule comes from God (whence ſome would inferre the immediate creation of the ſoule)

soule) it holds much more strongly, that the soule is not immediately given of God, but mediately by the meanes of nature; seeing we have not our bodies neither immediatly from the earth, but mediately by propagatiō from *Adam*, from whom both soule and body is communicated to posterity, and both by the gift of God. To conclude, therefore as our bodyes come from the dust, so doe our soules from God: but our bodyes come by propagation from *Adam*; and therefore (by this argument) so doe our soules soules also.

12. *Zacharies* testimony Zach. 12. 1.

Lastly, That of the Prophet *Zachary* before objected to the contrary, serves also notably for the confirmation of this mediate manner of the soules propagation: his words be these; *The Lord formeth the spirit of man within him.* Now to *forme* in the Scripture never signifieth to create of nothing, as God did in the be-

בָּרָא
Non eſt
בָּרָא
Gen. 1.1.
2. 7.

ginning: but to frame of ſome matter pre-exiſting, as when the Lord formed *Adams* body of the duſt of the ground. For though indeed creating be ſometimes put for forming, yet forming is never put for creating of nothing. Seeing therefore the Lord formeth the ſoules of men of ſome matter, it muſt be either of the ſoules of the parents, or of his own eſſence, they being neither bodies nor Angels; but the latter is impoſſible, and therefore it muſt needs be the former.

Againe the Prophet ſaith not, *Without him*, as if it were firſt made and then infuſed, but *within him*. So that in ſaying the *Lord formeth the ſpirit of man within him*, he doth evidently declare, that there is ſome matter within man, whereof the Lord formeth the ſoule: than which, what in ſo few words can ſo fitly and fully expreſſe the

I.
Of matter

the manner of the soules propagation; being formed in conception of the spirituall matter of the parents soules, by the power and vertue of the seede in generation. And yet not meerely by the power of nature; for in the last place it is to be observed, that he saith, *the Lord formeth it.* For he indeed is the externall efficient, the nature of the soule being of that height, that without an immediate act of his providence, it cannot be produced. Whence it is that in the production of the soule, though it be not a creation, it is as neere to a creation as can be: and though it be by propagation, yet it is not meerly by propagation, but some way above it: and so it is in a manner a kinde of meane betweene creation and propagation. For according to these words of the Prophet, the soule is formed of the spirituall matter of the parents soules, within the

conceived fruit, not without the omnipotent power of God.

So that by all these testimonies it appeareth (I thinke) sufficiently, that this doctrine went currant in the time of *Adam*, *Abraham*, *Moses*, *David*, and the Prophets: and (I beleeve) never was once questioned in those first ages of the world.

CHAP. XIV.

Testimonies out of the new Testament, proving the soules propagation.

THis doctrine is no lesse, if not much more clearely revealed and fully confirmed in the new Testament also. For
1. S. *Paul.* first the Apostle Saint *Paul* saith as plainly as can be, that all men in their whole persons, both were in *Adam*, and sinned in him. *Death* (saith he) *passed by one man upon all men, in whom all sinned.*

sinned. Where he maketh no such division of soule and body, one from one place, and another from another, as men have now invented: but he saith plainly, the whole man, yea all men (who consist of soules I am sure as well as bodyes) were in *Adam*, yea, and sinned in him too; which is absurd to say, and impossible to be without soules. What would we, yea, what can we have more plainly spoken? Is it not then high presumption (to say no worse of it) for men thus to sever what God hath joyned together without apparent warrant from his word? how much more then in this, for which it is confessed there is no warrant there at all? Rom. 5. 12.

And yet least any man should be mistaken, as thinking the whole man may well enough be said to be in *Adam*, though not in other of our parents, by I know not what imaginary im-

putation; becauſe he was the ſtocke of all mankinde (or rather of the bodyes of all mankinde;) the holy Ghoſt, I ſay, foreſeeing our aptneſſe to erre, to take away all exception ſaith the very ſame concerning other Fathers alſo; as that *Levi* (together with all his ſonnes) *was yet in the loynes of his Father* (grandfather, yea, and great grand-father) *Abraham when Melchiſedeck met him*; and which is more, *paid tithes in him*. So that by the teſtimony of the Apoſtle, *Abraham* is to be reckoned in the number of thoſe that did propagate the whole man, ſoule and body together: and for that cauſe paid tithes for his poſteritie while they were yet in his loynes. And if *Iſaac*, *Jacob*, and the whole tribe of *Levi*, were once in the loynes of *Abraham*; we need not doubt, but we were all in like manner once wholly in *Adam*, and conſequently are now

The Author to the Heb. Heb. 7. 1.

Vers 5.

now wholly propagated from him.

Againe, that we may not deny it, unlesse we will deny Christ and our owne salvation. The Scriptures teach, that Jesus Christ as concerning his humanitie was the sonne of the virgin *Mary*, and so of *David* his Father: for so said the Angell *Gabrell*, being sent unto her; *Thou shalt conceive in thy wombe, and bring forth a sonne*: and againe, *the Lord shall give unto him the throne of his father David.* Neither is it sufficient to say his body came from them; for the Apostle plainly affirmeth, that *he was made of the seed of David according to the flesh.* Where *flesh* is figuratively put for his whole humanity, both soule and body, as themselves confesse. Neither can it be denyed, for it is there opposed to his Divinitie, as the words immediately following doe manifestly declare: and all

2. The Angell *Gabrell.*

Luk 1.31, 32.

Rom. 1.3.

Per synecdochen.

Interpreters acknowledge.

Whence it neceſſarily followeth, that the ſoul of our Saviour was the ſeede of *David*, even the fruit of his loynes as well as his body, as St. *Peter* witneſſeth: for ſince the holy Ghoſt affirmeth it, why ſhould we feare to do it? yea, why ſhould we not feare to doe otherwiſe? Is it not ſafer to follow ſuch a guide, than to run a way by our ſelves for wch we have no warrant? And ſeeing as the Apoſtle elſewhere affirmeth, *He was made like unto us in all things, except ſinne*; why ſhould wee make any doubt, but it is ſo with us alſo, as it was with him? Eſpecially conſidering the whole current and full ſtreame of the Scriptures run this way, even from the beginning. And not onely concerning him, as where it is ſaid, the *Seede of the woman ſhall breake the Serpents head*; and, *in thy ſeede ſhall all the nations of the earth be bleſſed*, as

3. S. *Peter.* Act. 2. 30.

Heb. 4. 15.

Gen. 3. 15. & 22. 18.

Gen. 5. 10. 11.

We

we heard before: but also all other places speaking of his or our generation, comprehends both soule and body under the name of *seede*, without any exception, making the soule no lesse the seede of man than the body, and the body no more than the soule; and neither of them more or lesse propagation than the other, and this throughout the whole Scripture, without any the least word to the contrary. And therefore, I say againe, let no man dare to seperate what God hath so joyned together.

1 Chron. 1, 2, 3, &c. Mat. 1. Luk. 2. Mat. 19. 6.

Lastly, Unlesse we will make God the Author of sin, and consequently deny God that made us; we must confesse the truth of this doctrine, proved from those words of our Saviour, where speaking both of the naturall and the new birth of man, he saith; *That which is borne of the flesh is flesh, and that which is borne*

4. Our Saviour himselfe.

Ioh. 3. 6.

borne of the spirit is spirit. Whence I reason thus; If the soule were immediately created by God, it should not be flesh that is corrupt and sinfull, but spirit, that is pure and holy. For whatsoever comes immediately from God, he makes it pure & good,
Gen 1. 3. yea, all things *very good.* But man from his very beginning is corrupt and sinfull, because he is borne of flesh; for saith our Saviour of the whole man that being borne of the flesh he
Eph. 2. 3. *is flesh*; and therefore the whole man hath need of a second birth, that he may be borne of the spirit. Either therefore we must deny originall sin, or else make God the Author of evill, if the soule be immediately created by him. But seeing it is manifest we are borne of flesh, and are by nature children of wrath; and it is impious blasphemy once to imagine that God is the Author of sin; I feare not to conclude, that the

the soule is not borne of the spirit, I meane, created by God, but of the flesh, that is, propagated by man.

Thus then for divine testimonies we have produced no lesse than a whole Jury of witnesses: first God himselfe, then *Adam*, *Moses*, *Job*, *David*, *Salomon*, *Jeremy*, *Zachary*, *Peter*, *Paul*, the Angell *Gabrell*, and our Saviour Christ himselfe; and if humane Testimonies would serve the turne, it were not hard to shew more than twelve Legions of Saints, learned and unlearned, that have lived and dyed in this beliefe. It being the received doctrine of the westerne Churches in Saint *Hieromes* time, as was before declared: but if these will not satisfie, much lesse would those, and therefore I omit them.

The conclusion of the divine Testimonies.

CHAP.

Chapter XV.

The propagation proved from the Doctrine of Originall sinne.

Reasons proving the soules propagation.

BEsides the Testimonies of Scripture, this mediate manner of the soules propagation, may farther be demonstrated by reasons drawne from them; whereof there are two onely most materiall, and indeed necessary to be considered: the one concerning the doctrine of originall sin, and the other touching the incarnation of our Saviour; which two, being the maine difficulties in this question; the one hindering the soules immediate creation, the other the immediate propagatiõ therof; if these two can be cleared, but especially if both doe agree together to confirme this doctrine, there will remaine no more place of disputation about it; and therefore I purpose to in-

1.

2.

sist

ſiſt ſo much the longer in them both.

And for the better clearing the firſt reaſon drawne from the Doctrine of Originall ſin, I will firſt make way to it by a generall deſcription of theſe three things: Firſt, Originall ſinne; Secondly, Creation; Thirdly, Propagation: and then apply it particularly to the proving of the point in hand.

1. Originall finne.

1. From the nature of the ſin deſcending.
2. From the goodneſſe of God in creating.
3. From the courſe of nature in propagating.

Of all which, I will ſpeake as briefly and plainly as I can, and according to that divine light which is revealed in the Scriptures.

Firſt therfore it muſt be ſhewed out of the Scripture, whether there be any originall ſin or no, and what it is. For the firſt, that the

the ſtreame of mans being, firſt poyſoned in *Adam* the fountaine, hath infected every man that comes into the world with ſinne, is manifeſt through the whole Scripture. *By one man* (namely *Adam*) *ſin entred into the world, and death by* [a] *ſin: in the day that he did eate of the forbidden fruit, wee began to die the* [b] *death*: yea, [c] even Infants that had not actually ſinned, yet were tainted with originall ſin: ſo that in *Adam* all dye [d], becauſe in *Adam* all did ſin [e]: Hence it was that by and by after all the *imaginations of the thoughts of his heart were onely evill continually* [f]: yea, *evill even from his youth* [g]: *And now who can bring a cleane thing out of an uncleane* [h]: *And what is man that he ſhould be cleane* [i], *and he that is borne of a woman, that he ſhould be righteous*, ſayth *Iob*. Hence even *David* confeſſeth of himſelfe, *I was borne in iniquitie, and in ſin did my* [k] *mother conceive me*:

Proofes out of the Scripture.

[a] Rom. 5. 12.

[b] Gen. 2 17

[c] Rom. 5. 14.

[d] 1 Cor. 15. 22.

[e] Rom. 5. 12.

[f] Gen 6. 5

[g] Gen. 8. 21

[h] Iob 14. 4.

[i] Iob 15. 14.

[k] Pſal. 51. 5.

me: and of others, he saith, *the wicked are estranged from the wombe*[l], *they goe astray as soone as they are borne*. *Esay* also calleth man a *transgressor from the wombe*[m]: and *Jeremy* saith, the *heart of man is deceitfull above all things, and desperately wicked*[n]; hence also it is that the Apostle saith, *Wee are by nature children of wrath*[o]; *and by the offence of one, the fault came upon all men to condemnation*[p]. And to conclude, our Saviour saith plainly, *that which is borne of the flesh is flesh*[q]; *and except a man be regenerate and borne againe, he cannot enter into nor see the Kingdome of God*.

l Ps. 58. 3.
m Isa. 48. 8
n Ier. 17. 9.
o Eph. 2. 3.
p Ro. 5. 18.
q Ioh. 3. 6. Ioh. 3. 3. 5.

Besides, Reason teacheth, that like begets like, as touching the substance and accidents proper to the kinde, according to the Rule, *Generatum sequitur naturam generantis*; Beasts bring forth beasts; Serpents, serpents, and sinfull man, a sinfull of-spring: *We cannot gather grapes of thornes, nor*

Reasons to prove it.
1.
Mat. 7. 16.

nor figges of thistles; but an evill tree bringeth forth evill fruit; and corrupt *Adam* sinfull men, otherwise how could Infants justly be punished with death, seeing death is the wages of sinne. And why were Infants circumcized, and women purified after childbirth under the law, but to shew that all that commeth of mans seed, is defiled with sin. Againe, cõmon experience sheweth the fruit of this bitter roote to bud forth in childrẽ, even from their very cradles, and that by inclination before they can learne by imitation. The necessitie also of our regeneration proves it; for if by our first birth we were not corrupt, then should not the second be necessary to salvation. Lastly, the double grace which we receive from the second *Adam* Christ Jesus, namely, Justification & Regeneration, shews that there floweth a double evill from the first *Adam*, namely the guilt

guilt and corruption of nature. If we had not this double finne, we should not need this double remedy.

What originall sin is.

And now that we see we are thus infected, let us inquire a little more narrowly into the nature of it. It appeares by that which hath beene said already, that all men are become sinfull through *Adams* sin, having lost those now supernaturall gifts, wherewith he and we with him were at first indued; and in stead therof, are all over infected with a venomous qualitie, or inclination to all manner of evill, causing ignorance and blindnesse in the minde, stubbornesse and rebellion in the will, disorder in the affections, making the senses sensuall and beast-like, all the members of the body instruments of unrighteousnesse, and the whole man a slave to the devill; and that from our first being, even so farre as nature can reach

reach (as well potentially as actually) ever since *Adams* sinne, which groweth up with us from the wombe, and in time (if we live) brings orth the fruits of unrighteousnesse, in our thoughts, words, and actions, by reason whereof we are not onely corrupt, but guilty of Gods wrath, and lyable to eternall damnation from our first being. Now it is called Originall sin, first, because it was from the beginning, even as soone as ever *Adam* sinned: secondly, because it is with us from the beginning, even in conception, as soone as we doe actually begin to be: and thirdly, because it is the beginning of all actuall sin whatsoever. Howbeit, in the Scripture it is called by other names, as, *The old man*, *The body of sin*, *The sin that dwels in us*, *The law of our members*, *The sin that incloseth us on every side*, *Concupiscence*, and the like. And as we use the word, it is sometimes

Why it is so called.

Rom. 6. 6.
Rom. 7. 17. 23.
Heb. 12. 1.
Iam. 1. 14.

times taken more largely, for the sin of *Adam*, together with the guilt and corruption following it: but usually more strictly for the corruption of nature onely: consisting of the privation of goodnesse, and inclination to evill, before rehearsed. These grounds being laid down, we may make a full definition of it after this manner.

Definitio Originalis peccati.

Originall sin is the depravation of the whole nature of man, consisting of the privation of originall righteousnesse, and an inclination to all manner of evill; derived from *Adam* to all his posteritie by naturall generation, whereby they stand guilty of eternall death: in which definition, wee may see all the essentiall causes of originall sin: the subject, or materiall cause, is the whole nature of man, all men, and every part of all men, soule, body, understanding, will, memory, affections, senses, and severall

ſeverall members of the body, as they conſtitute the perſon of a man propagated from *Adam*. The formall cauſe is the depravation of the ſame, whereby every man is deprived of originall righteouſneſſe, and prone to every ſin that can be committed. The efficient cauſe, the ſinning will of *Adam*; the inſtrumentall cauſe, naturall generation: and the end and effect of it, guilt and puniſhment: miſery and death here, & eternall damnation hereafter.

More briefly, Originall ſinne is by ſome defined to be the depravation of mans nature, conſiſting of the privation of righteouſneſſe, and inclination to evill, contracted from the generation it ſelfe, and derived from *Adam* to all his poſteritie. For as ſickneſſe is not onely a privation of health, but alſo an evill affection of the body, ariſing from the diſtemper of the humours: ſo originall

ginall sin is not onely the want of righteousnesse, but also an inclinablenesse to unrighteousnes, arising from the sin of *Adam*, and conveyed unto us by naturall propagation. In a word, it is our potentiall sinning in *Adam*, whereby according to the law of nature, we are both corrupt and guilty. And so much for the generall nature of originall sinne.

Creation what it is.

Now for the second, what Creation is, we shall not need many words. Improperly Creation is taken sundry wayes, sometimes for the determination, and decree of God to create, as where Wisdome saith, *He created me in the beginning before the world*; that is, he decreed to create and reveale me in the Church. Sometimes for renovation, & changing, not of the substance, but the qualitie of a thing: So *David* prayeth, *Create in me a cleane heart, O God.* Sometimes for the naturall

Eccl. 24.

Ps. 51. 10.

naturall generation of the creatures; *Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, and they are created.* And sometimes it is taken for the restauration of that which is destroyed; *Behold, I create new heavens, and a new earth.* But properly taken, it either signifieth to make something of nothing, or else to give formes to the matter, unto which it hath no naturall power of it selfe. And for that cause doe require an omnipotent hand to effect it; so as creation properly taken belongs to God onely. Nevertheless, for the most part, it is used in the first sense, and therefore creation is commonly defined thus; *Creatio est productio entis ex non ente*; or as *Aquinas* hath it; *Est productio rei secundum totam substantiam ex nihilo.* So that in the most proper sense, a thing cannot be said to be created, unlesse the whole substance be produced by the omnipotent power of

Psal. 104. 30.

Isa. 65. 17.

of God out of nothing; and not at all, unleſſe at leaſt he hath an immediate hand in the forming of it.

Laſtly, For Propagation, it is that moſt excellent and naturall faculty, whereby a living creature, by ſeede of generation, begets his like, for the continuation of the kinde. It is a faculty, commonly accounted a ſpecies of the vegetative faculty, but is indeed the naturall perfection of a living creature, whether vegetative, ſenſitive, or rationall; and it is the moſt excellent, and the moſt naturall faculty, being ingrafted into nature, with a ſpeciall charge & bleſſing from God in the creation, and is therfore moſt deſired and conſequently moſt natural to all creatures that have life; whereby like begets like; univocall which is moſt properly ſo called, when as a creature brings forth the like to it ſelfe, as a plant comes

Propagation, what it is.

Gen. 1. 22. 28.

of a plant, and a Lyon of a Lyon: and æquivocall generation of unlike, as when a plant or living creature is bred of putrefaction, as, Mice, Flies, Serpents, and the like, for the continuation of the kinde, for nature aymeth at the higheſt perfection that can be, even to continue all creatures for ever; and therefore every creature naturally deſires ever to be, which becauſe it cannot be effected in the individuals, therefore it is done another way, namely, by propagation, for to beget the like, is after a ſort to be ever. And to conclude, this is done by the ſeede of generation, which as the faculty it ſelfe is moſt excellent: ſo is the matter of it the perfection of mans nature, as the ſeed of a tree, the ſap whereof hath paſſed through roote, body, branch, leafe, bud, and all: and ſo conteines the nature of the whole: ſo is the ſeede of man the

the quinteſſẽce of nature, which having paſſed through all the degrees of concoction, and conteining the whole kinde of man, is reſerved by nature in a place convenient for the procreation of another of the ſame kinde. Now becauſe this generation is the affection or rather perfection of the whole compound, conſiſting of matter and forme, a man cannot be ſaid to propagate the matter alone, but the whole creature, ſo as to ſpeake properly, generatiõ is not either of the matter, or of the forme, but of a certaine third thing, conſiſting of matter and forme. So that here it followeth, that our propagation from *Adam*, is nothing elſe but the deduction of the whole man out of *Adam*, according to the courſe of nature; that is, the turning of our potentiall being in him into act by naturall generation, which is the onely meanes whereby *A-*

dams nature is derived unto us.

Difference betweene generatiõ and creation.

And here to conclude, it ſhall not be amiſſe to obſerve the differences between naturall generation, and immediate creation; the chiefe whereof are theſe.

Firſt, Creation is the worke of God by himſelfe; Generation is the worke of nature from God: Secondly, Creation is wrought onely by the word & command of God by his onely becke and will; generation is performed in a naturall order pre-ordeined of God. Thirdly, Creation is meerly of nothing, not of any matter or ſubſtance, but of nothing at all; generation is of ſome matter pre-exiſting indeede, old matter putting on new formes. Fourthly, Creation is done in a moment, without any time, being by an infinite vertue, which is not capable of any time; generation cannot be but in time, being perfected by degrees and in ſucceſſion of time. Fifthly, In

Vide *Polan. Synt. lib. 5. c. 2.*

Creation,

Creation, things are not made of the same substance with the creator; but in generation, that which is generated, hath the same substance with the generator. Sixthly, Creation is performed without any motion or mutation; but in generation, there is both motion and mutation, the same matter being varied into diversitie of formes. Lastly, the order of creation is one, and of generation another; for in creation the privation is before the habit, power before act, darkneſſe before light; but in generation, the habit is before the privation, ſight before blindneſſe, & light before darkneſſe. And ſo much for the generall deſcription of Originall ſin, Creation, and Propagation.

CHAP. XVI.

How the nature of the ſin deſcending, confirmes the ſoules propagation.

The nature of the ſinne.

IT appeareth by the former deſcription of Originall ſinne, which is proved by the ſcripture, & confeſſed by all, that it is not onely a loſſe of originall righteouſneſſe, but an hereditary infection or ſpirituall corruption, wch hath over-ſpread the whole nature of man: which two, as they are the maine things in originall ſin, ſo the one neceſſarily followeth the other. For the ſoule ceaſing to be good, it muſt needs become evill; and being turned out of the right way, goes on in a wrong; for it cannot ſtand ſtill or be idle, but muſt be doing either good or evil, and therefore being deprived of goodneſſe, corruption follows as darkneſſe ſucceeds in the place of light. Where-

Whereas therefore ſome make originall ſin, to conſiſt of guiltineſſe & corruption, as the parts of it; and to be derived from *Adam* by imputation and propagation, guiltineſſe by imputation, and corruption by propagation; it appeareth that guiltineſſe is no part of originall ſin, but an effect of it; and conſequently, that imputation is not properly the meanes of conveying it to us, but an effect of the other. And as that depravation or corruption onely is properly originall ſin, and guiltineſſe comes onely by reaſon of corruption; ſo propagation onely is properly the meanes whereby it is derived unto us, and imputation is onely in regard of propagation. For as we ſhould not have beene guilty, if we had not beene corrupt; ſo ſin ſhould not have been imputed, if it had not beene propagated. And as we were potentially guilty in *Adam*,

The meanes of deriving it

because potentially corrupt; so by like reason it followeth, that it is now actually imputed to us, because we are actually propagated from him. I conclude therefore, that the nature of this sin consists in the corruption of nature, and the streame thereof runs in naturall propagation.

Objections from the nature of sinne.

But here it will be objected, that sin is such an accident, as cannot by the course of nature be communicated to posteritie.

1. It is nothing.

For if we consider the matter or substance of it, it is indeed nothing; it is *non ens in rerum naturâ*; no substance, for then it should be created by God, but a meere privation, the want of that which should be, and not any thing that should not be; as darknesse is a privation of light, not any thing that succeeds in the place of light. For there is nothing in the dark night which was not in the day, onely light is absent, and such a manner of thing

thing (or nothing rather) is sin said to be. And if it should be grãted, that it is somwhat more, namely, an evill qualitie, besides that then it must needs be created of God as good qualities are, it must needs be either in the soule or in the body, yea, in the soule and not in the body; for sin is a spirituall thing, if it be any thing.

Now if it be a qualitie of the soule, it cannot be conveyed to posteritie, for such habits and indowments of the minde, as are not engrafted into nature, but happen from without as this did, cannot be propagated, according to the Proverbe, *Ex grammatico non nascitur grammaticus*, but they are gotten by art and industry, and so they will grant that *Adams* sin may be derived to us by imitation, but not by generation.

2. Not by the soule.

On the other side, if it be a corporall and elementary quali-

3. Not by the body.

tie, besides that it cannot then be sinfull, it cannot descend to posteritie neither, because it is not inherent in the principles of nature, but an externall accident which nature hath no sense of; for what is nature the worse for *Adams* taking the forbidden fruit? yea, what if he had cut off his owne armes, his children should not have bin borne without, for nature followeth the first institution: yea more, if it had caused some distemper in the body, yet it is not necessary it should be communicated to posteritie, for all children have not the sicknesses of their parents, how much lesse their sins then, which are not naturall either to soule or body.

Ans. These things, I confesse, have a shew of truth, but I deny the power of it in them all for disproving originall sin, not doubting to make it appeare, that all these doe agree together to confirme

firme this onely way of sinnes propagation.

For first, let it be granted, that sin in regard of substance, is nothing but a privation of goodnesse; then it will follow, that it cãnot subsist without some subject, which must also be good, because every substance is created by God; so that evill cannot be but in a good subject.

1. Privation of good.

It is in a good subject.

Againe, being a privation, it can have no efficient cause, for to speake properly, it is no effect but a defect rather. And if evill can have no cause, much lesse can it be caused by the chiefe good. For God who is *summum bonum*, being as the habit unto this privation, can no more be the cause of sin than light can be of darknesse; which cannot possibly be; for light alwayes inlightens; and no darknesse can proceed from light; for though we reade, that God commanded light to shine out of darknesse, yet

2. Hath no efficient cause.

3. It comes from a good God.

yet for darkneſſe to proceede from light is altogether impoſſible; and even ſo it may ſtand with the nature of God, to bring good out of evill, but not evill out of good.

4. There can be no evill God.

And for that ſin is no poſitive thing, but a privation of good, hence it followeth alſo, that there cannot be a *ſummum malum*, as well as a *ſummum bonum*: for the one is not, and if it were the one ſhould deſtroy the being of the other, in as much as there cannot be two chiefes: contrary to the devilliſh conceits of the *Manichees*, of a good God, and an evill God.

5. It may be propagated.

Laſtly. Though it be an accident, yea, a privation, yet it is not a meere negation, & though it be but an accident, yet even an accident is his imperfection, and ſometimes the accident of a ſubſtance prevailes as much as the ſubſtance it ſelfe: ſo that though it be but a privation, yet it may have

have a being in nature: else *Aristotle* was much over-seene in making privation one of the principles of nature: and if that be so necessary in generation, why should we thinke this impossible to be generated? and though it cannot hang in the ayre, but must cleave to some subject, yet it followeth not but it may be propagated, together with the subject wherein it is.

Malum est in rerum naturâ etiamsi per se nihil est

2. An inclination to evill.

But if this will not satisfie, it is farther to be considered, that originall sin is not onely a privation of goodnesse, but also a corrupt qualitie and inclination to evill, as appeares by the former description, and the proofe of it; and may farther be manifested by the punishment and consequents of the same. For a meere privation of happinesse were a sufficient punishment for a meere privation of goodnesse: but we know that *Adam* and all his posteritie, have not only lost

Para-

Paradiſe, but gained a great deale of labour, paine, ſorrow and miſery. Neither was the earth onely deprived of that excellent condition wherein it was created; but in the place thereof hath ſucceeded a curſe, making it barren of good fruit, and fruitfull of evill, thornes, thiſtles, and the like. Teaching us that there is an evill qualitie in ſin as well as a privation of goodneſſe.

Gen. 3. 17, 18.

3. Seated in the Soule.

Againſt this it is objected, that if it be an evill qualitie, it muſt cleave either to the ſoule, or to the body, or both. If to the ſoule, it cannot deſcend, becauſe ſuch endowments of the mind as are not ingrafted into nature, cannot be propagated, according to the proverbe, &c.

Anſ. 1. To which I anſwer, firſt, that even thoſe arts which are leaſt naturall, are not altogether excluded in generation, nay, experience proves that children for the moſt part are like their parents,

rents, even in such faculties as these, whether they be inclined to Husbandry, Horse-manship, Merchandise, Navigation, or the liberall sciences: howsoever they are often crossed in their inclinations.

Secondly, It is commonly seene, that children are like their parents also in the faculties of the minde, as in acutenesse of understanding, firmnesse of memory, soundnesse of judgement, and the like. 2.

Thirdly, It is well knowne that the affections of the soule, which are yet neerer to the nature of sin, are very commonly cõmunicated to posteritie, whether concupiscible or irascible, as covetousnesse, wrathfulnesse, mirth, sadnesse, feare, boldnesse, and the like: whence is that other Proverbe, *Partus ventrem sequitur.* 3.

Lastly, It is manifest, that sin cleaves to the will it selfe, which 4.

is

is the fountain of the affections. For as there are certaine naturall principles of knowledge, as of good and evill, which were at the first ingrafted into the understanding: so there are certaine naturall inclinations in the will, as of love and hatred, which at first were carried to their proper objects, and so were created good: but now through mans failing and Gods curse upon it, they are carried a contrary way, by meanes whereof we are now corrupt and sinfull. Now if sin cleaves thus to the will, whence these affections proceede, yea, pierceth into the most inward and purest parts of the soule, whence it spreads it self through the whole man; it must needs be propagated much better (or rather) than the affections which are removed a degree farther from the soule, and how much more then, better than those externall acts, which are not naturall,

rall, but meere habits gotten by use and industry: which nevertheless in regard of naturall aptnesse unto them, may also after a sort be propagated unto posteritie.

Yet is not sin so seated in the soule, as that it should not affect or rather infect the body also. For though it cannot dwell in the body alone, nor be propagated by it, yet together with the soule the body is infected, and by them both sin propagated. 4. Cleaving to the body.

Which may further appeare.

First, if we consider, that not the soule or body alone, but the whole man or person is the subject of this sin especially; for not parts but persons sinned, and so were corrupted with sin in *Adam*: and thus the body is sinfull not of it selfe, but as a part of the person of man. 1.

Secondly, being a corrupt qualitie of the body, though accidentall, and not ingrafted into nature 2.

nature at the first; yet why may it not be propagated as well as the gout & leprosie (whereunto sin is resembled in the Scripture) especially considering these are no lesse accidentall, unnaturall, yea, and contrary to created nature at the first, and are not now common to all mankinde as sin is.

Lastly, If it be granted, that nature does alwayes follow the first institution, notwithstanding externall accidents, yet this is such an externall accident as it is also internall; yea, farther I affirme that sin is now no lesse ingrafted into our nature (I meane the whole nature of man, consisting of soule and body) than if we had beene created sinfull at the first, and yet without fault in God. Which that I may plainly manifest, and so cleare all in a word, I would know of the adversaries of this doctrine, whether that wisdome and holinesse which

5. Ingrafted into nature it selfe. How sin is ingrafted into mans nature and propagated with it.

which was at first in *Adam*, was such as might and should have beene communicated to his posteritie, if he had not sinned or no? If yes(as no reasonable man can deny it) then it must follow by that rule of reason, *Contraria contrariorum sunt consequentia*; that so may sin and corruption now since the fall.

All that can be objected to the contrary is this, that these vertues which were in *Adam*, were good qualities created by God, & ingrafted into him at his first creation: whereas our vices are neither such qualities, nor so ingrafted into our nature in the beginning, and therefore though they might have been propagated, yet it will not follow that these may. *Obj.* *Obj. 2.*

To the first I answer, that his vertues were no more qualities created by God, than our vices are. For God did onely so rectifie the will of *Adam* in his first creation, *Answ. 1.*

creation, that it had a disposition and inclination to good, by the exercise whereof those habits of the minde are in time gotten which wee call vertues: and contrarily, from the evill disposition of the will, proceeds those evill customes which wee call vices. So that (if I conceive right) neither the one nor the other, are qualities created by God. And concerning the second, the ingrafting of them into our nature at the first. I answer, that as God made *Adam* simply good, by giving him an inclination unto good without evill; so he gave him a free will to evill, though he were good. Neither was he at the first endued either with vertues or habits, save onely that same *habitus inchoatus*, which is called *Habitus*; a disposition or inclination wherby he was carried to good, yet not so strongly but he could as freely will evill also; whereby it

Anſ. 2.

Adam had evill in power and goodnesse in act.

it came to passe, that he had evill in power as well as goodnesse in act. So that the seede and power of the one was ingrafted into his nature no lesse than the act of the other, even in the beginning: which power also we see soone after came into act as well as the other. For if *Adam* had alike freewill to either, it must needs follow, that the one was as naturall to him as the other; and consequently as easie to be propagated. For however some conceive of it, for my part I see no reason to perswade me, that *Adam* was ever more inclined, or had more power to good than to evill; but that God made him, as *Ecclesiasticus* saith, *right*, that is, as I understand it in equall condition, either to stand or to fall; to continue good or become naught, which as it was the perfection of his nature, and that innocent cõdition in which he was created; so that it might appeare, Eccles. 7. 29.

appeare, it pleaſed God ſo to order the matter, that he fell from it, by ſo ſmall an inticement as an apple. Now ſo farre forth as he had naturall power to ſin by creation; ſo farre ſin might be derived by propagation, all will confeſſe: and why then when *Adam* through his owne folly, and Gods juſt wrath upon him for the ſame, had loſt the former freedome together, and brought upon himſelfe a neceſſitie of ſinning; ſhould not the corruption be propagated much more, being ſo much more increaſed? To conclude, therfore it followeth by juſt conſequence in reaſon, and is manifeſt by the rules of nature, that his corruption may and muſt be propagated to his poſteritie, now he is fallen; as well and as much as his goodneſſe might & ſhould have been if he had not fallen: yea ſo much more, by how much goodneſſe more properly belongs to the nature

nature of God, and evill to the nature of the creature. Wherefore having thus proved, even from the nature of the sin it self, that it is most agreeable to the course of nature, that originall sin should descend by propagation: I proceed now to prove that it is most contrary to the justice of God that it should descend by a course of creation.

Chap. XVII.

That a new created soule, cannot justly be united to a sinfull body.

THe necessitie of the soules mediate propagation, will farther appeare, if wee consider the impossibilitie of the immediate creation thereof, without injustice in God in respect of Originall sin: seeing a soule new created, can neither be justly united, nor corrupted when it is united with the body; for touching

It justly united.

ching the former, first I would know, how it can agree with the goodnesse and justice of GOD, to put an innocent soule (as he createth it) before it hath sinned into such a condition, as wherein it shall be lyable straight way to eternall torments: yea, and perhaps presently damned for

Obj. anothers fault? it will be said, that it is not lyable before faulty; for so soone as it is united to the body, it is guilty of *Adams*

Answ. 1. sin. I answer, first it must be shewed how a soule newly created very good, can be in the fault of his sin; otherwise it is unjust that it should be made guilty, and much more punished for a-

2. nothers fault. Secondly, I must aske why then God makes such an union, as whereby it shall be

Obj. 2. both lyable and faulty? If it be said, that it was the eternall decree of God, which neither needed nor could be reversed for *Adams* sin: and so the evill is not

It was the decree of God.

from

from God, but from the vertue, or rather vitiousnesse of the union which *Adam* caused by his sin, whereby it cõmeth to passe that so soone as they are conjoyned, both are guilty, which is meerly accidentall in respect of God.

To this I answer. First that wee cannot thus hide our selves under Gods decree: for it cannot be proved, that it is thus, and therefore neither that it is the decree of God. Indeed God did decree that all men should be corrupt and sinfull through *Adams* sin, yet this must be by some just meanes, which if it be by this course of propagation onely, and not by creation; then this & not that, is to be accounted the decree of God. Now it appeareth by that which is and shall be said, that this is the onely just and naturall way of sins conveyance, for which cause God would have all men to proceed

Ans. 1. It cannot be proved that it is.

ceed from one: and not that other, which for ought yet ſaid, ſeemeth to be an unjuſt courſe of mans deviſing.

Anſ. 2. It may be proved that it is not.

And as it cannot be proved that it is, ſo it is eaſie to prove that it is not Gods decree, becauſe it is contrary to his word. For if the ſoule be created good, it muſt needs be unwilling to enter into this ſinfull condition: elſe it ſhould even therein ſin, and none I hope will ſay now (as ſome did of old) that it ſinned before it came into the body: and being unwilling to enter, God cannot juſtly force it into the body, nor puniſh it for doing that which himſelfe cauſed. Now God forbid that wee ſhould once imagine ſuch a thought of him. *Shall not the Judge of all the world doe righteouſly?* Can Juſtice it ſelfe deale unjuſtly? No verily: in equitie it ſelfe there can be no iniquitie.

It ſhall be inforced to ſin.

Gen. 18. 25

Zeph. 3. 5.

Againe,

Againe, Take it the moſt favourable way that can be, and it muſt needs be and is granted by all, that for a good ſoule to be thus united and ſet into ſuch a condition, is a puniſhment of *Adams* ſin. Now ſince Gods juſtice & very nature proclaimes, that the innocent child ſhall not be puniſhed for the fathers offence: how can a good ſoule be puniſhed in ſo high a degree for the ſin of another who was not the father of it, no nor of the ſame kinde (for *Adam* was not a ſoule but a man) without injuſtice, yea cruelty in God? how juſtly might ſuch a poore ſoule complaine of God in this caſe, to be ſo farre from mercy as to be unjuſt? and how juſtly may the unjuſt Anabaptiſts cry out of us as they doe, that we make God the Author of ſin? The Lord hath taught us in his word, that he abhorres ſuch courſes: for my part therefore I am ſo

2. It ſhall be unjuſtly puniſhed. Ezek. 18. 20.

farre from beleeving this doctrine, that I quake to thinke of it.

CHAP. XVIII.

That a soule newly created by God, cannot be infected with Originall sinne.

2. Not justly corrupted.

AS the soule cannot be justly united; so being united, it cannot be justly corrupted, if it be immediately created. For whence should the corruption come? it must be either from the body or the soule, or the union of both: but it can be from none of these. It is manifest it cannot be from the body, for that alone cannot be corrupt, and if it could, it cannot corrupt the soule: and if it could corrupt the soule, yet not with originall sin. That the body alone cannot be corrupt and sinfull, may easily appeare by many reasons.

1. Not by the body.

First,

First, even the thing it selfe declares that the simple substance of the body, is no more capable of vertue or vice than a stone; for sin can be onely in a subject that hath power to understand, will, and move of it selfe: which the body of it selfe cannot doe, but onely by reason of the reasonable soule. So that the body cannot make the soule, but it is the soule that makes the body sinfull; and so the Apostle also implyeth, that our members are the soules instruments of sinne. Although therefore the body may be cholericke, melancholy, &c. all the world know, that elementary qualities, humors, and affections, are not of themselves sinfull, but naturally good, and so rather dispose to good than to evill.

1. It cannot be corrupt

Rom. 6. 13

Againe, The body hath nothing in it of spirituall nature, but onely that which is bodily; and therefore cannot have sin,

2.

3.

which is of ſpirituall nature: it being a ſpirituall evill, even as obedience to God is a ſpirituall good.

4. Moreover, if neither plants having life, nor bruites having both life & ſenſe, cannot be ſaid to be ſinfull, becauſe they want reaſon; much leſſe can the body, the ſenſleſſe and liveleſſe body of man be infected with ſin without the ſoule.

5. Laſtly, That which the body hath not firſt, with that it cannot infect the ſoule in being united with it, but the body hath not firſt in it ignorance, unbeliefe, &c. in which the ſoules tainture originally conſiſteth; and therefore cannot infect the ſoule thereby in being united with it, and conſequently not with originall ſin neither.

2. It cannot corrupt the ſoule. But let it be granted, contrary to all reaſon and truth, that the body is firſt infected with originall ſin; can the body faſten the ſame

same upon the soule? Nothing lesse.

And not onely because it is a spirit, and bodies can work onely corporally, according to their natures, so as the impuritie of the body can neither affect nor infect the purest spirituall soule: but also because the soule is the first mover, and commander of all actions in the body. 1.

Now if mens soules be created sound and sincere, free from the contagion of sin; every way absolute, as were the soules of our first parents, and so joyned unto their bodies: why doe they not by vertue of that divine nature, restore the ruine of that building which was defiled by the sin of *Adam*? why doe they not clense and cleanse and purge the blots and filth of the body? seeing they doe sit as Judges in the body, and rule and guide it according to their owne pleasure. 2.

If it be said that sin sometimes *Obj.*

begins in the body, as *Davids* eye when he saw *Bathsheba* bathing of her selfe; it is easily answered.

Ans. 1. For, first, the eye as a bodily part seeth not, but the soule by the eye; *Oculus non videt, sed anima per oculum.*

2. Secondly, His sin was not at all in seeing her, but in lusting after her in his heart & soule, wth lust conceiving, by consent, brought forth death in act: and therefore in his confession he ascends by this streame to the originall fountaine, namely, that originall sin wherein he was conceived. Wherefore if the soule be created good, and so infused into the body, there is more reason that it should sanctifie the body, than that the body should corrupt it: and according to this doctrine, it may much better be maintained that all men have originall righteousnesse, because the soule comes from God, than that we have originall sin, because the body

Iam. 1. 14

Psal. 51. 5.

body comes from *Adam*.

But let this also be granted, that the soule is corrupted by yeelding obedience to the body, as *Adam* did to *Eve*, yet we cannot have originall sin ever the more for this, for the souls yeelding obedience to the body, and following the sinfull motions thereof (if any such there be) is actuall sin: and not that originall corruption wherewith the whole man is infected by descending from the loynes of *Adam*, in whom as the Apostle saith, *We all sinned*, and which onely was before proved to be originall sinne. Not actually to commit something against the will of God is originall sin: but that in-bred home-bred breathing of sin which is the spawne of all sin; which if it be seated in the body, how it can corrupt that new created pure soule, without any provocation or inticement to sin, cannot possibly

3. It cannot corrupt it with originall sin.

Rom, 5. 12.

be imagined. Againe, if Originall sin most properly consisteth in ignorance of minde, averseneſſe of will, and perverseneſſe of affections, none of which can be immediately in the body: how can it give theſe things to the soule? and that originall sin consists mainly in theſe, beſides the teſtimony of Scripture, and all orthodox Writers, it is manifeſt in reaſon; for that from which actuall sin commeth, in that doth originall sin conſiſt; now all actuall sin ſprings from ignorance, unbeliefe, &c. and therefore therein eſpecially originall sin muſt needs conſiſt. To conclude, ſeeing the body alone cannot poſſibly have originall sin, nor give that which it hath not; Originall sin cannot poſſibly come by the body.

2. Not by the ſoule. 1.

Neither can it proceed from the ſoule, if it be created good, but it will be ſaid it may; for in the inſtant of creation God depriveth

priveth it of supernaturall gifts for *Adams* sin; which though it putteth not evill into the soule, yet evill necessarily followeth; and hence is originall sin. But neither can I see how this can stand; for first if God deprives it so soone as it is made, it should be not onely absurd, but a vaine worke, to doe and straight way to undoe againe. Secondly, It should be unjust nevertheless; for he had beene as good never to have given it goodnesse, as presently to take it away againe. Thirdly, Seeing they say it is created in infusing and infused in creating: they must needs grant that he creates it without supernaturall gifts, (unlesse it be infused with them, wch is worse) and so they cannot say, it is deprived of that which it never had. Fourthly, I answer, that if God createth it without those gifts which are supernaturall to us, he creates it evill; for so are 2. 3. 4.

we without ſupernaturall gifts, and a man may as well imagine a God without goodneſſe, as a good ſoule without ſuch gifts.

5. Fifthly, However it be for creation or privation, naturall or ſupernaturall goodneſſe: if God ſo makes it, as it muſt needs be evill (as they ſay) he makes it evill; for what is it to make an evill one, if not to make one that cannot be good? yea, that is the greateſt evill: for to be neceſſarily evill, is not onely nought,

6. but worſt of all. Sixthly, This were unjuſtly to puniſh the innocent for the guilty, as wee

7. heard before. Laſtly, though all this might juſtly be, yet wee are never the neerer to originall ſin. For this is not our ſinning in *Adam*, but our being made ſinfull for *Adam*. So that if the ſoule be created good, we cannot poſſibly be thereby infected with originall ſin.

3. In the laſt place therefore it will

will be ſaid, that it comes neither by the ſoule nor the body, but by the union of both, and that we are deceived if we ſuppoſe it to happen through any phyſicall touching, but becauſe in the union we become *Adams* ſonnes(he receiving and looſing both for himſelfe and us) his ſin is thereby made ours. Verily *Calvin* was a man of an excellent judgement, who ſeeing the former grounds unanſwerable, flyes to this as the laſt refuge; yet with reverence to ſo worthy an inſtrument, I muſt ſeeke for better ſatisfaction. True it is that originall ſin is neither puddle nor ſtench, yet it is a ſpirituall Leproſie, hereditarily deſcending from *Adam* to all his naturall poſteritie, and infecteth the whole man, both body & ſoule, with all the parts and powers of both: And I would know how, if the ſoule be pure, and the body ſinfull, the infant at firſt, is halfe

Not by the union of both.

Calv. Inſt. lib. 2. c. 1.

halfe holy and halfe corrupt, which is absurd, and if both be cleane at the first, can the uniting of them make both uncleane? can two goods (as both are confessed apart) make one evill? nay, rather they are so much the better, being conjoyned, according to that common saying, *Vis unita fortior*: neither will it serve the turne to say it is imputed, and so we are reputed corrupt, for so it can be onely, if it be imputed onely in this. Indeed Christs righteousnesse is really ours by imputation: For a voluntary institution, as it is a covenant of grace, differs from a necessary course of justice in the order of nature; it being lawfull to shew kindnes without cause, but not to inflict punishment, as afterwards we shall see; besides, it cannot be justly imputed neither, unlesse the whole man be propagated; as was before, and shall be againe more fully proved.

2. Goods cannot make one evill.

2. Imputation insufficient.

Obj.

Anſ.

1.

2.

3.

ved. But we are not onely guilty of his sin, but by him really corrupt our selves. For is originall sin onely imputed corruption? no, it is a reall infection also: and that is it whose originall I enquire for, which if it be neither from the soule nor from the body, nor the union of both, it is not at all this way: but seeing it is certaine, both by Scripture & experience, that we have both: certaine it is also, that we have our whole corrupt nature, both soule and body from *Adam*. 4.

CHAPTER XIX.

That Originall sinne cannot passe but by propagation.

FRom the impossibility of the soules creation, wee proceed now to the necessitie of the propagation thereof in respect of originall sin: the former being not more

more contrary to the nature of God, then this is agreeable to the course of nature:

1. For, first, as by Gods ordination, originall sin passeth from one to all mankinde, so by propagation all mankinde proceeds out of one.

2. Secondly, As originall sin overspreads the whole man both soule and body; so according to the course of nature, the whole man both soule and body is propagated.

3. Thirdly, As originall sin is seated chiefly in the soule, according to the Scriptures: so the soul especially is propagated according to the course of nature.

Wherefore that the truth of the one may appeare in Scriptures as well as the other is manifest in nature, I will prove

1. first that Originall sin cannot passe but by propagation:

2. secondly, that it cannot be propagated unlesse the whole man be.

The

The first, that originall sin can no way justly descend to us, but by propagation: being the chiefest must chiefly be proved, and so much the rather, partly, because this being granted, the other two will follow alone, and partly, because some are of opinion, that wee may justly be punished for *Adams* sin, though we had never beene borne of him; even as when one brother spends the estate which he received for himselfe and all the rest. And so indeed all must hold that hold the immediate creation of the soule, else there can be no originall sin: which course (being as I thinke) unequall, is as far from God as God is from injustice.

1. The necessitie of proving this.

First therefore this may appeare by the cleare testimonies of the Scripture; *for*, saith the Apostle, *death passed upon all men, by one man in whom all men sinned*: or, *because all men sinned in him*. Whence it is manifest not onely that

1. The scriptures teach this and none others. ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. Rom. 5. 12.

that *Adam* was then all men, that is, the ſtocke and roote of all men naturally; in whom all men were, and ſo ſinned in him and with him; but alſo that his ſin is therefore imputed to his poſteritie, becauſe they were in him. For if the death threatned to him for ſin, paſſed upon all, becauſe all were in him; it is plaine, that the ſin for which that death was threatned, was imputed for the ſame cauſe; namely, becauſe we were all in him. Now for the ſame cauſe it was imputed to us then when wee were in him, for the ſame cauſe it is imputed now that we are out of him; and therefore as his ſin was then ours, becauſe according to the courſe of nature we were in him: ſo it is now ours, becauſe by courſe of nature wee are come out of him. So that *Adams* ſin is ours by imputation, and by propagation: but by imputation onely, becauſe

cause by propagation: yea so by this that the other may well loose the name. For it is not the imputing of anothers sin to us which was not ours: but by propagation that is made ours naturally, which was before potentially onely. And thus by the order of nature (which is the rule we must goe by in this) his sin is as truly ours, we being potentially in him, as his owne.

This also farther appeareth by the Antithesis which the Scripture maketh betweene the first and second *Adam* Christ Jesus. *For*, saith the Apostle, *as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive. And as by one mans disobedience many were made sinners: so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.* And againe, *If one dyed for all, then are all dead.* Whence it appeareth that as *Adam* was the stocke of mankinde, in whom all men were by nature; so was Christ the

The Antithesis sheweth there can be no other. 1 Cor. 15. 22.

Rom. 5. 19.

2 Cor. 5. 14.

the head of the Elect, in whom all they were by grace. For this is that admirable way, in consideration whereof men and Angels may stand amazed, whereby God had from eternitie decreed, to give his creatures a higher perfection by grace, than he could possibly give them by nature; for therein stands the opposition, which alone well considered, may happily put an end to this question; that mistake being indeed the ground of this errour. For they are deceived that thinke *Adams* sin to be imputed as Christs righteousnesse: the one being by the ordinance of nature, and the other of grace; the one a voluntary institution of the creator, the other a necessary operation of the creature: the one a work of mercy wherein kindnesse must bee shewed without cause, the other a work of justice, wherein punishment ought not to be inflicted but upon

Mark this difference or rather similitude betweene grace and nature.

on due detect. So that if we will here make a true Antitheſis, we muſt ſay, that as in Chriſt wee fulfilled the Law, ſuffered death, and are now in the ſeate of ſalvation, becauſe we are in him as members of his body by grace: ſo in *Adam* wee did eate of the forbidden fruit, and are under the condemnation of hell, becauſe we were in him, and are ſtill members of his body by nature. And thus *Adams* ſin ſhall be as truely ours by nature, as Chriſts righteouſnes is by grace. For as Chriſt derives his righteouſneſſe to his childrē by grace, ſo *Adam* communicates his ſin to his children by nature. The meanes whereby Chriſt doth it is by ſpirituall regeneration: *Adam* by naturall generation. Now therefore I conclude, that as Chriſts righteouſneſſe can be no way imputed unto us, but by meanes of regeneration, whereby wee are ingrafted into him, and

and made members of his body by the ordinance of grace: so *Adams* sin cannot be imputed to us or become ours, but by generation, whereby we descend from him, as members of his body, by the ordinance of nature.

The Law of Iustice required it.

Againe, it is contrary to Gods law of justice, that one should be punished for anothers fault, yea, even innocent children for their wicked parents, much more many thrifty brethren for one prodigall. Hence it was that the Lord abhorred that wicked proverbe of the Israelites; *The fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge; as I live saith the Lord, yee shall not use this proverbe, &c. the soule that sinneth it shall dye.* And againe, he saith, *The son shall not beare the iniquitie of the father, neither shall the father beare the iniquitie of the sonne; the righteousnesse of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickednesse of the wicked shall be upon himselfe*

Ezek. 18. 2, 3, 4

Vers. 20.

himſelfe. True it is indeed the Lord will viſit the ſins of the parents upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation: but himſelfe ſaith, *it is of them that hate him.* And not ſimply for their fathers ſins, but for their owne: and the rather to afflict the parents, who oft live to ſee the fourth generation. Hence alſo the Lord made a law that the fathers ſhould not be put to death for the children, nor the children for the parents; but every man ſhould die for his own ſin; and it is indeed no leſſe contrary to juſtice than to the Lords own practiſe; for who was ever more excellent than ſome that came of wicked parents, & who more wicked than ſome that came of good parents, whereof not onely the Scriptures but alſo daily experience yeeld innumerable examples: and perhaps the more to confute this errour. On the other ſide, what can be more

Exod. 20. 5

Deut. 24. 16.

juſt

juſt and naturall than that all things ſhould be in their firſt principles, and partake of their natures: nature teacheth that if the tree be evill, ſo muſt the fruit be: and divinitie allowes that if the roote be holy, ſo ſhould the branches be. And hence God is juſt in making this order, might eaſily be cleared, but neede not here to be diſputed.

Mat.7.17.

Rom.11.16

Laſtly, The originall righteouſneſſe of Chriſts humane nature plainly proves it; for he was freed from this corruptiõ by his extraordinary generation: and why ſhould hee herein differ from us to free him from ſinne, if we be not hereby ſinfull? Againe, if *Adams* ſin be imputed unto us ſimply for that wee are men, as *Adam* was (becauſe whatſoever he received or loſt, was for all mankinde as well as for himſelfe;) it cannot be avoided but it muſt be imputed to Chriſt ſo far forth as he is man, as

Chriſts righteouſneſſe proves it.

as well as unto us. But God forbid that we ſhuld ſay, Chriſt was ſinfull. Woe were us if this were true. And yet true it muſt needs be, if the being man will make us ſinfull; for that his ſin is to be imputed to all men: If, I ſay, the meere being man, without being meere man will doe it. We muſt therefore beware of this, and hold, that not the being a man, as *Adam* was, but our ſinning in him, and now being ſinfully propagated from him, is both the cauſe & means whereby his ſin is derived unto us: from both which by his extraordinary generation. Chriſt is not onely free, but ſanctified from the womb, and holy from his firſt conception, as preſently wee ſhall ſee. Luk. 1. 35.

Chap. XX.

That Originall sin cannot be propagated, unlesse the Whole man be.

We sinned in *Adam* onely as we were in him.

IT being evident that originall sin cannot passe, but by propagation. I proceed now to prove that it cannot be propagated, unlesse the whole man be; and this will easily follow upon the former grounds; for as we sinned in *Adam*, onely as wee were in him; so we are sinfull from him, onely as wee are from him. Wherefore as if the whole man was not potentially in *Adam*, the whole man did not sin in him; so, if the whole man did not proceed from him, the whole man cannot have originall sin from him. For it is impossible wee should be in him, and sin in him, in that respect wherein we neither were in him nor could sin in him, that is,

without the whole man: and therefore if the whole man neither was nor could be in him, nor from him, the whole man neither have nor can have sin in him, or from him. So that if we say we were in him in our bodyes onely, then they onely and not wee sinned in him: yea, even they did not sin in him, for bodyes simply considered, cannot sin, as wee heard before: and therefore to say wee sinned in our bodyes onely, is as much as to say, we did not sin at all. Besides, it is manifest that neither the body nor the soule alone is the subject of sin, but the person or whole man. For if according to the rule of reason, that be the proper subject to which the accident properly cleaveth: then either the whole man is the subject of sin, or else the whole man is not properly sinfull. And why else is the law given to the whole man? and

The whol man is the subject of sin.

Obj.

Anſ. the whole man rewarded or puniſhed, according to his vertuous or vitious manner of living:

Obj. 2. If any object, that the ſoule cannot be puniſhed alone after

Anſ. 2. death: I anſwer, Neither is it ſimply as a ſoule, but as the ſoule of a wicked man. If they reply, that ſo our ſoules ſinned in *Adam*, not as our ſoules, but as the ſoules of men. I anſwer (nay, they muſt anſwer themſelves) that according to their doctrine, the ſoule never was before, and ſo had no being in nature, no not potentially: much leſſe was it the ſoule of a man, and leaſt of all could it ſin in *Adam*.

5. Scriptures. Seeing therefore I could not ſin in *Adam*, but as I was in him, & I ſinned in him in my whole perſon, conſiſting of ſoule and body: and that not by I wot not what imaginary imputation, but really and truly, as I was potentially in him by the law of nature: it neceſſarily followeth that

that I was naturally and really in him, in my whole person, both soule and body, and so have proceeded from him. And hereto serve the former Scriptures, *in him all men sinned:* and, *in Adam all dye*: speaking of the whole person, and therefore so must wee. For what is mortall man, that he should contradict the holy Ghost; or seeke a new way when God hath chalked out the old? Wherefore I conclude, that as none can partake of Christs righteousnesse, unlesse the whole man be regenerated and borne againe, by and from his grace; so none can partake of *Adams* sin, unlesse the whole person be generated, by and from his nature.

Rom 5.12. 1 Cor.15. 22.

Ioh.3.3.

Chap. XXI.

That the whole man cannot be propagated, unlesse the soule be.

1. The whol cannot be without the essentiall parts.

IN the last place it remaines to prove, that if the whole man doe; the soule also must needs come from *Adam*: for this must also be proved, be it never so manifest, because some seeing the former grounds unanswerable, would make us beleeve, that the whole man may be said to be in *Adam*, though the soule comes from God. I deny not but it may be said, but I cannot see how it can be said truely. For what can be more false and absurd, than to say the whole was in *Adam*, but not the essentiall parts, whereof the whole consisteth. And indeed such a manner of being must be an idle imagination, or nothing, for it is impossible to be either really

or

or rationally. But what is their reason? man gives the subsistence to the person, and the soule comes from *Adam quoad existentiam*, though not *quoad essentiam*. But I deny this too: man does indeed something in the subsistence of the person, but that (as they say) is onely to provide, I know not what, a body (it should be) without a form; which at the most is but the least part, and therfore not the whole nor halfe.

But they say, man conjoynes both natures together, whereby it doth subsist by it selfe as a person. But neither is this true, for the conjunction is (they say) no body knows how long after cõception; and therefore not man but the woman must doe it alone. And yet not shee neither, for they say, God doth create it in the infusion and infuse it in the creating. But say that God gave the soule to the parents,

2. The conjunction if it put them in one case, cannot yet bring them from one place.

and they did unite them, would it follow that the conjunction of both, makes both to come from *Adam?* Why doe they not rather come both from God, and not at all from *Adam?* it were more reason the greater should draw the lesser, than the lesse the greater; & that the baser should attend the more noble, rather than the most noble to waite on the baser: verily if the whole man may be properly said to proceed from *Adam*, because the body doth; much more may the whole man be said to proceed from God, because the soule doth. The vanitie of this reason (that the whole man comes from *Adam*, because the body doth) may appeare by the like. *Simile.* If a lame man should have a woodden leg joyned to his body, might it be said his whole body grew in the wood, because his leg did? nothing lesse. And yet is not the woodden leg so much

much inferiour to the body, as the body is to the ſoule. Any childe therefore may take away theſe ſtilts from ſuch a lame reaſon as this is.

And if any will ſtill urge it in good earneſt, let him tell me when the whole man was in *Adam*? ſince the former Scriptures ſay plainly it was, it muſt needs be in *Adams* time, or ours, yea in both: but according to this doctrine it could be in neither, & ſo not at all. It could not be in *Adams* time, for the whole man had not being in nature (nor not potentially in reſpect of the ſoule) many hundred yeares after; neither could it be in our time, for *Adam* was dead likewiſe many thouſand yeares before we had any being, eſpecially in reſpect of the better part of the ſoule: and ſo conſequently never was, contrary to thoſe Scriptures, and the doctrine of originall ſin. It muſt needs be

3. It could not be in *Adams* time nor ours.

therefore that the whole man, as well ſoule as body, forme as matter, even the whole compound was potentially in *Adam* (as the whole tree in the roote or ſeede, many graines of wheat in one) and ſo being naturally propagated from him, doth partake of his nature both in ſoule and body.

Abſurdities.

Elſe marke what abſurdities will farther follow. That wee were in *Adam* in that wherein we were not: we ſinned without that without which wee could not ſin: the whole man was in *Adam*, and yet never came from him: and we left that in *Adam*, which we never had in him, *viz.* our ſoules. Then alſo *Adam* ſhall be ſtill full of ſoules, which yet he never had: and (that I may not be endleſſe in that which is needles) who can abide a ſpeech ſo contrary to it ſelfe, the whole was in *Adam*, but not that which is the whole? All which are rather

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ther wholly to be laughed at, than confuted in any part.

CHAP. XXII.

That the whole humanity of Christ, was taken from the Virgin.

The use and order of handling this question.

HAving thus shewed out of the Scriptures the necessity of the souls propagation, by reason of originall sin; I proceede now to prove it from the incarnation of Christ, which yet is accounted the maine let why it cannot be propagated: for because the Scripture saith, *He is like unto us in all things, sin onely excepted:* and it is taken for granted, that his soule was created of nothing: this is used not onely as one of the chiefe weapons to maintaine the creation of ours; but also as a shield to defend them from the force of many other Arguments, which cannot otherwise possibly be avoided.

Heb 4.15.

It

It is very neceſſary therfore fully to cleare this point, and to ſhew both that it was mediately (though extraordinarily) produced from *Adam*, as well as ours, and how ſo it could be free from ſin.

No Scripture for it.

That the ſoule of our Saviour was not immediately created of nothing, may appeare; firſt, becauſe it is more than is in the

1. Scripture. The holy Ghoſt in the deſcription of Chriſts incarnation, ſaith nothing of any ſuch thing, no notwithſtanding it is thought to be ſuch a notable, yea, ſuch a neceſſary way to

2. cleare him from ſin. And who dare ſay or think the holy Ghoſt ſhould omit one of the moſt principal things, in the mightieſt matter that ever was revealed to men or Angels? yea, how con-

3. trary to all reaſo is it, that when the foure Evangeliſts were ſo carefull to ſet forth every materiall circumſtance (touching his birth

birth, life, death, &c.) ſo as that which is wanting in one, is ſupplied by another; yet in this alone, which is the chiefe of all, they ſhould all forget to mention it, if there had been any ſuch matter? And why then ſhould we thruſt in our conceits of ſuch things as never were heard of in the Scriptures? For from the beginning of the world (ſince *Adam*) it was never heard that a ſoule was created of nothing: and ſhall wee then father our imaginations upon the Scripture? yea, why or how dare man ſpeake where the holy Ghoſt is ſilent? know, that *curſed is he that addeth ought to the Word of God*? Deut. 14. 2

But not onely doe the Scriptures not ſpeake it, but they plainly affirme the contrary: as where it ſaith, *The ſeed of the woman ſhall breake the Serpents head: and in thy ſeede ſhall all the nations of the earth be bleſſed.* Where by Scriptures againſt it. Gen. 3. 15. & 22. 18.

ſeede

seede is meant the whole nature of man which Christ tooke: and how can it be denied then, but his soule as well as his body was their seede. Againe, *Christ was made of the seede of David according to the flesh*, that is, his whole humanity; for it is there opposed to his divinitie As also where it is said, *God raised up Christ, of the fruit of his loynes according to the flesh*: And how else can he be in all things (except sin) like unto us, who (as is abundantly proved before) are mediately traduced from *Adam* both soule and body.

Rom. 1. 3.

Act. 2. 30.

3. Then *Adams* sin must be imputed to him.

Againe, If his and all soules be immediately created by God, then the imputation of *Adams* sin to all men, must lay hold on Christ as man. Neither is it sufficient to say, that he is more than a man, for if *Adams* sin be imputed unto all men, *eo nomine*, even because they are men, it cannot be avoided, but it must light

light upon him alſo, ſo far forth as he is man. And thus they muſt needs fall into that which they ſo much feare; the making of Chriſts humane nature ſinfull: ſo flippery is it to walke out of the right way, though never ſo warily.

This appeareth alſo in that his ſoule and body were conceived together both at once: and not after the perfecting of the vegetative and ſenſitive ſoules; as they ſay it is with us. For this is generally confeſſed, becauſe the divine nature is immediately united to the ſoule, and by the ſoule to the body: ſo that unleſſe we ſhould ſay, that his body did ſubſiſt by it ſelfe out of the divine nature before it was aſſumed; or elſe that the divine nature was united with a brute body, (or unformed un-informed Embrio) which no man I beleeve, is ſo brutiſh to affirme: it muſt of neceſſitie be granted

4. His ſoule and body conceived together.

(ſo

(ſo forcible is the truth) that however it is with us, his ſoule and body was conceived together. Which being ſo, it followeth by the ſame reaſon that if he be like unto us, and we like unto him in all things, except ſin; our ſoules and bodyes alſo conceived together as his was. And if it be graunted that all ſouls are preſent at the firſt conception; there will be ſmall reaſon to thinke they come by immediate creation.

5. His miraculous cõception.

Beſides, it is manifeſt from the manner of his conception; for if his ſoule had come immediately from God, he might have beene begotten after the common manner of men without ſin: but this could not be: and therefore the former is not. The connexion of the propoſition is manifeſt, for if his and all ſoules doe come immediately from God, Originall ſin cannot poſſibly come by propagation: but

but either becauſe God bereaves it of ſupernaturall gifts, whereby it becomes evill; or by the union with the body at the inſtant whereof it is guilty of *Adams* ſin, becauſe the ſoule of man. But ſeeing Chriſts ſoule ſo ſoone as it was, was together with the body one perſon with the eternall word: he muſt needs be exempted from the common condition of men, and ſo even (by their doctrine) neither could be bereaved of thoſe gifts, nor guilty of *Adams* ſin, being more than a man. Neither can it be ſaid, that there is evill in the act of generation, for that is naturally good: and the ſoule (they ſay) is not then preſent: and the body alone is not capable of ſin: no though the ſoule were preſent, it (as they ſay) man propagate the body onely. Wherefore if his ſoule had been immediatly created by God, he might well have bin propagated without

Generation not evill.
1.
2.

out ſin. But the aſſumption that this could not be, is no leſſe apparent, if for no more but this; that if it could, no queſtion it ſhould. For God and nature doe nothing in vaine; and wee cannot deny the truth of that ſaying, *Fruſtra fit per plura quod fieri poteſt per pauciora.* So that either this extraordinary worke of the holy Ghoſt was in vaine, or elſe Chriſts ſoule was not immediately created.

6. The confeſſion of the adverſaries.

Laſtly, For the confirmation hereof, I will only adde one reaſon more, taken from the reaſoning of the Adverſaries unto this Doctrine, who therefore prove the holy Ghoſt not to be Chriſts father (though he overſhadowed the Virgin) becauſe the matter of his humanitie was not from the holy Ghoſt, but from the Virgin. From whence I might conclude;

1. Firſt, That Chriſts ſoule comes not immediately from God; for then

then the greateſt part of his humanitie ſhould haue beene from the holy Ghoſt: becauſe all externall workes of God are common to each perſon in Trinitie.

Secondly, That his ſoule was taken from the Virgin, for they ſay his humanitie was: whereof I am ſure the ſoule is the principall part: yea, that without wch it cannot be humanitie. 2.

But that which I doe eſpecially conclude from hence is, that if the holy Ghoſt cannot be Chriſts father, becauſe he gaue not the matter of his humanitie, Chriſt cannot be the ſon of *Adam* nor *David* according to the promiſe: no nor the ſon of man (and ſo no Saviour) unleſſe he receive the matter of his humanitie (whereof the ſoule is the chiefe part) from them. And herein indeed they ſpeake the truth, for it is impoſſible to be a naturall father to that whereunto we give not the whole matter, 3.

ter, yea and forme too: as wee shall see when wee come to the rules of nature, which God hath instituted, and from whence the truth of this is also to be fetched.

How Christ was true man.

I conclude therefore, that Christs whole humanitie, both soule and body, was traduced from *Adam*: that is, deduced out of his substance, though not after the common manner, but seperated from the person of the Virgin onely by the miraculous worke of the holy Ghost, which useth to be takē from both sexes in ordinary generation. And though a soule cannot by the power of nature be produced of one soule, no more than a body: yet it being performed by supernaturall power, it is a true soule no lesse than the body is a true body; and both together makes a true man, no lesse than *Eve* was a true woman (whom *Adam* called *bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh*, even his other selfe-

Gen. 2. 23.

ſelfe-woman) although ſhee was taken onely out of man. For that which the Apoſtle ſpake in a ſpirituall ſenſe, is true alſo litterally, that *Wee are members of his body, of his fleſh, & of his bones:* Eph. 5. 30. & conſequently ſo is he of ours: which could not be if he had not the true nature of man, though taken out of a woman onely: as well as *Eve*, who was made onely of a man: yea, much more becauſe ſhe was immediatly made perfect at the firſt: and he conceived of ſeede, formed, nouriſhed, and brought forth by degrees: like unto us in all things excepting onely the manner of his firſt conception, that ſo he might be free from ſin. And here let us ſtay a little to behold and wonder at the admirable correſpõdency, yea, double concordancy in the four-fold production of mankinde, to wit. in *Adam* and us: *Eve* and Chriſt: immediately and mediately: after this manner.

Adam

A double harmony in the four-fold productiō of mankinde.

Adam made immediatly without man or woman.
Other men mediately, both of man and woman.
Eve partly both waies, of man and woman.
Christ also both wayes, of no man but woman.

Conclusion.

Thus by the same authoritie that they would prove our soules created of nothing, because Christs was, I can prove they were not because his was not, yea, by so much more, as there are abundance of Scripture, and reasons to confirme this, and none of all for, but against that.

CHAP. XXIII.

That Christs humanitie was never cleansed from sinne.

The puritie of Christs Incarnation.

CONcerning the Incarnation of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, it is comonly said, that

that the holy Ghoſt did ſanctifie a part of the Virgins ſubſtance, which was then aſſumed by the divine nature to make the perſon of Chriſt. Which words muſt be warily interpreted, and wiſely underſtood, for by a part, we are not to underſtand a part of her body onely, but of her whole perſon aſwell ſoule as body, whereof his humanitie was formed: and by ſanctifying, we are not to imagine cleanſing it from ſin, but only the conſecrating it to this holy purpoſe, and endowing it with gifts fitting ſuch a divine union. The former is already proved, namely, that his whole humanitie both ſoule and body was taken from the ſubſtance of the Virgin: and the latter, how thus it could be free from ſin, wee are now to ſhew. For the ground whereof, I will firſt prove, that it was not cleanſed from ſin, and then ſhew how he could be incarnate without ſin.

1.
2.

sin. The former I will prove,
1. first, becauſe it could not be ſin-
2. full: and ſecondly, if it had beene ſinfull, it could never have beene ſanctified.

That Chriſts humanitie was not ſinfull.

The firſt, that that part of the Virgins ſubſtance which was aſſumed by the divine nature, was never ſinfull, may appeare;

1. Firſt, Becauſe all ſubſtances, as they are meere ſubſtances, were created by God exceeding good, & have their dependance on him: yea, even the ſubſtance of the devils themſelves.

2. Secondly, Meere ſubſtãce cannot poſſibly be capable of ſinne, becauſe that cannot be without a perſonall ſubſiſtence, knowledge and will to encline and move it ſelfe to good or evill: which meere ſubſtance ſimply conſidered cannot doe, whether it be of the ſoule or body.

3. Thirdly, Sin is not eſſentiall to the nature of man, but onely an accident or evill qualitie, cleaving

cleaving to the person of him in whom it is, and so cannot properly be said to the substance of mans nature.

Fourthly, Even evill affections and actions themselves (though they be so called) are not simply sinfull, but the man that commits them. For not the matter of the action which proceeds from God, but the will and intent of the doer makes it to be sinfull. Now if those be not, much lesse can the bare substance of man be sinfull: but onely the man whose substance it is. 4.

Fifthly, If every part of mans substance should be sinfull, then it followes that the haires upon our heads are even infected with it, and much more such abortives as perish before the soules infusion: and consequently must all rise at the day of Judgement againe to suffer (without Christs satisfactiō) infinite punishments. 5.

None therefore is to be accounted sinfull, but onely that which necessarily serves to make up the perfect person of a sinner: and so much, so, is sinfull, and must and shall be punished in it selfe, or Christ.

6. Sixthly, There is no law given to substances, but to creatures, not to parts, but persons: neither can any other be accused, condemned, or convicted of sin.

Rom 4.15. *Now where no law is, there is no transgression*, saith the Apostle: not simple parts therefore, but onely persons can be sinfull.

7. Seventhly, It is manifest it could have no actuall sin, and originall sin is not of that nature (as was before shewed) that it cannot come to us neither by the soule nor body, nor union of both, if it be created: and by propagation onely, if it be propagated; for which cause Christ onely was freed from the ordinary course of propagation.

Lastly,

Laſtly, If meere ſubſtances be ſinfull, it cannot be ſhifted but Chriſt was infected with originall ſin; for his ſubſtance was in *Adam*, in as much as he was his ſonne, and ſo by this doctrine muſt needs be ſinfull. But this ſeemes to be graunted by Divines, and therefore they ſay, that the holy Ghoſt did in the ſame moment that it was aſſumed, cleanſe that maſſe whereof his body was made from ſin: and ſo it was ſanctified from the firſt conception in the Virgins wombe. Whereof we give this reaſon, that it became not the eternall ſonne of God perſonally to aſſume unto himſelfe a nature, ſtained, defiled, and polluted with ſin. And farther they ſay, that indeed *Mary* was a ſinner, but the maſſe of fleſh which was taken out of her ſubſtance, was at the ſame inſtant ſanctified by the operation of the holy Ghoſt. So that it is graunted,

8.

This doctrine not ſo well cleared of old.

that the ſubſtãce wherof Chriſts humanitie was made, was ſinfull before it was aſſumed. This point not being ſo well cleared, hath much troubled the Church in former ages: being aſſailed with divers dangerous errours, why elſe did the *Marcionites* and *Manichees* hold that Chriſt had an incorporeall or heavenly body; wch was not takẽ from the Virgin, but only paſſed through her? and what elſe cauſed *Apollinarius* to hold, that Chriſt had no humane ſoule, but only a body which was inſould with the deity, but to free him from ſin?

2. If it had been ſinfull, it could never have been ſanctified.

That we may therefore fully cleare this truth from all ſuch phantaſticall opinions; I deny that it can be truly and properly ſaid that Chriſts humanitie was ever ſinfull. And not onely for the former reaſons, but becauſe if it had beene ſinfull, it could never have beene ſanctified; the Sonne of God could never have beene

beene incarnate, nor any man ever saved. For who should have purged away that sin? the holy Ghost? nay; there is one onely *Mediatour between God and man, the man Christ Jesus: and it is through his blood that wee have redemption, even the forgivenesse of sinnes: and it is the blood of his crosse, that reconcileth all things.* And againe, it is the *sprinkling of the blood of Christ* that giveth power to the purging away of sin: and therefore also it is said, that *without shedding of blood there is no remission.* So that the bloud of Christ onely cleanseth from sin. Yea, but the holy Ghost also sanctifies. It is true, the holy Ghost doth now sanctifie the elect, purg out sin, & infuse grace: but all by vertue of Christs redemption. For if he had not first (I meane in the order of nature) take away the guilt by his bloud no man could have been sanctified by the Spirit. Now this he

1 Tim. 2. 5.
Eph. 1. 7.
Col. 1. 14. 20.
1 Pet. 1. 2.
Heb. 9. 22.

Obj.
Mat. 3. 11.
Ioh. 3. 5.
Rom. 8. 14

could not doe by his own humanitie, for it was impossible that he shuld purge sin, by that blood which he had not: & therfore if it had been necessary, that Christ shuld have takē away the guilt & corruption of his own nature, (wch could not be but by the same nature taken) before he tooke it; it had been impossible, that ever Christ could have bin incarnate.

Obj. 2. Yea, but God is omnipotent. True, but his omnipotency cannot work cōtradictions, & such is this: we must take heed therefore how we hold this, lest at unawares we shut out Christ from being a Saviour, and our selves and all other from salvation by him. Now then if his substance was never sinfull, the worke of the holy Ghost herein was not to cleanse it from sin, but to seperate that wch was not sinfull in it selfe, from a sinfull creature, that so being free, it might be assured by the divine nature, & subsist in the person of the same. CHAP.

Chapter XXIV.

How Christs Incarnation was free from corruption?

THis ground being laid, wee have a faire way opened for the freeing of our Saviour Christ from sin in every respect, although his soule and body came from *Adam* as well as ours: which we shall more fully conceive by shewing how it was, and why it was so. For the first, seeing neither the substance of soule or body, can be sinfull, as it is substance, but as both together are a person; for as much as Christs soule & body is no person, but as it is united with the divine nature: he, namely, his person never was, and so never could sin in *Adam*. And thus is his person free. If then it be said that though his person was not, nor could sin in *Adam*, yet seeing his humanitie was in him,

How Christ was free from sin.

1. How free.

1. His person free.

His humanitie free.

and came from him (elſe he were not true man) that muſt needs ſin in him. It cannot poſſibly be neither. For as is ſaid his humanitie without the divinitie never was a perſon, and not being a perſon but ſubſtance only, he is thereby exempted from the common condition of men, and originall ſin could not juſtly be imputed unto him.

1. From imputation.

2. By propagation.

Neither could it be propagated, becauſe he was conceived after an extraordinary manner without man: and thus is his humanitie free alſo. If it be further ſaid, that though he be not ſinfull as Chriſt, nor yet as having the meer ſubſtance of man: yet he muſt needs be ſinfull as his ſubſtance was belonging to the perſon of corrupt *Adam*, in whom it was, and afterwards to the ſinfull Virgin; that cannot be neither. For though it were ſinfull as a part of their perſons, yet as it was ſo it was none of his.

3. His ſubſtance in the Virgin free.

his. Christ never assumed the person of the Virgin (for one person cānot be another though sin were not) but he tooke her nature or substance only, which because it was good in it selfe, though sinfull as hers, the holy Ghost did seperate it (by an unusuall course) from belonging to her person (and so being by it selfe it was sinlesse) and then it was instantly assumed by the eternall Word, and so made the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that in the same moment that it was: being by that union enriched wth supernaturall gifts, and exalted above all men and Angels. And thus also was his substance sinlesse, although it was the substance of the sinfull Virgin. And to conclude, thus is he the immaculate *Lambe that taketh away the sinnes of the world.* Ioh. 1. 29. 1 Pet. 1. 19.

2. Why his conception was extraordinary.

Now all this was effected by the immediate working of the holy Ghost at the instant of his con-

conception. For it neither might nor could be performed after the manner of mans sinfull propagation. Because if man had ministred the matter of his humanitie after the ordinary way, it should have been sinfull in part: that is, as man gave it to be a part of Christs person, or indeavoured the subsistence of that nature in the person of the Son, which nature alone would have made a person, and consequently a sinner. For by the law of nature in ordinary generation, so much as man begets another person, he begets another sinner (which yet if the soule were immediatly created, were so little, as there could be no originall sin, as we heard before.) So that by propagation the humanity of Christ which is the whol person, so farre as man could in this cause have effected, should have beene sinfull. And though not meerely as humanitie, yet

1. It could not be by man.

as

as a nature ſinfully propagated from man, wherewith it was impoſſible the divine nature ſhould be united. Seeing therefore it could not be by man: and the Virgin neither might nor could conceive alone (for corruption muſt have no hand in it) it was neceſſary therefore that it ſhould be done by the ſupernaturall power of God. And ſeeing it muſt be done extraordinarily by the immediate power of God, no perſon was ſo fit for it as the holy Ghoſt, whoſe office it properly concerns from the Father and the Son, to conſecrate and ſet apart for holy uſes, and eſpecially to indue mens ſoules with ſupernaturall gifts: & therfore moſt of all in the incarnation of our Saviour Chriſt, which was abſolutely the moſt holy of all GODS externall workes.

And this (as I am undoubtedly perſwaded) is the true doctrine

Phil.2.6,7 Heb.4.15 2.-6.

trine of the Incarnation of our Lord and Saviour Christ Jesus, who was like unto us in all things, sin onely excepted: made of the same substance both for soule and body, and therefore true man; and yet not sinfull. He was in *Adam* in respect of his humanitie as well as we: and yet sinned not in him as we did. In the consideratiõ of all which, we may well say with the Apostle, *Without controversie, great is the mystery of godlinesse.*

1 Tim. 3. 16.

Why this truth hath beene so long obscured.

Thus I hope, I have sufficiently manifested, both by Scripture and reasons drawne from them, that soules are not immediately created of God of nothing, but all mediately propagated from *Adam*: yea, Christs as well as ours, though his after an extraordinary manner, because he was an extraordinary man. From all which, it plainly appeareth, that the holy Ghost hath not left us to wander in un-

uncertainties, concerning the soules originall, but clearely enough revealed it, had not men set up two false opinions, one of which they thought must needs be true: and neither having sure footing in the Scripture, because both false, the truth hath beene long obscured, and both accounted doubtfull, and almost curious, because difficult to be knowne.

CHAP. XXV.

Naturall reasons, proving the soules propagation.

HItherto wee have proved the soules propagation, by testimonies and reasons drawne out of the Scripture: and now wee are to proceed to naturall reasons, which in worth and authoritie are to be regarded next the former: they being the word of God wrought, as the other is his

The nature and validitie of naturall reasons.

his written word: the one we call the voice of nature, the other the word of grace: the one mediatly manifested in the creatures, the other immediately revealed by himselfe. For if nature be (as is no lesse commonly than truly said, *ordinaria dei potentia*) the ordinary power of God, as miraculous workes are his extraordinary power: then by like reason it followeth, that the voice of nature is the ordinary voice of God; even as the divine Oracles are his extraordinary voice. Now as this question chiefly concerneth nature, so the resolution thereof ought chiefly to be fetched from nature: whose sentence is therefore so much the more to be respected; yea, so much that though the Scripture said nothing, yet natures testimony were in this of sufficient credit alone. And if we will hearken to nature, I doubt not to make

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it appeare, that there is nothing more manifeſt in nature, than this mediate manner of the ſouls propagation: and when as well nature as divinitie concludes for it, I ſee not with what reaſon it can be gainſaid.

The firſt naturall reaſon which I will produce, ſhall be from the nature of reaſon it ſelfe: which teacheth not to beleeve any thing for which wee have no reaſon, Scripture, nor experience. Some things our ſenſes teach us to beleeve, as the vertues of the Loadſtone, for wch we can render neither Scripture nor reaſon, but only experience. Some things reaſon teacheth us, as that the whole conteines the parts, which we would beleeve without Scripture or experience, onely by reaſon. And ſome things wee receive from Scripture, as the Trinitie in the Unitie, which cannot appeare either by ſenſe or reaſon, but onely by faith.

1. Reaſon from the nature of reaſon.

It hath neither Scripture, ſenſe, nor reaſon.

1.

2. faith. But none of theſe can manifeſt the ſoules immediate creation, for it is confeſſed to be above ſenſe or reaſon, neither is there any Scripture to prove it. For who ever heard of a ſoule newly created ſince the firſt in the beginning? is it likely that God ſhould continually do ſuch wonderfull workes, which the Scripture never ſpake of, and whereof there can no example be given? yea, is it not contrary to all ſenſe and reaſon, that God ſhould worke a perpetuall miracle, and that the moſt omnipotent worke that can be, and yet this onely among all the workes of God ſhould be omitted in the Scripture? If there were ſuch a thing as this, wee ſhould neede none other Arguments to confute all the Atheiſts and Epicures in the world: this therfore of all other ſhould have beene revealed, if it had beene ſo.

Seeing

Seeing therefore there is no divine testimony to warrant it, there had need be strong reasons to make a man beleeve it. Neither is it unreasonable onely, but as it seemeth to me a most unnaturall opinion: cleane contrary to the whole order of nature, and end of all GODS extraordinary workes. For although the supreame goodnesse of GOD would not content it selfe without producing more good, for which cause he created the world: yet for as much as his essence is chiefly manifested in the vertues which are essentiall to himselfe onely, and the end of all his workes is to manifest himselfe, which as it is the greatest good, is his greatest glory: he therefore could not without disparagement to his own excellency, worke alwayes immediately in the matters of his creatures, as in creating new substances of nothing, but onely

2. From the order of nature.

Why God made the world. Why he instituted nature.

ly in bringing to an higher perfection, by qualifying them with his owne essentiall vertues, so farre as the creature is capable: and for this cause at their first creation he disposed all things in such order, as they might persist of themselves, without his immediate working any more in their matter or substance, which order we call nature.

It breeds a disturbance in the course of nature.

Now seeing this is true in Angels, and all other creatures that ever God created; were it not unreasonable & unnaturall too, to disturbe the order of all Gods workes in exempting man onely? Nay, then let nature goe to wracke, and every thing be done miraculously, for the whole order of nature is broken, and instituted in vaine. And for my part, I thinke that God would have rather created men together when he made *Adam* (as he did Angels) than thus to continue creating to the worlds end.

But

But it pleased the wisdome of God to make choice of this course, not onely for the former reason, namely, becauſe it was most fit for the excellency of his nature, which might worke no more in the substance of his creatures than needs must: but also for the meanness of ours, which require his working by meanes, after a naturall order, proportionable to that reason he hath given us (which onely our nature was capable of) the better to manifest himselfe unto us.

3. From the end of GODS workes.

1. This is a disparagement to God.

2. Unfit for us.

3. Against the order of grace.

4. A vaine worke against nature.

Againe, that so he might propagate his Church of mankinde successively by course of nature, who thus according to his decree might and did all fall most fitly and justly in one *Adam* by nature; as they are restored againe most fitly and justly in another *Adam* Christ Jesus by grace.

And lastly, that he might not work perpetuall miracles, which onely

onely manifeſt his power, one of the meaneſt of his attributes: which yet is ſo fully manifeſted without it in the firſt creation of all things of nothing, and ſtill preſerving them, that it ſhould be in vaine for him to doe ſo at the beſt: and therefore certainly he doth not; according to the Rule, *Deus & natura nil fruſtra faciunt.*

Ariſt. de Cælo. lib. 1. cap. 4.

Chap. XXVI.

Reaſons from the nature of generation.

Man can father no more than he begets.

NOw by this mediate manner of Gods working, I meane the rules of nature, and that order which God inſtituted for all creatures in the beginning: it is impoſſible that *Adam* ſhould be our father and we his children, if wee have not our whole man as well ſoule as bo-

dy

dy from him. For if we receive onely the leaſt part of our ſelves, that is, our bodies from him, then he doth not beget a man, that is to ſay, a reaſonable creature, but onely I wot not what formeleſſe matter or dead carkaſe: for ſuch an uncouth thing is the body without the ſoule: and though a ſoule comes afterward from another, that's nothing to the parents, for they beget onely the former: and I trow it is unjuſt to make them father that which they never begate. So that by the courſe of nature, if man doe not beget the whole man, he cannot poſſibly be ſaid to be a father to the whol man.

Obj.
Anſ.

This farther appeareth for that by the law of nature, it is not the giving of the matter alone, much leſſe the matter of the body onely that makes a father, for that is of the elements: in the conveyance whereof the father

No father without giving the forme.

father is as it were an instrument onely: but the forme is properly and immediately his, which if he doe not propagate to his of-spring, he can no more be a father to his children, than to fleas or lice, that breed of his matter, but without his forme, than which, what grosser absurditie can be in nature.

3. Else he cannot be a father to the body.

Besides, man should then be so farre from being a father to the whole man, that he could be father to no part of him. For he can be but partly a father that begets but part of a creature, and so not a whole father to any part. And if fatherhood consists especially in giving the forme, and that comes only from God, he onely is a father to the whole man rather: yea, is not there much more reason to say, God onely is our father, because the soul, the more noble part, comes from him; than that *Adam* is, because the baser part the body, and

and yet not the body neither, but ſomething like the body comes from him? I ſuppoſe any reaſonable man will graunt it, without any farther reaſon.

4. Elſe he can beget nothing.

And thus he cannot be father to our bodyes, unleſſe to our ſoules alſo: yea, it is impoſſible in nature, that he ſhould beget any thing without the ſoule. For, there can be no naturall body without forme, and no forme of a humane body but the ſoule.

If therefore man doth not propagate the ſoule, together with the body, he cannot propagate any thing but a meere nullity, *viz.* nothing at all.

5. Elſe he cannot beget at all.

Moreover, I ſay, he cannot propagate at all, for generation is not of parts, but of creatures, the matter and forme ſimply conſidered, cannot be ſaid to be generated, but the creature, conſiſting of matter and forme: and therefore when I ſay the ſoule is

is generated or produced, it is to be underſtood joyntly with the body, becauſe the whole is: otherwiſe neither can properly be ſaid to be generated, but rather congenerated; ſo that if man begets not both, he begets not at all.

6. Elſe man ſhall be inferior to beaſts.

Againe, If man cannot beget man, he is by nature herein inferior to brute beaſts, yea, even the baſeſt creatures, who yet can propagate their like, both in regard of ſoule and body: And to make man herein inferior to beaſts, what can be more abſurd? Ob. Anſ. Neither is it not any diſparagement, ſo long as his ſoule comes from an higher principle; for it is not onely an *indecorum*, and a groſſe deformity in nature, that man ſhould be left deſtitute of that power which is given to brute beaſts in ſo maine a thing, yea, even the higheſt degree of naturall perfection: but alſo it caſts an aſperſion upon GOD him-

himselfe, as if he were overseene in endeavouring to make a creature subject to the lawes of nature, of so high perfection, as could not be subjected thereunto: and so God should faile in his workmanship, and be constrained to helpe himselfe, and worke perpetually in creating soules, notwithstanding his creating all Angels together, which could not be propagated, and instituting naturall meanes for the rest, that so he might rest, and yet cannot.

7. Like begets like.

Yea, doe not the contrary directly follow, and not onely from the common rule in nature, like begets like, and therefore, man, man: but also because if man be the most excellent of the creatures, having all or at least the most excellent faculties in an higher perfection than they, he should so much the rather be more able to propagate his like than they? yea,

shall any beast bring forth another, which shall be able to persist of it selfe, and bring forth more; and shall the God of all creatures make mans nature so lame and imperfect, that he and he onely cannot goe alone as well as they, unlesse God leade him? If this be true, God shall be the most step-father to man, and man the worst creeple of all Gods creatures.

8. Every man two fathers or none.

Furthermore, As men can have no children this way: so children can have no fathers, or else every one two fathers. For if the soule comes from God, who is a mans father, the whole mans, I meane? not *Adam*, for he is the father of our bodies onely; nor God, for our soules only come from him. If then neither God nor *Adam* be our father, whose sonnes I beseech you are wee? By this doctrine he is a wise childe that knowes his owne father. Perhaps

haps it will be said, wee are the sonnes of both. But then every one must have two fathers, an infinite and a finite father. Oh strange absurditie, and no lesse ridiculous than impossible! for how can both be, when by the lawes of nature neither can? To be short, either they must make GOD and *Adam* both one, or else every childe must have two fathers, or none at all.

9. Children like their parents.

Neither is it without force, that children are ordinarily like their parents, and not onely in the features of the body, but in the faculties of the minde also. Now though all soules be essentially alike, and this is not alwayes true, neither in soule nor body, for divers reasons, yet since it is true in both for the most part, it appeareth that the parents have more in generation, than the body; yea, so much as the whole man is ordinarily

like the parents, ſo much is the whole man propagated from him.

Chap. XXVII.

Reaſons from the nature of the ſoule.

Every man muſt have two ſouls.

NEither is this kinde of propagation more agreeable to the ordinary courſe of generation, than to the nature of the ſoule it ſelfe: nor that of the immediate creation more contrary to the one than the other. For, firſt, as by that doctrine every one muſt have two fathers, or none, ſo alſo two ſoules; for if the rationall ſoule be infuſed by God after the perfecting of the vegetative and ſenſitive ſoules, as they are called (though in truth both be performed by one ſoule, as wee ſee in beaſts) I would know what

what soule it was that did informe and shape the fruite before, giving it vegetation and sense? These things cannot possibly be done without a soule, which if it were not the rationall, was some other unreasonable soule, such as is in beasts; and so every man must have two soules. For wee see by experience, the former did not perish at the comming of the latter, as it is in the forme of corporeall substances, when one perish, then another succeeds; but here both remaine, and therefore either must be mingled and made one with the reasonable soule (which cannot be unlesse it be corruptible;) or else every man must have two soules, one reasonable and another unreasonable: which opinion is verily as farre from reason, as the soule is from being unreasonable.

Againe, The soule is an essen-

The soule the chiefe part of man.

tiall part of man, and the very forme of man, without which man is not man, and therefore it is against nature, and contrary to all reason, that man by the course of nature propagating a creature like himselfe, should not be able to propagate such an essentiall part as the soule is: especially seeing it is graunted he can propagate such an accident as sin is. Yea, how can this doctrine possibly be true, that man should propagate that wch is unnaturall, & not that which is naturall; an unnaturall accident, and not a naturall essentiall part? sin which cannot be without the soule, and not the soule without which there can be no sin.

3. The soule compared with other spirits.

This also will farther appeare, if we compare the nature of the soule with other spirits. For it is observed by the learned, and manifest even to the ignorant, that GOD hath created three sorts

ſorts of ſpirits in the world.

Firſt, Angels, which are ſo ſpirituall that they cannot be joyned with bodyes.

Secondly, The ſpirits of beaſts, &c. which are ſo corporall, that they cannot be ſeperated from bodyes.

Thirdly, Mens ſoules, as a mean which can both live without bodyes (as after death) like Angels; and united with bodies, as in this life like beaſts.

Againe, we ſee it is the will and ordinance of God, that Angels ſhould neither increaſe nor decreaſe: corporall ſpirits (as I may call them) both increaſe and decreaſe: and that ſoules ſhould increaſe and multiply, but never decreaſe or periſh. Doe not then the order of nature teach then, that as Angels are immediatly created by God onely, and the ſpirits of beaſts altogether mediately propagated, ſo the ſoules of men, which

are the meane betwixt both, ſhould be produced, partly by the immediate power of God, and partly mediately by propagation, or rather by ſuch a manner of production as is even a meane betweene creation and propagation. It were to diſturbe the order of nature, to confound the nature of the ſoule, and to make a mingle-mangle of the orderly workes of God, to deny it.

4. The nature of the ſoule it ſelfe.

And this is no leſſe apparent, if wee conſider the nature of the ſoule alone, then compared with others. For it is to be conſidered, that the ſoule is the loweſt nature of all incorporeall ſpirits, indued with power to uſe the bodily organs, to thoſe purpoſes whereunto they were ordained by nature: but chiefly by its rationall faculty, to get knowledg of all ſenſible things, which ſenſes are ſo proportioned by God, that the reaſonable ſoule by them

them get all its naturall knowledge. Yea even our knowledge of God himselfe, doth ordinarily arise from sense, onely ordered by reason: and reason it selfe is a meane betweene the sense of beasts, and intelligence of Angels. And therefore God hath united the soule with the body, it is incompleate without it, it naturally desires union with it, it cannot ordinarily know any thing but by it, and the end and use of it is in all things naturally to worke mediately by the body. For the soule is not such a strange nature, dwelling in the body miraculously, as some imagine, but lovingly united by a sweet union, and fit concordance in nature. And therefore without question, as the nature, use, end, and all ordinary faculties and workes, are naturally and mediately by these corporall natures, so also is the originall;

and could not otherwiſe have ſuch union and ſympathy with the body. But yet as the nature and workes alſo are ſome wayes extraordinary, without and above all elementary natures, ſo proportionably thereunto, God hath an extraordinary and ſupernaturall worke in producing of it.

5. The faculty of propagation ſeated in the ſoule.

Another reaſon that the ſoule is propagated, may be becauſe the faculty of propagation belongs as well to the ſoule as the body: yea, hath originally the chiefe ſeate in the ſoule onely. For the body alone is but a dead inſtrument (as the pen in the hand of the writer) and therefore muſt needs be in the ſoule, which is the firſt principle, and principall cauſe of all actions: unleſſe wee ſhould graunt more ſoules than one, and diſturbe, yea, deſtroy the uniforme government of nature, by placing divers commanders in one body.

dy. Now if the ſoule hath a part, yea, the chiefeſt power in propagation; it were moſt abſurd to ſay, that all is ſpent in the producing of I know not what brutiſh thing, which is neither man nor beaſt. And ſeeing according to the rule of reaſon, ſuch as the cauſe is, ſuch alſo is the effect: how can it be but the ſoule muſt produce a ſoule, and cõſequently the whole man. the whole man.

6. The ſoule preſent in concepti-on.

Adde hereunto that the ſoule doth accompany the ſeede, and perfecteth the body from the very firſt conception, which not onely the ancient Philoſophers acknowledge as moſt agreeable to nature and reaſon; whence it is that nothing is more cõmon with *Ariſtotle*, than that the power of the ſoule is in the ſeed, making its owne houſe, fitly framing the bodily organs, and bringing them to the higheſt perfection that the firſt conſti-

Ariſt. de gen. anim. l. 2. cap. 3.

tution

tation of the matter is capable of: but even amongst our modern Philosophers and Divines, it is acknowledged, for such effects cannot be done without a soule, as the most acute *Scaliger* abundantly proveth. And if the soule informes the seede at the very instant of perfection, when there are as yet no organs, is it not more probable, that it is mediately propagated with the seede, than immediately created by GOD? Yes doubtlesse. Neither need any doubt how the rationall soule, can informe the seede without organs, I know that the chiefe, yea the only immediate organs of the soule are the spirits, and these are as well in the seede, as in the most perfect body.

Scal. Exerc. 6. Sect. 5.

The soule worketh the Embrio.

Although therefore there are, as yet, no eyes or eares, for the soule to heare or see with, yet there is worke enough for it, to heate and coole, moysten and dry;

dry; and thereby to seperate and conjoine, to thicken and thinne, to extend and contract, to make rough and smooth, to harden and soften: these and such other are the workes of the soule, whereby it doth ordaine, place, number, and forme the seede. For though they be the prime and secondary qualities of the elements, yet in such a naturall body, all are done by the power of the soule, and none of all can be done without it.

7. God the efficient cause.

Lastly, It appeareth that not nature, but God is the efficient cause of the soules procreation, because even elementary bodies cannot be produced without a more excellent efficient than themselves. For wee see that all naturall things, yea every plant that growes out of the earth, besides the materiall cause the elements, whereof it is compounded, and the seede whence it receiveth the forme, hath also

alſo an externall efficient cauſe, which certainly is the influence of the celeſtiall Orbes, who by cauſing motion, gives it the firſt hint and power of growing. And ſeeing the ſoule hath ſuch ſimilitude with theſe corporall natures, that though they have not matter and forme as they have; yet having a ſpirituall kinde of compoſition, which for likeneſſe juſtly meriteth the name: therefore as the ſpirituall matter and forme thereof is propagated from the parents by the ſeede; ſo it muſt alſo have a ſpirituall externall efficient cauſe more excellent than it ſelfe, which can be no other but the immediate power of God the father of ſpirits. For as all naturall bodyes have an efficient cauſe correſpondent to their natures, which in courſe of nature cannot be good immediately with whoſe nature they have ſo ſmall affinitie, yea, ſo

ſo great contrarietie: but theſe heavenly powers, with whom they have ſuch ſympathy, being of the ſame corporall nature, though of a more excellent temper: ſo the efficient cauſe of our ſoules muſt needs be agreeable to their natures, which cannot be the Starres, which are far inferior, but God who is alſo a ſpirit, and of a more excellent nature than our ſpirits; even as the Sunne is more glorious than theſe earthly ſubſtances: betweene whom there is ſuch ſympathy, that even as plants welke and fade, without the force of their efficients, that heavenly lampe the Sunne, and the reſt of thoſe celeſtiall orbes, but grow and flouriſh with them: ſo how a ſoule ſeperated from God and one united unto his and injoying the beames of his grace, is either miſerable or happy: we know in part, but cannot perfectly comprehend.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Reasons from other considerations.

Rarenesse of humane conceptiō.

BEsides these arguments taken from the ordinary course of generation, and the nature of the soule, divers other probable reasons may be produced. As first, the often failing, and indeed rarenesse of humane conception in comparison of other creatures, as common experience teacheth. Now if the soule be created after the perfecting of the body, then the first conception and breeding beeing by the power of nature onely, why should there not bee as much frequency and certainty in the propagation of mankind as of other creatures? This rarenesse of humane conception doth intimate unto us, that it is not by the power of nature alone that man is conceived in the

the wombe, but that there is ſome more ſpeciall worke of God in it, than in the generation of other creatures. And if it cannot be denyed but God hath ſuch a ſpeciall worke in the conception of man, why ſhould we not thinke that the ſoule hath its beginning then alſo, rather than (with reverence be it ſpoken) to put God to a double labour, and to ſet him twice on worke in every mans generation.

2. God ſhuld be tyed to nature.

And this may farther appeare, not only by teſtimony of Scripture, which makes conception to be a ſpeciall worke of God, and never mentioneth any extraordinary power, in the quickning & giving of ſoules to children: as when *Rachel* raſhly cryed out; *Give me children or elſe I dye*; *Jacob* gravely anſwereth, *Am I in Gods ſtead?* And ſo when *Boaz went in unto Ruth*, it is ſaid, *the Lord gave her conception*: but

even

even reason it selfe will evince it. For is it not an absurd thing, that God should waite our leisures, and be set on worke at our pleasures? And yet this must needs be, if God create soules after the forming of the body; for then the former being done by the power of nature, God shall be bound to give soules immediately whensoever nature produceth bodyes: unlesse hee should suffer children to be born without soules, or corrupt and kill their bodyes before they be informed, (and so indanger their mothers too) both which are both against nature and reason. Whereas if this mediate manner be admitted, this cannot justly be objected, for as much as God shall not then produce mans soule according to a particular immediate and new creation: but according to his almighty blessing, powerfull ordinance, and constant conserving

ving providence: which though it be somewhat more immediate in this than in other cases, yet it is still within the lists of nature, nature it selfe so requiring.

Yea farther it followeth, both by divine and naturall reason, that as God hath from eternitie decreed concerning man above all creatures, both who shall come into the world, and at what time: therefore accordingly he must needs have a work in mans conception above all other creatures. Which what can it be in the course of nature, but that he is the immediate efficient of mens soules, whereby he blesseth or blasteth, furthers or hinders, mans conception at the first, and so by a speciall providence, orders the same according to his owne most wise decree. And hence it is that men cannot propagate either what or when they will.

3. The excellency of mans nature requires it.

Againe,

4. God and nature should worke in vaine.

Againe, Otherwise this absurditie will also follow, that there are many children, begotten, conceived, formed, quickned with sense, and so well nigh perfected, and yet dying before the rationall soule be infused, they shall never rise againe at the end of the world; that God might be glorified in their salvation or damnation, unlesse he should then create new soules for un-informed bodyes. And this besides crossing the word of God, which teacheth that all that are conceived in sinne, must be punished in Christ or themselves, for the satisfying of Gods Justice: wee must absurdly frustrate the workes both of God and nature, notwithstanding, neither can doe any thing in vaine.

5. Unnatural conceptions voyde of reason.

Furthermore, It is manifest that not nature alone, but the efficient power of God is joyned with the propagation of soules,

ſoules, becauſe it is wholly denyed to ſuch copulations as are out of kinde. For nature alone would make a mixture, whereas notwithſtanding, we ſee that ſome kinde of creatures, as Apes and Satyres, which (as it is probable) were at firſt begotten by ſuch unkindly conjunctions, are not indued with reaſonable ſoules Or if not they, yet it is poſſible that humane ſeed ſhould be mingled with other creatures (for which cauſe buggery is forbidden in the Law) and yet ſuch iſſue is altogether ſouleleſſe, and voyde of reaſon: although it cannot be denyed but naturall ſenſe may be and is the more perfect in them, and ſo they more craftie than other creatures. They therefore make a monſtruous and prophane mingle-mangle that would have man propagate his like by the power of nature meerely, as other creatures doe.

On

6. Soules infused in adulterous generations.

On the other side it is plaine also, that it is not altogether immediately created by God without naturall meanes, because it is not denyed to children that are unlawfully begotten: for then God should seeme to approve of that which is evill. For albeit it is true (as it is commonly answered) that it is good in God to make stollen corne grow, because that order of nature is good, though the action of stealing bee naught, and there is no reason he should alter that good institution of nature, for the personall corruption of some men: yet this helpeth them not at all, who maintaine the immediate creation of the soule, but onely sreeth him in regard of this mediate manner and naturall order in propagating soules, which is indeed this way sufficiently answered. But if (as they say) there be no naturall order for the soules

pro

propagation, but they come immediately from God (he not being bound to infuse soules, but where he pleaseth) he cannot be free from tollerating, if not allowing and approving of evill in this behalfe. Whereas in the other, though he be not bound neither (unlesse by his owne band) yet he may lawfully by the just order of nature.

7. Sense ariseth out of the dead elements.

Moreover, Concerning the matter of the soule, seeing wee see by daily experience, that nature by vertue of Gods first ordination, doth out of the dead matter of the elements, continually produce so admirable powers, as seeing, hearing, &c. yea, common sense, phantasie, memory, and all those cogitative vertues which are in brute beasts; the manner of which working is above humane reason to conceive: how can it seeme strange that the God of nature

nature by his owne ſpeciall aſſiſtance, ſhould out of that farre more excellent and divine nature in man, produce others like unto it, though we cannot conceive the manner how? Even this well weighed, will adde no ſmall credit to this truth amongſt the wiſe.

The corporall ſeed a fit inſtrument.

Laſtly, That the corporall ſeede is a fit inſtrument for nature to uſe in ſo high a worke, is manifeſt enough in as much as it is of a more excellent temper, eſpecially the ſpirits therein, being more purely ſubtle, and temperate, than they are in any other creature in the world. And how this may farther the operation, and conſequently the propagation of the reaſonable ſoule, appeareth in that Elephants, who being of a more excellent temper, and comming neerer to the nature of man than other creatures, doe both live longer, and are (as I may ſay) indued

indued with more reasonable parts than others. So that although the soule cannot arise out of any elementary temper (as appeareth by the immortall nature, which even naturall reason is able to demonstrate;) yet there is no question, but it may bee instrumentally furthered or hindred thereby, yea even in the most excellent workes of reason, this beeing indeed one of the maine reasons in nature, why one man excelleth another in wisedome. Now then seeing the Spirits in humane seed are of such a transcendent nature, not meerely corporall, but approaching very neere to the nature of the soule, whereby they are soone acquainted and easily united, and used as the hand of the soule, even in the most divine operations of reason: why should they not much more be a fit instrument for the conveyance of the soule in naturall ge-

neration. And thus I have finished my taske in proving this manner of the soules propagation, both by divine and naturall reason.

Chap. XXIX.

An answer to some objections against this manner of propagation.

But now me-thinkes I heare some call me backe, saying, I contradict my selfe in that I say, and that even this meane way hath its extremities. Having therefore shewed that the soule of man can neither be immediately created by God, nor yet meerely propagated by man, and proved this middle way betweene both, both by Scripture and naturall reasons: I will now in the last place (that there may remaine no

no just scruple to cavill at) briefly answer some few Objections, which I conceive may be made more directly, even against this meane manner of the soules procreation, and so conclude.

Objections.

The Objections are these foure:

First, That the soule shall not be immortall, if it may be resolved into a former principle, namely, *Adams* soule from whence all came.

Secondly, God shall hereby still worke immediately in the creation of soules, and so shall not yet have ended his worke, and rest from his labours.

Thirdly, Man shall still be inferior to beasts, in that he cannot beget his like alone, but must have more helpe from God than they.

Lastly, God shall still be touched with sin, in being the immediate efficient of our sinfull

soules. All which may be as easily answered as objected.

1 *Obj.* That the soule must be mortall if it proceed from another.

For the first, first, although it is true, that all mixt bodyes may be againe resolved into their former principles the elements, whereof they are compounded, and out of which they arise: yet this is no impeachment to the soules immortalitie. For the comparison is unequall, and the causes nothing like, unlesse wee should say that all bodyes must returne into *Adams* also, whence they came as well as soules.

Secondly, Mixt bodyes are not the simple elements, but compounded of them: where as our soules are of the same nature, and no lesse simple than his was.

Thirdly, If it were compounded, yea, even of the elements, yet it would not presently follow, that it must needs be mortall, because corruption and death comes not onely, nor so

ſo much from propagation or compoſition, as from divine malediction, for death is the wages of ſinne, without which even *Adams* body ſhould have beene immortall, as well as his ſoule.

Laſtly, To this objection I will oppoſe an infallible concluſion, *viz.* that nothing can returne to nothing, but by the ſame meanes whereby it receives the firſt being. And hence it is that all creatures that are produced out of the elements by the power of nature, doe by nature reſolve into them againe: but becauſe mens ſoules cannot be propagated from their parents, but by the immediate power of GOD concurring, hence it neceſſarily followeth, that neither can they be againe diſſolved or annihilated but by the ſame omnipotent power. This therefore doth invincibly prove, ſo farre is it from diſ-

proving the ſoules immortalitie.

2 Obj. That God ſtill works in creating Soules.

For the ſecond, that God ſhall not yet reſt from his labour, but be ſtill ſet aworke in the creation of ſoules.

1. I anſwer, firſt, here is no creation of any new kind of creature, which they of the contrary part would have us to take for a ſufficient anſwer.

2. Secondly, Which is more, here is no new ſubſtance created of nothing, but onely produced out of former matter.

3. Thirdly, It nothing oppugnes Gods reſting, to worke immediately in ſome things, as by his holy Spirit in the hearts of Gods Elect: in ſuch things the Father worketh hitherto and the Sonne likewiſe. Ioh. 5. 17.

Laſtly, This worke is no part of creation properly, but of preſervation, which is ordinarily either mediate or immediate. Mediate, ſo all elementary creatures,

tures, and individuall natures, are preſerved by God; but by the meanes of nature or rather naturall meanes: but now nature it ſelfe, (or as I may ſay) the very nature or Symmetry of nature, is preſerved by his owne immediate power, there being no nature above nature, but onely his to preſerve it. And by the ſame immediate power it muſt needs be that the production of ſoules is conſerved: the excellency of whoſe nature, is ſuch as can have no naturall or mediate efficient cauſe, and therefore of neceſſitie it muſt be his immediate providence onely, and that even by courſe of nature.

To the third objection, that if mans generatiō requires more helpe from God than other creatures, his nature ſhall therein be ſtill inferiour to theirs.

3 Obj. That man ſhall ſtill be inferiour to other creatures.

I anſwer, That no creature can propagate the like alone, no

more than he; and that he doth as much in the generation of his like, as any other creatures doe in theirs. For it is well knowne, that in generation, besides the matter and forme, which proceeds from the generators, it is necessary that there should bee an efficient power, comming from an externall cause, which all grant to be the influence of the celestiall Orbes; whence is that common Proverb amongst Philosophers; *Sol & homo generant hominem*; now seeing man gives the matter and forme of the whole man, soule and body, though in regard of his soule, he hath a more excellent efficient than they, or rather the same efficient after a more excellent manner, that is, immediately: this is so farre from disparaging, that it exalteth mans nature above all other creatures in the world. Nevertheless, if man did not give both matter and

and forme, this were indeed justly objected, and he should be herein according to the order of nature inferiour to all others, as we heard before.

Lastly, The last objection, that God shall be touched with sinne in being the immediate efficient of our sinfull soules, is easily answered: for God is simply the efficient cause of the soule, and not of sin, but that comes from our corrupt parents, who supply the matter of the whole man, corrupt and sinfull like themselves. It being Gods just ordinance in nature; that as the tree is so should the fruit be. And thus sin is meerly accidentall in respect of God, who as he made man at the first perfect: so also this ordinance of generation, whereby he should have begotten children perfect like himselfe, but he by his fall corrupting himselfe, hath likewise corrupted all his posteritie, albeit

4 *Obj.* That God shall still be touched with sin.

Rom. 11. 16.

albeit God ſtill performes his part as perfectly as ever, in conferring of his efficient power for the producing of them. Thus then we ſee how the generation of men, which ſhould have been perfect, is become ſinfull through our faults, and not Gods, and why then God did not make man new againe, or ſtop ſin there, but continue his firſt inſtitution, might be ſufficiently cleared, but is not in this place to be diſputed.

CHAP. XXX.

The Concluſion, recapitulating the ſumme of the premiſſes.

Uſe of this Tractate.

IT is now time to conclude this ſo difficult a doctrine, which as in the beginning it ſeemed ſo hard that no words could ſufficiently explaine it, ſo now me thinkes it is ſo plaine and

and easie, that I feare nothing more than that I have insisted too long in the proofe of that which I thinke no man can or will deny; yet considering that such is the curiositie of some in this age, that are wittily acute, and such also the difficultie and necessitie of understanding this doctrine aright, that a mans life were well bestowed in giving full satisfaction therein; this short discourse I hope will not seeme over-long to the judicious.

I. The originall of the Soule.

I conclude therefore as before, first, that the soule is neither immediately created by God of nothing, nor yet meerly propagated by man without his immediate power: but that he hath instituted a naturall order whereby the whole man begets the whole man, both soule and body, and as well the one as the other. Not the soule the body, nor the body the soule, nei-

neither the soule the soule alone, nor the body the body alone, yet in this order, the soule the soule onely immediately, but mediately by the body: and the body the body onely immediately; but mediately by the soule. And thus in man the whole propagation, the whole, as concerning matter and forme as well as other creatures: albeit in the one the immediate power of GOD concurreth as an efficient cause, and naturall meanes onely, in the other.

2. The immortalitie of the soule.

From this naturall yet divine beginning, I also conclude the immortall nature and everlasting continuance of the soule. For seeing it is not produced by the power of nature alone, nor yet made of any corporall matter, but spirituall both for matter & manner, wherein it excelleth all other creatures, though united through Gods institution to the naturall generation:

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it must needs transcend the condition of all corporall creatures, as well in the end as in the originall, and so can be no lesse than immortall, though we goe no higher than the rules of nature.

Hence also I conclude, that all *Adams* off-spring are infected with that staine of nature which he contracted to himselfe by sin; which is propagated from parents to children, together with the whole man the subject thereof; and that without any fault in God, it being our act and not his, our sinfull soules proceeding not from him but our sinfull parents, and so not being corrupted by him, but by our selves in *Adam*. 3. Originall sinne.

And lastly, hereby also appeareth the puritie of Christs incarnation, who, though he were true man like unto us, and made of the same substance both for soule and body, yet was not 4. Christs incarnation.

pro-

propagated after the common manner of men, to avoide that infection of sin which wee receive in propagation.

Reasons to beleeve without reason.

Now if any cannot conceive, through the subtle conceit they have of it, how the soule should minister any matter to the producing of another (which I confesse is hardest;) yet considering that most of the most learned ancient Fathers and Schoolmen in former times, have allowed aëreall bodyes even to the Angels themselves: it cannot be thought absurd, that I ascribe such a spirituall composition to soules, as hath such a neere resemblance unto corporall matter and forme, as may well stand both with this manner of propagation and the divine nature of the soule. And if thus much be not granted, it cannot appeare in nature neither, how it can be united with the body, the one being in my conceit as hard

hard to conceive as the other. But seeing I see the one is, I beleeve the other may be. And further I adde that, that though this did seeme to disagree with reason, yet wee ought rather to beleeve it than the other which we plainly see doe disagree with Religion. But to conclude, seeing wee see the reason why wee cannot see the reason, let us not be so vainely curious to enquire, of that which we know certainly we cannot certainly know, let us content our selves a while not heathenishly to reason, but Christianly to beleeve, and shortly after this life, all these things shall be revealed unto us. Phil. 3. 15.

FINIS.

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